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**New-Build Gentrification and Anti-Gentrification
Movements in Seoul, South Korea**

By

Seon Young Lee

**Dissertation submitted to the Department of Geography
King's College London, in fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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Abstract

This research examines new-build, high-rise gentrification in Seoul, South Korea, and its social impact in the context of the developmental state and its legacy. Socio-spatial justice was ignored for the sake of rapid economic growth between the 1960s and 1980s under the authoritarian developmental state. These characteristics were reflected in spatial development processes and have continued to the present day, even though politics has been democratised and liberalised. Cities have been extensively redeveloped as growth machines by pro-growth coalitions, consisting of property owners, chaebols and the state, over the last three decades. Urban redevelopment in Korea has functioned as gentrification, causing large scale displacement and extensive social protest and conflict. Tenants have limited rights in the process of urban redevelopment, so their attempts to resist have not been successful at halting gentrification. Political and economic analyses of in-depth interviews and data gained through participant observation pertaining to the Yongsan urban redevelopment and property owners-led opposition movements has revealed the characteristics of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements. The developmental state has promoted gentrification at the expense of tenants and some property owners' economic, social and political rights. Even though the state has been the main beneficiary of gentrification, numerous property owners have joined pro-growth coalitions for their own profits. However, property owners have collectively formed opposition movements over the last five years, as many of them have realised the contradictions of the Korean urban redevelopment system and come to understand that it has been paving the way for gentrification. Property owners-led opposition movements have been pushing the state to come up with a different urban redevelopment system. Although the characteristics of the new social movements are rather ambiguous and sometimes contradictory, they have undoubtedly hindered and changed the direction of urban redevelopment and the overall housing system.

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List of Abbreviations

GBT	Government Briefing Taskforce
JRP	Joint Redevelopment Project
KCHR	Korea Coalition for Housing Rights
KLDC	Korea Land Development Corporation
KNHC	Korea National Housing Corporation
KOSIS	Korean Statistical Information Service
NCFE	National Coalition for Victims of Forced Evictions
NCHC	Nationwide Coalition for Housing Countermeasures
NCPO	Nationwide Coalition of Property Owners for Immediate Counteraction to Urban Redevelopment
POAR	Property owners' Association for Redevelopment
REO	Residential Environment Organization
SCFE	Seoul Council of the Centre for Victims of Forced Evictions
SFHD	South Korean Federation against Housing Demolition
SMG	Seoul Metropolitan Government
YGG	Yongsan Gu Government

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Chapter 1: Introduction

“People are here!”

On 20th January 2009 in Central Seoul, South Korea (hereafter Korea), 30 protesters cried “people are here” when 300 riot police started to repress them. Tenants and members of the South Korean Federation Against Housing Demolition in the urban redevelopment area of Yongsan went up to the rooftop of a building listed for demolition in order to resist forced eviction and publicise the problems caused by urban redevelopment. However, they were not given much time to make their voices heard and were suppressed by the police and demolition thugs hired by chaebol construction companies just one day after they started their protest (*the Kyunghyang Sinmun*, 20th January 2014). Five citizens and one policeman lost their lives as a result of an accidental fire which started during the riot police suppression.

This incident, referred to as the Yongsan disaster or tragedy, is one of the most prominent examples showing how quickly Korea has developed and reshaped urban built environments over the last six decades. Spatial development mechanisms have been dominated by state interventions, and citizens have limited rights in the development process. This has caused major social conflicts around urban and housing redevelopment, and these sometimes spill over into violence and state repression. This thesis asks why many citizens continue to be vulnerable to urban redevelopment processes, and explores how their rights can be improved by investigating new-build gentrification in Seoul. This chapter sets up the context for the rest of this thesis. Section 1.1 reviews the background of the research. Section 1.2 discusses the theoretical framework utilised in this thesis. Section 1.3 is concerned with elaborating on the research aims, questions and the wider significance of this research. Section 1.4 presents the structure of this thesis.

1.1 Background of the Research

Korea has witnessed huge economic growth, rapid industrialisation and fast pace of urbanisation over a short period. Immediately after the Korean War (1950–1953), GNP per capita was only \$67 USD, but this had dramatically increased to \$22,708 USD by 2012 (BOK, 2012). Korea has become the 11th biggest economy in the world, and is the first country that once received foreign aid to now provide aid to other countries (*The Economist*, 12th November 2011). The crucial driver of this remarkable development is the role of the state. It can be argued that the differences between the production of urban built environments in Korea and the production of urban built environments in the West can be attributed, in part, to the nature of the Korean state. Korea is one of a group of East Asian states often termed developmental states. The state worked closely with large corporations called ‘chaebols’ between the 1960s and 1980s, directing and controlling the economy and society. Urban development and housing policies in Korea were vehicles for the promotion of state-led industrialisation and compressed growth. These policies achieved economic growth and physical improvements, but also increased spatial inequality, destroyed communities, marginalised the urban poor and distributed the profits from development unequally. This situation has continued to the present day, although politics has been democratic and liberal since the June democracy movement in 1987. Around three decades of post-dictatorship transformation have reformed the economy, politics and society in Korea. Great political problems have been solved over the last three decades, but the influence or legacy of the developmental state seems to be strengthening – especially over urban redevelopment processes at the urban level and the local politics level.

The state has driven urban redevelopment projects in city centres and inner city areas during the last decade. Urban redevelopment policies in many cities are almost identical, and promote the construction of super high-rise, mixed-use flats. The definition of super high-rise flats has continuously changed as technology and perceptions have advanced. The Building Act 2–19 defines a high-rise building as a building with a height of more than 120m or 30 storeys; however, there is no definition of super high-rise flats. Flats with more than 40 storeys have

been dubbed super high-rise flats since the 2000s, and have become symbols of the well-to-do (Kwon, 2007:16). A super high-rise tower block is considered a 'golden egg' that can guarantee a huge profit. The construction of these blocks is strongly influenced by capital from property estate developments. Cities have changed, and they now have increasing numbers of expensive super high-rise mixed use flats. City centres are attracting the residence of well-off people rather than those from low income households.

The impact of these redevelopment plans has been extensive. It is not common to leave land as brown fields in Korea because there is not enough land for urban development (Cho, 2011b). Therefore, it is almost impossible to avoid conflict between and displacement of the many actors involved with these developments. Tenants were totally excluded from the urban redevelopment process, whereas property owners considered urban redevelopment a chance for capital accumulation. Urban redevelopment was totally driven by property owners, the power of real estate developer capital and the state. This caused extensive resistance from tenants, but their attempts were not able to halt redevelopment processes completely. According to a report by the Seoul Institute, the total area (23.8km²) designated for the urban redevelopment project called the 'New Town Project' after 2003 is almost 2.4 times larger than the total area (10.1km²) designated for redevelopment between 1973 and 2003 in Seoul (Jang and Yang, 2008:iii). When considered along with the land areas designated for other urban redevelopment projects, the total area is substantial. Therefore, the potential for social conflicts and protests is stronger now than it was in the past. However, tenants' struggles did not draw much attention from the public and the media before the Yongsan incident.

The Yongsan incident drew attention from the general public. Many citizens demonstrated peacefully by participating in a yearlong candlelight vigil, asking the government for an apology and requesting that similar redevelopments be halted. The media started to report the detrimental effects of the current urban redevelopment system rather than simply printing property advertisements and biased market news. This led to discussion of a law to protect tenants from forced and violent eviction. However, the Supreme Court took issue with the

illegality of tenants' resistance to legal redevelopment, disregarding the illegality of excessive suppression by the state and capital. This incident has not yet been completely resolved. The families of victims are demanding that the truth be revealed and that the people in charge be punished. Many people continue to be displaced and evicted from their homes, workplaces and neighbourhoods by urban redevelopment projects that aim to build luxury super high-rise flats. The general public still has limited power to change the urban redevelopment system. However, social attention to socio-spatial justice and inequality is growing and more citizens are demanding a different city that considers universal welfare and fairness. The concept of what makes a good society and city has been redefined. Several meaningful attempts, from the state level to the grassroots level, have been made to establish better housing policies and urban planning approaches. Consequently, the existing system and government directives have become less powerful since a variety of reforms were attempted. The implementation of reforms has accelerated since the new Mayor of Seoul took office in 2011.

Urban redevelopment policies have been driven by urban strategies crafted to attract capital and affluent people. Urban redevelopment in the Korean urban context is directly connected to social upgrading through improvements to the physical environment. All areas after urban redevelopment are gentrified in the sense that they experience an upwards shift in the social class of their residents; in many cases, earlier residents have to leave their homes. Therefore, gentrification in Korea has been considered equivalent to urban redevelopment, housing renewal, urban renewal and urban regeneration in previous empirical research. Although urban redevelopment policies in Korea have implied social or class issues, the term 'urban redevelopment' has been in use for a long time and does not cover these issues as it should. The earlier terms such as urban redevelopment are often considered class-neutral, and do not take into account the social cost of urban redevelopment and the social inequality it causes. Indeed, it seems to disguise the uneven benefit distribution that tends to emerge from urban redevelopment policies. Although the Korean state has continuously changed the name of urban redevelopment policies (e.g. the Joint Redevelopment Project, Urban Regeneration and the New

Town Project), 'urban redevelopment' is essentially a sugar-coated term and another name for gentrification. It is state-led, new-build gentrification that normally results in large scale displacement of existing residents. Gentrification is a useful label for the contemporary urban socio-spatial changes triggered by urban redevelopment processes in Korea, but the form, nature and scale of gentrification in Korea are very different from how they are in Western gentrification.

In general, property owners are in favour of urban redevelopment since it improves the exchange value of their property. Some of them have asked the state to designate their area as an urban redevelopment district. However, property owners also emerged as major actors standing in resistance to urban redevelopment in the late 2000s and have pushed the state to change urban redevelopment plans; in the same period, tenant movements appeared relatively weak. The long-lasting idea of there being a division between winners (property owners) and losers (tenants) seems to have been partly broken over the last five years. Social conflicts over urban redevelopment have become more complicated and expanded along with existing conflicts. Anti-gentrification movements have taken place in many areas following the Yongsan incident. In contrast, urban redevelopment plans in Yongsan seem to have progressed smoothly and no significant collective action has been taken by tenants or property owners in the area. They would have been in a position to take more action than those in other redevelopment areas, since they observed the outcome of the Yongsan incident area more closely. This lack of protest can be explained by the power mechanisms embedded in the Korean urban redevelopment system, which lead to gentrification.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

Gentrification and anti-gentrification movements are both the results and parts of the dynamic power relations that exist between the strong state, capital and relatively weak civil society in Korea. These are linked to greater economic and political power issues, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. As will be seen in the next chapters about East Asia and Korea, social

relations in developmental states are clearly governed by political and economic processes. There has been an oligarchy of wealth and power for a long time. A select few have ruled over the majority by controlling resource distribution. The potential for protest has been significant, but its occurrence and success have not been great since oppression has been systemised (Young, 1990). Therefore, a political economy approach can help to identify the dynamics of power relations and identify the key actors and their relationships:

Political economy analysis isessentially concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society. It focuses on the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and on the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time. When applied to situations of conflict and crisis, political economy analysis seeks to understand both the political and the economic aspects of conflict, and how these combine to affect patterns of power and vulnerability (Collinson, 2003:10).

The political economy approach helps us to understand who has power, who does not and why this makes a difference. In other words, it provides an explanation of who the winners and losers are and how their relationships change in the face of resistance. Political economy analysis is particularly useful for understanding the shifting forms of control over urban built environments (e.g. Harvey, 1976, 1978). For Harvey, political economy analysis means investigating the cyclical patterns of urban growth and change. Logan and Molotch (1987) explain the different aspects of urban change in terms of the political economy of place. Their urban growth thesis attempts to explain how social interest groups exercise their power and establish allies in order to boost their profits. It can help to explain who the city builders are, since political and economic imperatives have played a key role in property development (Healey et al., 1992, Fainstein, 1994). In a nutshell, political economy analysis plays a key role in understanding urban power and how its workings have changed over time.

Recognition of the uneven power positions that complicated the ideals of discursive planning along with a historically and economically situated critique of political philosophy are at the heart of the political economy approach to justice (Connolly and Steil, 2009:4).

Connolly and Steil (2009) argue that political economy analysis continues to play a strong role in defending the importance of democracy, equality and fairness in terms of urban space. Understanding structural inequalities provides a basis for challenging the dominant relations

between the powerful and the powerless. It can help to facilitate changes for the future. Therefore, a broad political economy analysis was chosen to explain how people have tried to rebalance asymmetrical power relations and how these attempts have influenced and been influenced by political and economic processes.

1.3 Research Aims, Questions and the Significance of the Research

Many researchers in Korea have provided significant conceptual and empirical explanations of the production of high rise residential space by urban redevelopment and its social impact. However, further research into the issues they cover is needed. Plenty of research has pointed out the negative effects of urban redevelopment systems over the last three decades: the lack of the public sector's role, the lack of citizen participation in the decision-making process, unreasonable profits which construction companies earn through urban redevelopment, and conflicts between property owners and tenants (Kim, 1989, Kim, 1998a, Seo, 1995, Lee, 2008b, Chang, 2010, Ryu and Son, 2010, Byeon, 2011, Kim and Jeong, 2011). Various solutions to these problems have been suggested. These studies draw attention to the scope and scale of the disruption residents in urban redevelopment areas have suffered. However, there are few recent and in-depth empirical studies addressing the rise and fall of the anti- and pro-urban redevelopment coalitions. This is surprising given the heated discussion currently ongoing over urban redevelopment plans and their future.

Also, while previous research has examined the processes and outcomes of urban redevelopment, it has not embraced the contemporary phenomenon of social interest groups which have been involved with and influenced urban redevelopment and anti-urban redevelopment movements. The effect of these social interest groups has not been considered as a whole. Images of power relations in urban redevelopment have been based on stereotypes. Property owners are often described as beneficiaries of urban redevelopment backed by the state and chaebol construction companies, whereas tenants have been portrayed as the victims of urban redevelopment. However, it is important to remember that these stereotypes are no longer

wholly relevant today. In fact, anti-urban redevelopment coalitions have recently helped to create a range of new policy measures, although pro-urban redevelopment coalitions have continued to fast-track urban redevelopment as they always have done. In reflecting on the effects of pro- and anti-urban redevelopment coalitions in urban politics, this thesis sheds light on property owners' attempts to both initiate and stop urban redevelopment over the last five years.

In assessing the negative effects of the production of urban built environments in the West, many scholars have contrasted the interests of commercial development (exchange value) and those of community preservation (use value). Most research into the anti-gentrification movement has described working class communities' and residents' struggles against middle class newcomers (classic gentrification) and state policy (new-build gentrification). In contrast, state-led restructuring in urban spaces has prevailed in the East Asian urban context, so anti-gentrification movements are often equivalent to social conflicts between the state and residents (see chapters 2 and 3). However, social conflicts over gentrification in Korea have manifested differently. The Korean urban redevelopment system has created complicated power mechanisms and blurred power relations between winners and losers. It has produced a myriad of confrontations: the state vs. residents, property owners vs. tenants, owner occupiers vs. absentee landlords and so on. These complicated dimensions of social interaction and urban redevelopment need various explanations to illuminate the dynamics that surround them. In order to consider the full magnitude of urban redevelopment and its impact in Korea, this thesis draws on four powerful concepts: growth machines, developmental states, gentrification and urban social movements (see chapters 2 and 3). These four concepts provide theoretical frameworks for examining the production of high-rise residential space and the consequent social resistance to urban redevelopment. Also, they show that in Korea there are similarities and differences in urban restructuring and its social impact in comparison with other countries.

Firstly, the concept of growth machines provides a wider analytical framework for the production of the built environment in capitalist societies. Growth machines explain the political

and economic factors underpinning the production of urban built environments. They focus on the links between states (central and local) and developers, and the emergence of planning policies in favour of large-scale development. Growth machines set the context for the analysis and practice of urban redevelopment in Korea by focusing on similarities between Korea and Western capitalist countries. However, the characteristics of urban redevelopment and its social impact in Korea differ considerably from Western countries, as shown in section 1.1. In order to capture differences, it is important to examine the role of the developmental state. The developmental state is responsible for the different nature of spatial planning and urban redevelopment in East Asia compared to that of Western countries. It provides an explanation for the strong state and limited citizens' rights in Korea.

The Korean developmental state, aiming for rapid modernisation and economic growth, regarded the city as a growth machine and has conducted urban redevelopment projects to foster economic growth. The central and local state, as well as developers and property owners, have formed pro-growth coalitions which share similar goals and work together to promote urban redevelopment. In contrast, it has been the lack of protection for existing residents which has resulted in displacement caused by urban redevelopment. The pro-growth coalitions have considerable power to acquire land and clear old housing for the construction of new flats and to actively displace existing low-income residents in favour of high-income newcomers. Both growth machines and the developmental state harness key features of Korean urban redevelopment in the process of gentrification.

Urban redevelopment in Korea has provoked various forms of resistance, from individuals in each urban redevelopment area to collective movements across a city. As the form of gentrification varies from one country to another, anti-gentrification movements in Korea also appear to differ in nature from their counterparts in Western countries. The protests have not won support across Korea. The occurrence of protests, the composition of the opposition groups and the goals of anti-gentrification movements in Korea have been dissimilar to those in the West. The concept of urban social movements is helpful in evaluating and comparing social

conflicts and collective movements in Korea and the West. The examination of urban social movements and the literature on gentrification helps to advance understanding of the power mechanisms involved in gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea. However, it is necessary to avoid simply transplanting Western urban theory into Korean cities, which have their own context. The concepts of gentrification and urban social movements in Korea are therefore examined in the context of the developmental state and its legacy. This different development path has affected the parties supporting and opposing gentrification in Korea. Using the four concepts mentioned previously– growth machines, developmental states, gentrification and urban social movements – this research aims to develop greater understanding of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea. The following overall research question is explored further in a case study in Yongsan, Seoul: how and why have anti-urban redevelopment movements evolved and influenced urban redevelopment in Korea after the Yongsan incident?

In order to achieve the research aim, four interlinked research objectives have been formulated and investigated in terms of political economic perspectives.

1. To shed light on gentrification in relation to urban redevelopment in Korea and critically assess the urban redevelopment processes that underpin the actions of the developmental state.
2. To explore growth machines that mediate the influence of the various stakeholders in urban redevelopment policy making processes in order to reflect upon the power dynamics.
3. To identify the key players in urban redevelopment in Korea, and explain how they are brought together to work either for or against urban redevelopment
4. To critically engage with urban redevelopment-led socio-spatial problems and identify future challenges requiring innovative work by the state and grassroots bodies in Korea.

5. To make links to the international context by describing the similarities and differences between social conflicts and interest over urban redevelopment, gentrification, displacement and urban social movements

1.4 The Structure of the Thesis

Following this introduction, the remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 seek to establish an overall theoretical framework. Chapter 2 sets out the ways in which the urban built environment in capitalist societies has been reshaped. It starts with Harvey's theory regarding urbanisation and, the circuits of capital, which explains the relationship between capital accumulation and urban space. This chapter also argues for the role of urban planning in controlling urban development in market based economies. In order to outline how urban planning and urban policy are involved in socio-spatial development and social conflict at the local level, the chapter reviews literature that has considered the role of pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions in urban politics. It identifies a key concept that of growth machines, for the purpose of this research. Arguments about growth machines need to be applied carefully outside of the Western context, since the political economies of newly industrialised countries in East Asia have followed very different political and economic development paths. A particular focus in this argument is the importance of the developmental state theory. The contextual similarities and differences between East Asia and the West show how urban politics has dealt with spatial development and housing policies. This analysis leads to a discussion of gentrification, which is a typical confrontation over socio-spatial changes caused by capital accumulation in a particular area.

Chapter 3 builds upon arguments of social resistance and urban protest over urban redevelopment, housing, gentrification and displacement. This chapter looks at sophisticated urban social movements under diverse conditions. It begins with a brief review of the history of urban social movements in the West, since Castells introduced the term 'urban social movements' in the 1970s. It shows the success and failure of social protests across time and

space. It then attempts to outline a typology of urban social movements in order to examine the similarities and differences between the West and East Asia when it comes to the development of civil society. It shows how the different developmental paths in the two regions have affected the characteristics of urban social movements. It then examines the implications and application of the ‘right to the city’ principle in the context of urban social movements. It attempts to create a workable definition of the ‘right to the city’ from a massive pool of literature and discusses how to apply this concept to the East Asian urban context.

Chapter 4 presents the research design adopted for this thesis. It combines an outline of the methodology with personal experiences gained from fieldwork. This research was facilitated by the use of empirical data derived from a multi-method case study conducted in Yongsan, Seoul, where urban redevelopment has been ongoing over the last decade. Chapter 4 first discusses a case study approach which shapes research design. Then, this chapter discusses the selection of the case study area and its background. This chapter explores the methodological issues presented by document analysis, interviews, questionnaire surveys, and participant observation. This chapter outlines the limitations and strengths of each data collection method. Also, it discusses analysis methods and some issues around data analysis and writing up. Lastly, this chapter closes with reflections on research practice and design.

Chapter 5 provides a narrative overview of the history of Korea’s political and economic development, charting its gradual evolution since the early 1960s from an authoritarian developmental state into a democratic state. This chapter shows how the politics and economy of Korea have influenced civil society and vice versa. Since local governments gained autonomy in the early 1990s, local politics has played an important role in determining urban and housing policies along with broader socio-economic and political changes. Local governments have taken a developmental state position in connection with urban development and housing policies. After a general review considering Korea’s political and economic development, this chapter demonstrates how urban and housing policies have become a means of stimulating economic growth under the developmental state. This chapter also reviews the

civil resistance experienced in Korea over economic and political changes. It shows how Korean society and social movements have developed and are interwoven with political and economic transformations.

Chapter 6 offers a more detailed consideration of the institutional and organisational contexts and structures that facilitate urban redevelopment. It reveals the triangular partnership formed by the state, chaebols and property owners, and considers how this has paved the way for urban redevelopment. It examines how this partnership has played an important role in spatial development. The state has implemented many urban redevelopment programmes in order to improve residential environments, and compulsory purchase orders have been used to promote urban redevelopment. However, the compulsory purchase and limited compensation system has led to severe social conflict and socio-spatial inequality. Urban redevelopment has strengthened the commodification of space and housing, the violation of property and housing rights, and social polarisation. This chapter shows how urban redevelopment in Korea works as a gentrification process, and considers the scope of the 1980s anti-urban redevelopment movements led by powerless groups in urban redevelopment areas. In addition, it investigates the evolution of the middle class and the importance of condominium ownership in the urban redevelopment arena, since these two elements have played crucial roles in gentrification.

Chapters 5 and 6 provide a preliminary discussion of the production of the urban built environment and social interaction in the Korean context. These two chapters develop the theoretical frameworks and make it possible to conduct useful empirical analyses in the later chapters. The emphasis is on the serious limitations on control over commercial development within the organisational context, in which the production of urban built environments occurs, and the lack of grassroots involvement and influence. These issues are taken up in the following three chapters in connection with the theoretical approaches presented in chapters 2 and 3.

Chapter 7 explores the formation and mobilisation of pro-urban redevelopment coalitions in Seoul. The H urban redevelopment area in Yongsan is used to investigate how a number of

different property based interests have been brought together and made to work. Interviews and observational data are used to examine how each interest has helped to reshape urban redevelopment politics. It sets out the characteristics of the key players in Korean gentrification and the gentrifiers themselves. The chapter also gives voices to people who have been overlooked in existing literature: silent and passive property owners, and tenants who are particularly vulnerable to displacement. Understanding these passive and silent parties gives additional insights into how the Korean profit driven urban redevelopment system has operated over the last three decades, and helps throw light on the problems it has caused.

Chapter 8 takes as its central theme the new anti-urban redevelopment movements in Seoul, which property owners have actively participated in over the last five years. It unravels the characteristics of these movements, which clearly do not fit into the pattern of previous anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea. Drawing upon interviews and observational data, this chapter shows how new social movements have emerged and what has changed urban redevelopment politics. This chapter clarifies the ambiguity of the new movements by examining key questions: Where have these movements taken place? Who has taken part in them? What are their goals? and How have they been mobilised? This chapter also discusses the nature and extent of the new movements and their limitations after exploring how local politics has been changed by property owners-led opposition movements.

Chapter 9 discusses the political implications of this thesis, what needs to be done and how by drawing upon the findings presented in chapters 7 and 8. This chapter explores policy and legislative changes in the fields of redevelopment, housing, and public participation in the planning decision-making process. It looks at new attempts made at the grassroots level which have managed to enrich civil society and make grassroots democracy more robust. It outlines the evolution of anti-urban redevelopment movements, and the recent challenges to urban redevelopment and housing policies which have driven changes in civil society. It delves into a discussion of how to make a difference in terms of ideas relating to the just city and the right to the city.

Finally, chapter 10 summarises the preceding chapters and provides a concluding discussion which aligns the research findings thematically to the research questions. This chapter outlines the research contributions and suggests agendas and directions for future research.

Chapter 2: The Production of Urban Built Environments

“If New York City is a business, it isn't Wal-Mart... It's a high-end product, maybe even a luxury product” (The Mayor of New York, Michael R. Bloomberg from *New York Times*, 8th January 2003).

“The city is a product, so the city's brand value is important. When the brand value is high, the city is sold well at the global market. In order to increase the brand value of Seoul, I introduce a new urban master plan. This urban plan can make Seoul to become one of the world top 10 cities” (The Mayor of Seoul, Oh Se-Hoon, 14th June 2007 from the SMG (2007:46)).

Although these two mayors delivered their addresses in different places and at different times, their goal – finding a direction for contemporary urban growth—is identical. Their mutual goal is to enhance their cities' competitiveness by rebuilding them into valuable commodities. In his book *Triumph of the City*, Glaeser (2011) argues that “[the] city is our greatest invention which makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier and happier”. He argues that restrictions on land use need to be lifted in order to make cities denser and buildings higher. He insists that this would help to prevent slum expansion and urban sprawl, since the building supply would meet public demand. In contrast, others consider this kind of urban restructuring to be a man-made monster which causes the death of communities and diversity (Jacobs, 1961). These different views on how to use or reshape cities conflict with each other, and cities have become complex and highly contested places as a result.

These contrasting approaches do not simply ask whether one neighbourhood or city has to be preserved or developed. They imply more complicated issues, such as who gets what, where and how. This raises a critical question about citizens' economic and political power over their everyday lives. It is very important to make decisions on how to restructure our cities and how to form agreements between many interest groups. The decision-making processes should be democratic, and the benefits of urban restructuring should ideally be distributed to all citizens. However, this decision-making process is often dominated by a few people in power rather than the majority. Decisions are often advantageous to developers who pursue profit, whereas citizens bear all the costs and burdens of development. As a result, the main function of the city

– which is to serve as our habitat – has been ignored, and cities have become property machines (Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975) and growth machines (Molotch, 1976, Logan and Molotch, 1987).

When cities are considered commodities, the most important decisions in urban development are often made to pursue economic interests. The benefits of urban development are unequally distributed to society. Urban restructuring is confronted by urban resistance in a myriad of ways, with forms of resistance including protests, riots and urban social movements. These are attempts by the powerless to resist unfair processes in their cities. However, conflicts between the interests of capital and citizens have usually ended up with the victory of capital interests. Cities have been constantly transformed in order to facilitate or increase capital accumulation. This is due to the fact that the urban built environment functions as a container for and facilitator of economic activity, which is one of the most critical elements when it comes to boosting urban economies and growth (Fainstein, 1994).

In light of this context, this chapter examines the political and economic factors underpinning the production of urban built environments in capitalist societies. This chapter sets the context for understanding Korean experiences by reviewing the similarities and differences between the West and East Asia. The general relationship between capital and urban space in advanced capitalist societies is investigated in section 2.1. This includes the role of urban planning in capitalist societies, since urban planning plays a significant role in the production of space. Logan and Molotch's growth machine theory is used in section 2.2 to explain how urban growth has been driven by local growth coalitions. When it comes to applying Western theories outside the Western context, we need to be aware of the risks inherent in generalising theories produced in a particular context. Hence, section 2.3 explores the East Asian context which has followed a different developmental path compared to the advanced capitalist countries in Western Europe and North America. This section focuses on how developmental states in East Asia have affected spatial development and housing policies, unlike their Western counterparts. Section 2.4 reviews gentrification literature from classic gentrification through to contemporary

gentrification. Gentrification is a representative example to show how urban conflict can be triggered by changes to the socio-spatial structure. The phenomenon of new-build gentrification, a type of contemporary gentrification, can be used to explain the current urban reshaping process in East Asia, so this section focuses on how the state and capital are involved with new-build gentrification.

2.1 Capital and Urban Restructuring in Capitalist Societies

Urban built environments are continuously transformed as new buildings replace old ones. Sometimes, old buildings are still habitable and functional but they are nonetheless demolished and replaced by new ones. Pahl (1970:151) discussed the relationship between spatial structure and social structure, offering a profound explanation for this phenomenon:

The built environment is the result of conflicts in the past and present, between those with different degrees of power in society...As the balance of power changes and ideologies rise and fall so the built environment is affected. It is a continuing situation, with the past constraining the present and together binding and limiting the future... The social structure is the key to the spatial structure and until we understand how a given socio-economic system places people with regard to fundamental scarce resources.

As Pahl has pointed out, spatial structure shapes social structure and vice versa. Lefebvre (1991:286) argues that “[space] is not only supported by social relations but it is also producing and produced by social relations”. Ultimately, we need to explore who decides what is produced, how they achieve production and for whom production is initiated in order to understand how and why the urban space has changed and will continue to change. In spite of the importance of this, it is not straightforward to determine the precise relationship between spatial structure and social structure. To do this, we need to decipher the complexities of the economic, social and political conditions within the city and beyond it.

However, urban space is unquestionably a product of the capitalist mode of production in market economies (Harvey, 1976, 1978, 1987). Production, consumption and reproduction of the urban built environment in capitalist societies are all associated with capital accumulation. Urbanisation patterns and trends are dominated by economic activities (Smith and Feagin, 1987). Harvey (1978) outlined the ground-breaking theoretical framework of capital switching,

which considers how capital is accumulated in the urban built environment. Harvey argues that any surplus value from the primary circuit can be invested into a secondary circuit, which produces fixed capital that can assist with production and consumption

This schema of capital switching in circuits helps to illuminate why ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ occur in built environments. In order to understand urbanisation patterns, we need to take a close look at the secondary circuit.

A general condition for the flow of capital into the secondary circuit is therefore the existence of a functional capital market and perhaps a state willing to finance and guarantee long-term, large scale projects with respect to the creation of the built environment. At times of over accumulation, a switch of flows from the primary to the secondary circuit can be accomplished only if the various manifestations of over accumulation can be transformed into money capital which can move freely and unhindered into these forms of investment. This switch of resources cannot be accomplished without a money supply and credit system which creates ‘fictional capital’ in advance of actual production and consumption (Harvey, 1978:107).

Harvey’s theory has had an immense impact on our understanding of how the urban built environment is produced and consumed. However, there is little empirical research to support his theory (King, 1989a, 1989b, Beauregard, 1994, Christophers, 2011), since it does not straightforwardly show the relationship between urbanisation and capital circulation. This relationship is more unclear in the process of capital accumulation in the East Asian context, since East Asian states tend to control the distribution of economic resources. Therefore, the circuit of capital needs to be seen as a process of state-led capital accumulation and urbanisation. However, the main idea can help to explain the relationship between capital accumulation and capital mobility. It can also help to reveal the central mechanism that drives urban change for the purposes of profit maximisation. Before Harvey, Lefebvre (1976:34) emphasised the essence of capital mobility:

More precisely, the real estate cycle has long been a subsidiary economic sector; little by little, it is becoming a parallel sector heading towards integration into the normal production consumption cycle, although it is normally a compensatory investment sector when the production-consumption cycle slackens or when there are freak recessions. Capital investment thus finds a place of refuge in the real estate sector, a supplementary and complementary territory for exploitation.

As a result of this capital mobility, urban transformation is not evenly distributed in terms of location. New spaces and locations, and even sometimes old ones which have been abandoned, acquire new meaning. Smith (2010:197) explains this transformation of the direction of development as the “seesaw movement of capital”:

Behind the extant pattern of uneven development lies the logic and the drive of capital toward what we shall call the seesaw movement of capital. If the accumulation of capital entails geographical development and if the direction of this development is guided by the rate of profit then we can think of the world as a profit surface produced by capital itself... Capital moves to where the rate of profit is highest (or at least high) and these moves are synchronised with the rhythm of accumulation and crisis.

Due to the urbanisation of capital (Harvey, 1985), large property owners have power to initiate various urban developments and also have bargaining strength in relation to the public authorities. In contrast, people without property are powerless in urban development processes. The gap between ‘the haves’ and ‘the have nots’ in terms of power distribution is not easy to lessen, since property owners can take advantage of their property in many ways. Harvey (2003:34) makes a point about this power relationship by quoting Hannah Arendt:

A never-ending accumulation of property must be based on a never-ending accumulation of power...The limitless process of capital accumulation needs the political structure of so unlimited a power that it can protect growing property by constantly growing more powerful.

There is no free competition for space among users in the market economy, since capital driven economic activity is the most dominant factor in urbanisation patterns. It is difficult to reshape urban space for people who do not have any property, because of the established power distribution structure. A place, a community or a city could shrink due to market driven development, leading to land use intensification to achieve increased profitability. Some forms of public space meant for all citizens is transformed into private recreation areas for the same reason (Defilippis, 1997). The private sector’s profit seeking activities prevail at the expense of the public. However, this is not only the result of capital interests; it is also influenced by state interests. King (1987:220) underlined the role of both the central and local state in determining urbanisation patterns, along with economic interests:

In relation to cities state managers generally pursue their own interests in the aggrandizement of power and resources and specifically have interests in the viability of cities which do not simply reflect the interests of private capital or any other societal group. Their general objectives derive from the concrete interest of public officials, elective and appointive in maintaining the political institutions and relationships which underpin their power, status and privilege.

This interpretation of the role of the state in urbanisation patterns is in line with Mollenkopf's analysis of US federal urban redevelopment programmes:

Fundamental to the idea of a pro-growth coalition is that political entrepreneurs can bring together widely different, competing, and even conflicting political actors and interests by creating new governmental bases for exercising new powers which none of these actors and interests could otherwise have exercised on its own... Pro-growth political coalitions thus provide a framework for the creation and exercise of power (Mollenkopf, 1983:4).

This argument could be helpful when looking at the East Asian and Korean urban context, since here the state has had a more dominant role in its relationship with capital, as will be explained in subsequent chapters. Savitch (1988:9) points out that "the state is neither incapable of efficient planning nor necessarily a handmaiden for capitalism". He claims that urban transformation in three post-industrial cities (New York, London and Paris) was determined by how the state distributed economic resources (Savitch, 1988:7).

If the state and urban planners are concerned about social justice and social welfare for powerless groups, it is theoretically possible for them to implement redistributive urban planning through their legislative powers. Unlike elected politicians, most bureaucrats working in local planning authorities are unaffected by election outcomes and can stay in their positions regardless of the political situation. Therefore, urban planning designed by the state could be an alternative that would protect disadvantaged groups and direct urban planning with the goal of reshaping the city's fabric and structure for the benefit of all. A significant difference can be made by expert bureaucrats with the view that they are "social gatekeepers who help to distribute and control urban resources" (Pahl, 1970:6). However, the central and local states generally use urban policies for their political benefit or to serve the interests of capitalism. Fainstein (1999:249) argues that:

The profession of city planning was born of a vision of the good city...City planners aimed at creating a city where the insalubrious environment and social structure of industrial capitalism would be defeated by a reordering of physical and social arrangements, even while its bounty continued. The hope was that all citizens could attain the benefits of beauty, community, and democracy not through revolutionary means but through the imposition of reason.

Fainstein criticises the urban planners of today for not helping to achieve this original vision, and emphasises that planning should help to achieve values that add to urban value, values such as equality, diversity, and democracy. Urban planners control urban development processes, and local states have the power to give or refuse planning permission. However, Pahl (1970:300) criticises planners for their lack of will:

I see statutory land use planning as basically concerned with the allocation of use of land and as having created vast fortunes for capitalist entrepreneurs. Planners have tidied up the physical urban scene so that one might see them as the estate handymen of the major property owners. Those who have been able to be genuinely discriminatory in favour of the disadvantage have done this, in spite of, not because of, their enabling legislation. Planners should make clear the distributional effects of what they propose but very few do.

In contrast, urban planning does not operate exclusively at a local scale. It is connected to the national planning hierarchy. National and local planning goals and methods are affected by political values (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1971,1996). Fainstein and Fainstein (1971,1996) have argued that political values and political culture determine the planner's role, the planning process, the degree of citizen participation and the ultimate planning outcomes. Each country has its own approach to urban planning and has distinct planning methods, all derived from the country's unique history and culture. However, the decision-making processes surrounding development policies are generally led by business agendas and facilitated through public-private partnerships, since cities are often seen as the engines of economic growth (Stephenson, 1991). In this respect, urban planning in East Asia has been a vehicle used to pursue economic growth and urbanisation. The entrepreneurial state in East Asia has controlled the overall urban planning system (Shin, 2011b).

In neoliberal economic globalisation, cities compete with each other to attract more capital investment for urban growth; this means local states have to take the stance of entrepreneurs (Harvey, 1989). Under entrepreneurial discourses, local states in Western countries have

redesigned the city and driven urban development to enhance competitiveness between cities, thus overcoming the urban decline caused by the Fordist crisis. As a result, urban politics is interested in promoting business friendly policies rather than general public service provision (MacLeod, 2002). Local states try to attract capital investment to their areas, and distributional policies (such as those focused on providing social housing) are given lower priority. Local states claim these developments help increase revenue that can then be spent on public services, but Ambrose and Colenutt (1975) exposed the limitations of this argument. The local state, which is closer to citizens and directly influences them, can take the leading role in establishing a system based on democratic planning and citizen participation. There are, however, limitations on the production of urban space in the current neoliberal capitalist societies. Urban boosterism has affected the local planning context and the scope of public involvement. The next section is thus concerned with elaborating on local politics and economies in relation to growth machine theory.

2.2 Growth Machines and Urban Restructuring

Urban growth has been seen as another form of progress and economic growth in Korea. Local politicians often make election pledges about urban growth (Choi and Park, 2012). They promote various development plans such as urban redevelopment projects and new infrastructure construction in pursuit of local growth. Large scale urban development policies are adopted as preconditions for economic growth. However, urban growth is not the goal of all citizens and often causes urban problems. Sometimes, communities are split into pro-growth and anti-growth factions due to urban growth policies. However, many Koreans have supported urban development policies, since they believe that urban growth benefits them through increased job opportunities, higher property values and other benefits. Therefore, urban growth policies have been electorally popular for a long time (Jeon, 2009, Choi and Park, 2012). However, Logan and Molotch (1987:88) are sceptical about the benefits of urban growth:

We suspect that the promised benefits of growth would be found, more often than not, to have been greatly exaggerated by the local growth activities, who, while portraying

themselves as the prudent guardians of the public purse, often lead their cities into terrible fiscal troubles.

They identified the importance of local politics by considering urban property relations in the US urban development context. Initially, Molotch (1976:309) developed an urban growth machine theory which he outlined as follows:

A city and, more generally, any locality, is conceived as the areal expression of the interests of some land-based elite. Such an elite is seen to profit through the increasing intensification of the land use of the area in which its members hold a common interest. An elite competes with other land-based elites in an effort to have growth-inducing resources invested within its own area as opposed to that of another. Governmental authority, at the local and nonlocal levels, is utilised to assist in achieving this growth at the expense of competing localities. Conditions of community life are largely a consequence of the social, economic, and political forces embodied in this growth machine.

Logan and Molotch (1987:63) argue that this growth machine is run by a growth coalition consisting of business groups, politicians, local media, utility providers and auxiliary players. Growth coalitions form the local land-based elite, a group which has critical power to shape urban systems and land use planning (Molotch, 1993). Molotch and Vicari (1988:188) define the people who form this elite as “place entrepreneurs who buy, sell and rent the physical environment”. Local governments also advocate growth through growth coalitions, since growth can improve fiscal health and tax income (Logan and Molotch, 1987:86). Therefore, Peterson (1981:25) argued that “urban politics is above all the politics of land use”.

Growth machine theory is essentially a US-based idea, in which local governments can barely survive on federal aid in terms of tax revenue, so instead the aim to attract mobile capital to their areas to boost their tax revenue. For this reason, the goal of urban policies is to attract or increase industry and economic growth. Local governments tend to create business friendly environments for entrepreneurs, imposing only weak regulations or providing incentives to encourage investment. However, this theory has been applied to many other capitalist societies such as the UK (Harding, 1991), Israel (Kirby and Abu-Rass, 1999), Germany (Strom, 1996) and even China (Lin, 2002, Zhang and Fang, 2004). Growth machine theory needs to be adjusted depending on the context to which it is applied, since local politics and their

importance differ depending on local conditions and the wider national context in question. In a comparative study of three countries (the US, Italy and Japan) Molotch and Vicari state that

... three national settings that, although all basically capitalist, vary in terms of local-national government relations, the significance and quality of political party systems, the nature of citizens activism, and the roles played by parochial business and national industrial elites (Molotch and Vicari, 1988:189).

Molotch and Vicari's research found that the national government and big conglomerates in Japan had manipulated land use and the property market to achieve national economic growth. In Italy, the influence of leftist political parties means the property market there is less commodified. Molotch (1999:251) has asserted that the growth machine approach is still valid when used to understand cities across different cultures and nations, as long as land and buildings are commodified. Although the conditions in the US and East Asia are wholly distinct and 40 years have passed since Molotch first introduced growth machine theory, it still provides a useful approach that allows us to explain how urban space in East Asia has been shaped. The developmental state in East Asia has played a crucial role in the formation of growth coalitions.

Logan and Molotch's main argument, about the struggle between the pro-growth coalition and the anti-growth coalition over urban space production, is a crucial starting point when looking at the political economy of place. Logan and Molotch (1987) differentiate use of property (use value) from the market commodity (exchange value), and argue that cities are socially and spatially transformed by the mechanisms that lie between these two different values. Tensions between the two values around urban development are often serious and frequently induce social conflict and resistance (Molotch and Logan, 1984). Exchange value potentially threatens our daily lives and neighbourhoods in various forms, and the working class, minorities and the poor are the most vulnerable groups to these threats since they are absent from the decision-making processes (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Local politics is the starting point of democracy at the grassroots level, since it allows the political order of cities to be governed by local people. However, local politics is limited when exercising redistributive policies because of fiscal limitations, as Peterson (1981) points out. Accordingly, local politics relies on developmental

policies that promote local growth. The pro-growth coalition displaces vulnerable groups through urban development processes due to market mechanisms.

Property-led urban redevelopment financed by private capital is an example of the exchange value threat at the neighbourhood level. Various interest groups such as developers, real estate agents and so on take part in this property-led development in collaboration with local government bodies (Mollenkopf, 1981,1983). Local governments which depend on property tax as their main revenue source cannot help being involved with business groups, especially those in the real estate industry. Local governments provide a large amount of support to the property sector through land assembly, subsidy provision, and risk minimisation in order to promote property investment. This is similar to the urban redevelopment conditions in Korea. The dependence on property tax in the Korean local state is also high, and market driven urban redevelopment for profit has been dominant since the 1980s (see chapter 6).

The most deliberate government effort to support advanced capitalist land use priorities has been urban renewal. Instead of seeking to control the social cost of corporate development, urban renewal sought to subsidize the corporate structure's ability to redefine the form and the functions of our cities at minimal private cost (Smith, 1979a:245).

As Michael Smith (1979a) argued, the case of the US federal urban renewal projects that lasted from the 1950s through to the 1960s is one of the best examples of this. The state used compulsory purchase orders to acquire land and relocate residents, and the land was then sold to private developers. Even though this was a federal aided renewal programme, it caused massive demolition and displacement and was sometimes termed 'negro removal' (Anderson, 1964:8). After developers bought the land at cheap prices from the state, they tried to maximise their profits by building luxury condominiums and focusing on commercial development. That is, taxpayers' money was used to help developers rather than residents. There is another case illustrating similar action by the state during this period of urban renewal. The stadium of the Los Angeles Dodgers baseball team was constructed in Chavez Ravine, where public housing had been planned (Parson, 1993). Hispanic communities were scattered, since the local state sold the land to the LA baseball team. Pro-growth coalitions have often redeveloped city centres

and inner city areas into hotels, convention centres and sports stadiums to attract tourists and money. However, Logan and Molotch (1987:79) pointed to the limitations of this sort of development by referring to a city in Florida which:

has agreed to invest \$59.6 million in a new stadium in the hope that it will lure a major league franchise to a city that woefully lacks the demographic profile necessary to support major league sports. So far the project has required displacement of four hundred families (primarily black) and saddled the city with a huge debt.

As can be seen from these cases, public policies have enabled growth machines to maximise exchange values at the expense of local communities' use value, since growth coalitions have made cities into commodities for sale (Sandercock, 1977, Hartman and Carnochan, 2002). Growth coalitions are interested in continued urban growth through intensification of land use, not the quality of life of local people. It is therefore very questionable that urban growth is good for cities and for most of their citizens when local politics is shaped by pro-growth coalitions. More fundamentally, we need to critically consider the question of whether wealth is distributed by urban growth or not. Considering the previous cases, wealth seems to be concentrated in small groups rather than evenly spread. As concerns about the negative effects of the urban growth machine have increased, a new approach to urban development termed 'growth management' has emerged and received attention (Vogel and Swanson, 1989, Gill, 2000). Vogel and Swanson (1989:83) argue that

Growth management changes the nature of the questions from "is growth good or bad?" to "what kind of growth?" "how much growth?" "where will the growth go?" "when will the growth occur?" "who will benefit and pay for the growth?" and "what impact will the growth have on the community?"

Vogel and Swanson predict that growth management could change the urban growth paradigm in the future. However, growth machines still seem to influence urban restructuring and this is very true of East Asia where the major role of the developmental state has meant the evolution of growth machines with Asian characteristics

2.3 Growth Machines and East Asian Developmental States

East Asia has experienced a vastly different socio-economic development path from the advanced capitalist countries in the West. This is known as the developmental state. When we look at the relationship between capital and the urban built environment in the East Asian context, it is necessary to consider how the characteristics of the developmental state are interwoven with urban and housing policies. This section argues that developmental states have led to growth machines with East Asian characteristics. The concept of the developmental state was first introduced to explain the extraordinarily rapid economic growth and industrialisation of Japan (Johnson, 1982). Nowadays, it is commonly used to explain the dramatic economic growth in developing countries across Asia (Cumings, 1984, Öni 1991, Douglass, 1994, Grabowski, 1994). After its post-socialist transformation, China could also arguably be considered a developmental state (Johnson, 1999, Wong, 2004, Bolesta, 2007).

According to Woo-Cumings (1999:1), the developmental state is “shorthand for the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast Asia”. It has been argued that the developmental state lies between the liberal open market economic system and the central planning economic system that exists in socialist countries (Johnson, 1982,1999). Woo-Cumings (1999:2) described it as “conjoining private ownership with state guidance”. Even though the economic environment is capitalist, the intervention of the state in the economy is very high. Thus, it can be concluded that the most dominant characteristic of developmental states is the existence of strong government intervention. The state in East Asia has played a dominant role in economic development, industrialisation and urbanisation, which is not the case in traditional Western democracies (Douglass, 1994, Hill and Kim, 2000). Some scholars have attempted to explain why the state has strong autonomy and how the developmental state has succeeded in East Asian countries. During colonial times in the Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs: Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), economic policies such as land reforms and control of business activities led to the collapse of the landlord class and impeded growth in the capitalist class. Therefore,

the state was the only strong actor available to drive industrialisation (Douglass, 1994). In addition, the Cold War forced the state in countries such as Korea and Taiwan to be stronger to protect their independence and economic growth from external threats (Grabowski, 1994:414).

Brohman (1996) has explained East Asian countries' success in terms of the new international division of labour. Economic development in NICs was essentially based on export-led industrialisation and labour intensive production. In the 1960s and 1970s, technological developments, aided by relatively inexpensive transportation and communication costs, enabled these countries to connect to the economies of advanced countries. The competitiveness of the NICs, with their more productive and less expensive labour forces, enhanced their role in the global market (Brohman, 1996). This division of labour is also workable within Asia. This is illustrated by the 'flying geese growth model' (Akamatsu, 1962). In Asia, Japan played the role of regional growth leader, like the head of a group of flying geese; the other developing countries followed the industrialisation model set by Japan. As the NIC countries had links with the advanced economic system of Japan (through subcontracting, capital investment and technology transfers), they could achieve greater economic development (Brohman, 1996:120). The interventionist state has led rapid economic development in East Asia, and this has contributed to the production of space.

Under the auspices of the developmental state, urban and housing policies in East Asia have been used as vehicles for the promotion of state-led industrialisation (Doling, 1999, Lee, 2003, Lee et al., 2003b, Ronald, 2007, Shin, 2011b, Watson, 2011). Working closely with business groups, the developmental states have promoted the urban built environment and created infrastructure to drive compressed economic growth in the form of East Asian growth machines. Eventually, the real estate sector became crucial to economic growth in East Asia. Haila (2000) argues that the real estate sector plays an important role in economic growth and that property is the main source of revenue in East Asia:

Singapore and Hong Kong can be termed 'property states' where land rent is an important source of revenue and profit. The property sector contributes a substantial portion of economic growth; property and development companies are important

companies, property and development companies constitute an important sector in the stock market; land and buildings form an important source of public revenue; and expatriate housing channels the surplus produced by TNCs in Singapore and Hong Kong (Haila, 2000:2249).

Property-led developments have created various property-based interest groups. These have become a 'land ruling class' which influences people's lives (Poon, 2005). In particular, the power of conglomerates in the Hong Kong property sector is noticeable. Due to the developer cartel hegemony with the state, conglomerates are in a position to have extensive influence over the Hong Kong economy.

Financially powerful conglomerates are all landowners and developers, for some of them property development is their core business and for others it is a supplementary business. Without exception, they all prospered immensely from the wildest property craze in the history of Hong Kong property market, which lasted from 1992–1997 (Poon, 2005:57).

As Yip and Forrest (2002) point out, the state owned all land and decided the price, allocation and zoning of land without sufficient public participation in the decision-making process.

Yet more significant is the land use planning system under a non-democratic and executive led government which derives much of its revenue from land sales and powerful, vested corporate interests. These have combined to produce a high density, high-rise approach to housing in Hong Kong (Yip and Forrest, 2002:707).

In contrast to the general public's disempowerment, conglomerates have privileged access to the government's land policies, since the state has generally adopted pro-developer policies. Conglomerates have had a monopoly on the housing market and commercial property, which they achieved through a period of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. This non-competitive system has enabled developers to make large profits. The close relationship between the state and the business sector has created a rather peculiar property market system in Hong Kong, which would not work in a conventional capitalist economic system.

These developmental alliances between the state and the private sector can be seen as equivalent to the growth coalitions used to explain the urban political economy in the West. The mechanisms behind developmental alliances and growth coalitions seem similar, except for the different spatial scales. However, the central state in East Asia is immensely powerful in developmental alliances and its decisions directly affect local policies. At the urban level,

growth machine theory is not very helpful when analysing urban politics in East Asia. However, it has received attention more recently since the authoritarian central state made way for the introduction of local autonomy in Korea in 1993 (Lee, 2008a, Kim and Ahn, 2010, Yoon, 2012) and local corporatism in post-reform China after the late 1970s (Lin, 2002, Zhang, 2002, Zhang and Fang, 2004, He and Wu, 2005). Nevertheless, the role of the state in East Asia is greater than that of local business groups: in Korea it has actual power to decide the direction of property development (Kim and Ahn, 2010); in China, the land market is directly controlled by the local state (He and Wu, 2005). The dominant role of the state in East Asia needs to be understood, as well as the differences and similarities between the distinct growth machine theories developed for the West and the East. It will be argued in chapters 6 and 7 that the Korean growth machine has been responsible for the construction of large numbers of high-rise buildings in Seoul, which has displaced large numbers of existing residents. Holliday (2000:708) argues this East Asian exceptionalism can also be seen as a social policy:

Social policy is strictly subordinate to the overriding policy objective of economic growth, and everything else flows from this: minimal social rights with extensions linked to productive activity, reinforcement of the position of the productive element in society, and state market-family relationships directed towards growth.

Therefore, the growth-oriented states in East Asia have intervened in various social welfare policies, including housing. Holliday (2000:709) distinguishes the East Asian welfare system from the Esping-Andersen's approach adopted in Western countries, and dubs the East Asian welfare model "productivist welfare capitalism". Holliday's argument is that social investment is a means of achieving economic growth elements, and he also suggests that states have a responsibility to ensure social welfare in a residual way. By contrast, the market and the family in the East Asian welfare model have played a vital role in welfare provision. Aspalter (2006) extends this argument and outlines a new typology of social welfare systems in terms of the political aspect. Aspalter (2006:299) terms the East Asian welfare model a "conservative welfare regime" and argues that a social welfare system has been deployed by the conservative ruling elite for the sake of political stability and securing governmental legitimacy.

The social welfare system in East Asia is not fully developed, and housing has been important due to this because a house can be considered a substitute for a pension (Ronald, 2007, Ronald and Doling, 2010).

Housing policies have been implicated in the economic successes of East Asian societies. On the one hand, construction sectors have driven economic growth and urban renewal. On the other, the ability of families to invest and exchange owner-occupied housing properties, building up housing wealth over the life-course that can be exchanged in family and market economies, has supplemented individual pension and welfare requirements under conditions of limited public insurance (Ronald and Doling, 2010:237).

This helps explain why many existing owners in Korea are keen to see their area redeveloped (see chapter 7). This is similar to the ‘asset-based’ or ‘property-based’ welfare system practised in Western welfare states, wherein individuals are asked to manage their welfare needs by using their own assets instead of relying on help from the state (Doling and Ronald, 2010). The close affinity between economic growth and housing policies has important consequences, and leads to socio-political stability, economic outcomes and the creation of a social welfare structure (Ronald and Kyung, 2013).

A weakening housing system affects two key domains in East Asian societies: the family and the social security system. A household in negative equity does not simply face the risk of repossession and serious debt-burden; it breaks down a private social security system where households place all their life savings. In East Asian societies, the collapse of the housing system means the breaking down of the basic social fabric, the repercussion of which has serious implications on overall social policy provisions. The relationship amongst housing policy, housing consumption, economic growth (or decline), and social policy is thus extremely complex (Lee, 2003:16-17).

This distinct East Asian housing culture has been shaped by economic growth-oriented housing policies (Park, 1998, Lee, 2003). Doling (2002:181–183) created a typology for the housing system by considering the degree of market and state intervention in housing policy from the planning stages through to consumption. As the private sector in the liberal model has a stranglehold on housing politics, there is no redistributive tendency in housing consumption. In the European model, the state works to meet the housing needs of all and takes responsibility for needs which are not met by the market. The ‘little tigers’ model stands in an intermediate position between the liberal model and the European model. Even though the state regulates

housing policy at the development stage, there is no support for low income households at the consumption stage.

Chronic housing shortages and land scarcity have been longstanding problems in East Asia, but many states in East Asia have not taken enough responsibility for housing provision and consumption. Instead, the state has facilitated homeownership and adopted pro-market policies in order to promote the property sector for the purposes of economic growth. Under the commodified housing market system, homeowners have seen huge returns from their homeownership and non-homeowners have developed strong aspirations for homeownership after witnessing homeowners' capital gains (Smart and Lee, 2003, Poon, 2005). In this environment, Lee et al. (2003b:41) argued that

The development of the sector [home-ownership] has been intimately connected with broader strategies of economic growth and development and in all cases home buying has formed a major element of the growth machine.

This is very clearly seen in terms of the extensive growth of high-rise flats redevelopment in East Asia, which can be closely linked to gentrification. Shin (2011b) defines East Asian urbanisation experiences as “vertical accumulation”.

As a result, modern high-rise apartments have been identified as the means of asset-building as well as the loci of an urban way of living. A vicious circle of capital investment and reinvestment has been paired with a repeated, compressed cycle of property-led development and redevelopment in the urban landscape to achieve what could be termed as “vertical accumulation” (Shin, 2011b:50).

In particular, the emerging middle class and their desire for decent living standards and wealth through condominium ownership led to large scale high-rise flat redevelopment in Korea in the 1980s. This saw the mass construction of high-rise flats and extensive speculation around homeownership and capital accumulation. This created severe conflict between pro-redevelopment coalitions and anti-urban redevelopment groups, since urban redevelopment has given birth to new-build gentrification.

2.4 Growth Machines and New-Build Gentrification

Battles between pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions seem never-ending. In particular, urban conflict over housing issues tends to make it difficult to find a compromise between exchange value and use value, since houses cannot only be understood as socio-economic goods; they are invested with emotional connections by individuals and families. In this respect, gentrification, which is “a process involving a change in the population of land-users such that the new users are of a higher socio-economic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital” (Clark, 2005:258), is the front line of social conflict over the contested city landscape (Smith, 1996, Smith, 2002a). This process has been extremely important in the form of new-build gentrification in South Korea in recent decades, and will be discussed in more detail in chapters 6, 7 and 8.

Housing policies and urbanisation in East Asia have experienced a different development path compared to the West, as discussed in the previous section. Despite the differences, gentrification has been observed in East Asia. The term ‘gentrification’ itself is fairly new to East Asia, but this does not mean East Asia has not experienced gentrification at all. Instead of gentrification, many different terms have been used by the public and in previous research (Kyung and Kim, 2011, Ley and Teo, 2014). He (2010b:346) argues that the Chinese are reluctant to use the term ‘gentrification’ since it has a political meaning. In terms of space, form and actors, urban redevelopment in East Asia and gentrification in the West appear to be distinct phenomena. Ley and Teo (2014:1229) shed light on the characteristics of gentrification in East Asia:

The high-rise, high-density model of urban redevelopment narrows the range of landscapes recognisable as gentrification in Anglo-America, while the pervasive role of the state as facilitator is less visible in the West. Indeed this conjunction of the market and the state in a joint urban project is central to the alternative modernity of Asia Pacific.

In a nutshell, East Asian gentrification is much closer to new-build gentrification than the classic gentrification observed in the West. Gentrification in East Asia has taken place through urban redevelopment policies, and Smith (1982:151–152) argues that gentrification

systematically occurs as a part of a larger redevelopment process for profit. Although Smith (1982:153) argues that gentrification is the spatial aspect of economic restructuring at the late stage of capitalist urban development, gentrification in East Asia, which has yet to reach the late stage of urban development, is occurring systematically. This is due to the fact that the state in East Asia has facilitated urban redevelopment for the purposes of capital accumulation. Continuous urban redevelopment policies have reinvested capital in under-invested areas, and high-rise luxury condominium blocks have replaced existing buildings following wholesale demolition. This has caused the movement of middle or higher income groups and the displacement of low income, existing residents (Fujitsuka, 2005, Wang and Lau, 2009, He, 2012). The state has been in favour of this urban redevelopment process to promote gentrification for economic and urban growth. The strong role of the state in gentrification is more overt in East Asian cities such as Shanghai (Wu, 2004, He and Wu, 2005, He, 2007, He, 2010b), Hong Kong (Ley and Teo, 2014), Tokyo (Cybriwsky, 2011) and of course Seoul (Shin, 2009b).

First, however, it is important to discuss the concept of gentrification in more detail, paying particular attention to the shift from classic to contemporary gentrification, which can take a variety of forms. The concept of classic gentrification, involving renovation of older city centres and inner city properties, has a long and well documented history. The term was coined by Glass 50 years ago to describe urban socio-spatial change in London.

One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle-classes—upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages—two rooms up and two down—have been taken over, when their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences... Once this process of 'gentrification' starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is changed (Glass, 1964:xviii-xix).

She defined the concept as involving both socio-demographic transformations in working class residential accommodation located in the inner city by the new middle classes and the physical rehabilitation of old historic houses and the displacement of lower classes. Many studies have identified gentrification as one of the most important lenses through which to analyse urban change. However, gentrification has many mutations and the meaning of the term

‘gentrification’ has been expanded since Glass coined it. Many scholars agree that it is becoming harder to separate traditional gentrification, which involves the rehabilitation of existing housing, from redevelopment facilitated by new construction (Smith, 1996, Badcock, 2001, Davidson and Lees, 2005). Gentrification includes various actors, from the new urban middle classes to the state and local authorities; locations are equally flexible, and can involve anything from inner city districts to rural areas (Phillips, 1993, Karsten, 2003, Preteceille, 2007). In this context, Slater et al. (2004:1144) argue:

Whether gentrification is urban, suburban, or rural, new-build or the renovation of existing stock, it refers as its gentry suffixes attest, to nothing more or less than the class dimensions of neighbourhood change—in short not simply changes in the housing stock, but changes in housing class.

In addition, gentrification is no longer restricted to Western countries or global cities. It has developed in the global context from Asia through to Africa (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005, Harris, 2008, Visser and Kotze, 2008). The globalisation of gentrification means we need to pay attention to the expanding definition of gentrification. Smith (1996:39) acknowledged this change by writing that:

Gentrification is no longer about a narrow and quixotic oddity in the housing market but has become the leading residential edge of a much larger endeavour.

A high volume of gentrification literature has emphasised that gentrification is not a universal phenomenon, and cannot be explained through one lens. Many scholars have argued for the importance of differences, such as place-specificity (Shin and Kim, 2012), the city-specific nature of gentrification (Hamnett, 1984), and the geography of gentrification (Lees, 2000, Lees, 2011). Badyina and Golubchikov (2005:127) stress geographic factors such as “geographic location, cultural identity and position in the global hierarchy” when explaining gentrification in post-socialist cities. Maloutas (2012) also stresses the importance of alternative understandings of the concept and inter-contextual characteristics.

However, it is necessary to rethink the nature of gentrification, especially in terms of who moves into an area. Some authors (Ley, 1986, 1994, Michael, 1986, Caulfield, 1989), notably Ley, underline human agency, not structural or economic factors. The demand-side explanation

focuses on the role of gentrifiers in seeking to relocate to the inner city. In this context, the most important research questions are: Who are the gentrifiers? Why do they move into city centres? What are their characteristics? Scholars in favour of the demand-side explanation explain gentrification in terms of consumer preference. They pay attention to the fact that gentrification involves people, and work from the view that the most important process when understanding gentrification is that of identifying the gentrifiers and understanding how they are produced. The emergence of a new middle class is a very important factor in gentrification. Many scholars emphasise the role of the new middle class by considering how its characteristics differ from those of the conventional middle class (Ley, 1994, 1996, Butler, 1997, Butler and Robson, 2003, Hamnett, 2003a). This approach focuses on the development of a new class of educated liberal professionals with new tastes, and a preference for living in old properties in inner city areas. The new middle class is almost regarded as a synonym for white collar workers, and is seen as a product of the industrial restructuring that followed the decline of the manufacturing sector and the boom of the producer services sector (Ley, 1986, Hamnett, 2003a). In particular, Hamnett links gentrification to a process of professionalization (Hamnett, 1994, 2003a, 2003b, Hamnett and Whitelegg, 2007). Hamnett explains that the expansion of the middle class is the result of a change of income and occupational structure, and that members of the new middle class (like those of the old middle class) tend to be located towards the higher end of the income hierarchy, enabling them to live in the inner city.

Consumption-side explanations, which consider gentrification to be a result of consumer preferences, could apply to gentrification in East Asia and Korea in some respects, but the main explanation for gentrification in Korea should use production-side explanations that stress the role of the state, developers and property agents over individuals, since urban redevelopment programmes have essentially been licensed gentrification. These were forcefully articulated by Neil Smith (1979b, 1996).

Gentrification is a structural product of the land and housing markets. Capital flows where the rate of return is highest, and the movement of capital to the suburbs along with the continual depreciation of inner city capital, eventually produced the rent gap. When this grows sufficiently large, rehabilitation (or for that matter, renewal) can begin

to challenge the rates of return available elsewhere, and capital flows back (Smith, 1979b:546).

Smith's argument should be a starting point in looking at production-side explanations which give an account of urban development in the context of economic restructuring activity. It is one of the most influential arguments in response to the limitations of consumer sovereignty. Smith (1979b) objected to the idea of consumer sovereignty which was dominant in the 1970s, and instead stressed the role of producers like builders, developers and landlords in providing gentrified properties. He challenged the conventional view of a 'back to the city' movement of people from suburban areas, and insisted on the back to the city movement of capital due to investment for profit. He attempted to explain gentrification in terms of a rent gap between potential ground rent and capitalised ground rent in light of the capital accumulation cycle. Smith's rent gap theory can provide a wider perspective on the causes of uneven urban development, and can explain why certain areas are developed and others are not.

The rent gap is the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalised under the present land use. Gentrification occurs when the gap is wide enough that developers can purchase shells cheaply, can pay the builders' costs and profit for rehabilitation, can pay interest on mortgage and construction loans, and can then sell the end product for a sale price that leaves a satisfactory return to the developer (Smith, 1979b:545).

These two arguments are both important to interpreting gentrification, and Hamnett (1991:175) criticised the perceived dichotomy between them:

Like Aesop's fable of the blind men and the elephant, each of the major theories has perceived only part of the elephant of gentrification. The two theoretical perspectives are complementary rather than competing.

However, the importance of each argument can vary depending on the context. Therefore, structural explanations could have more meaningful implications when making a case for gentrification in Korea, where the role of development capital has been very marked.

Each argument appears somewhat insufficient and flawed because gentrification in the 1990s operated according to different mechanisms than was the case previously. Hackworth and Smith (2001) outline the stage model of gentrification to shed light on the progression of gentrification. Lees et al. (2008) build upon and extend Hackworth and Smith's model to

conceptualise the four waves of gentrification. Hackworth and Smith (2001) categorise gentrification after the early 1990s recession as the third wave of gentrification; this third wave of gentrification differs from the previous two. Compared to the first wave of gentrification (sporadic and small scale gentrification based in the UK and North America before the early 1970s), the third wave of gentrification has expanded from the urban core to the urban fringe (Hackworth and Smith, 2001:468). Smith (2002b:437) argues that gentrification in the third wave has been generalised all around the world as a ‘global urban strategy’ as a result of neoliberal urbanism. As gentrification was adapted into a key public policy tool for urban restructuring, gentrification has been closely integrated in public and urban politics. These are the heightened characteristics of the second wave of gentrification, which occurred in an environment of 1980s privatisation driven by neoliberalism (Lees et al., 2008:176–177). Accordingly, the state has had an unprecedented part to play in shaping gentrification processes (Hackworth and Smith, 2001, Smith, 2002b). Economic factors became even stronger during the third wave of gentrification. The commercial developer’s role has become more important and direct in initiating gentrification, especially state-led gentrification (Hackworth, 2002).

The third wave of gentrification is a purer expression of the economic conditions and processes that make reinvestment in disinvested inner-urban areas so alluring for investors, overall economic forces driving gentrification seem to have eclipsed cultural factors as the scale of investment is greater and the level of corporate as opposed to smaller scale capital has grown (Hackworth and Smith, 2001:468).

Adrian Smith (1989) empirically investigated the relationship between the state and commercial developers in the Docklands’ regeneration programme in London. His research shows a very different gentrification process, more driven by the capital of the property market than classic gentrification. Adrian Smith (1991:245) defines this combination of state policy and private capital as “state subsidisation of private capital accumulation”. In this new form of gentrification, the previous explanation of consumer preference is irrelevant, since gentrifiers consume new housing instead of remodelling existing housing with their sweat equity; also, it is not possible to create this large scale gentrification without developers’ significant capital. To

sum up, the third wave of gentrification after the early 1990s was orchestrated by capital and the state, and has continued up until the present day.

More than ever before, gentrification is incorporated into public policy—used either as a justification to obey market forces and private sector entrepreneurialism, or as a tool to direct market processes in the hopes of restructuring urban landscapes in a slightly more benevolent fashion (Wyly and Hammel, 2005:35).

However, this model of the progression of gentrification is not valid in East Asia. Gentrification in East Asia has been dominated by the third wave style gentrification rather than the earlier, more linear models of gentrification, since the state and capital have been the main players in urban restructuring. In order to grasp contemporary gentrification in the West and East Asia, it is necessary to study public policies and consider how they are produced in terms of changes to the political economic process. Public policies and state intervention have been given top priority in contemporary gentrification debates. The scale and effects of policy-led gentrification have attracted researchers' attention (Lees, 2003: plus a special issue of *Urban Studies*, 45(12), 2008). Much policy-led gentrification is created to achieve a social-mix at the community level (Bridge et al., 2012). However, extensive criticism has been directed at this mixed community policy, since it has had a limited effect on social cohesion, something it was meant to improve (Uitermark et al., 2007, Davidson, 2008). These urban policies are therefore considered “depoliticised euphemisms for gentrification” (Porter and Shaw, 2009:40) or “soft-selling gentrification” (Glynn, 2008:164). Macleod and Johnstone (2012) disapprove of this kind of urban redevelopment programme and criticise it as “accumulation by dispossession”, a theory Harvey proposes instead of Marx's primitive theory of accumulation (Harvey, 2003:137).

Under neoliberal urban politics, public assets and land, as can be seen in the example of Adrian Smith, have been increasingly obtained by the private sector. Harvey (2003:167) describes this as the “cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession”. A few people have gained wealth and power, whereas the majority of people have been excluded from their former workplaces and homes. This approach, focused on public policies and speculative capital, sets out powerful arguments around urban transformation at both the global level and the local level. Harvey's

concept of accumulation by dispossession allows us to shape our thoughts around gentrification and the urban redevelopment process in Korea, since a handful of people with power and capital decide the future of an area, often handing it over to new residents rather than the indigenous population. Harvey's concept can explain contemporary gentrification as a form of capital accumulation in East Asia.

New-build gentrification can be considered the best example of state- and capital-orchestrated gentrification. The growth of new-build residential developments in central and inner city areas for middle class occupation has generated considerable debate as to whether this should be seen as another form of gentrification: that of new-build gentrification. Davidson and Lees (2005, 2010) outline the concept of new-build gentrification. They argue that new-build gentrification has similar characteristics to classic gentrification, even though the physical transformations are different (Davidson and Lees, 2005:1170). In contrast, Boddy (2007) disagrees profoundly with this position and draws an analogy between classic gentrification and new-build gentrification in his case study of Bristol, UK. Boddy points out that new-build residential developments in the city centre can be linked to commercial developers, real estate agents and investors rather than individual gentrifiers. He also raises a question concerning the role of displacement. New developments happen on brown field sites, so no direct displacement of existing occupants occurs. Boddy concludes that gentrification is not an appropriate and comprehensive explanation for the current urban development taking place in city centres. Davidson and Lees (2010:403) critically discuss Boddy's account through various examples of new-build gentrification.

As established areas of gentrification in inner London have matured, it has been new-build gentrification (state-led and funded/co-funded by corporate capital) that has pushed the process further into, and across, a diverse range of the city's low-income neighbourhoods. The exclusive and often gated built form of new-build gentrification has been central to this encroachment. Whereas the collective action of classical gentrification focused on areas where existing housing stock enabled a new middle-class habitus to be created, new-build developments are pushing gentrification into the remaining working class neighbourhoods and ultra-marginal areas.

Furthermore, several empirical studies in different countries, such as China (He, 2010b), South Africa (Visser and Kotze, 2008) and Switzerland (Rérat and Lees, 2011), concerning new-build gentrification challenge Boddy's perspective. New developments do not always happen on brown field sites in China and South Africa, so new-build developments can still cause direct displacement. We can therefore conclude that new-build gentrification is not a contradiction in terms and an over extension of the concept as Boddy suggests. On the contrary, new-build gentrification is now a major new form of gentrification, particularly in East Asia (Lützel, 2008, He, 2010b).

2.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has dealt with how urban space is produced in order to set the stage for a discussion of the characteristics and dynamics of urban redevelopment and gentrification in Korea. Urban restructuring in capitalist societies does not take place within a political and economic vacuum. It is connected to a wider political and economic context. A range of different interests, for example developers versus residents and exchange value versus use value, conflict with each other. These different interests are hard to reconcile. Planners and the local state have an important role to play in minimising urban conflict over urban restructuring. In theory, these parties can make decisions without having to submit to political and economic pressures. However, their regulation and supervision are not effectively positioned to resolve social conflict. Some particular interest groups are predominant in the production of urban space. Gentrification can be considered one of the most prominent examples showing the unequal relationship shared by the parties responsible for shaping urban space. When it was first observed, gentrification was a marginal event occurring in old housing districts in small areas of global cities (Butler and Robson, 2003). However, it has since become a key urban strategy all over the world which is used to reshape dilapidated areas. In particular, contemporary gentrification triggered by capital and public policies is disguised by other terms such as 'urban renaissance'. It has become more difficult to grasp the actual reality of how capital and the state interact in relation to urban restructuring.

This urban restructuring process has also happened in East Asian countries, although it has manifested itself in a rather different way. Compared to the West, East Asia experienced compressed urbanisation and industrialisation after the Second World War, led by a strong state. This different developmental path has created the East Asian urban development model and housing culture. All social goals in East Asia are oriented towards economic growth, with the ultimate goal being to catch up with advanced industrialised countries. East Asian states have traditionally held strong power, whereas civil societies have not fully developed into a position where they are able to check and balance the influence of the state. Accordingly, urban and housing policies have been subordinate to economic growth, and people's housing rights and social welfare have been sacrificed. Urban redevelopment programmes in East Asia have been run by the state with private capital, in what amounts to a process of gentrification. This has resulted in large scale displacement and relocation of residents.

Urbanisation patterns in capitalist economies are largely determined by profitability and the accumulation activity of capital and the state. In the West and East Asia, cities have been transformed into growth machines and growth coalitions between capital and the state have led to property-led redevelopment programmes, which in turn lead to new-build gentrification. Communities have been excluded from these urban redevelopment processes, and this has caused uneven distribution of redevelopment benefits and resulted in great social conflict. The antagonism between development agencies and communities has continued over urban redevelopment, or gentrification. Neighbourhood groups have forced the local state to change these unfair policies. When all their efforts through political channels fail, they take direct action in order to protect their communities. This issue is taken up in the following chapter and connected to urban social movements.

Chapter 3: Urban Conflicts and Social Challenges

Mr. Prosser: “Come off it, Mr Dent. You can’t win you know. You can’t lie in front of the bulldozer forever. This bypass has to be built and it’s going to be built.”

Arthur Dent: “...First I've heard of it, why’s it going to be built?”

Mr. Prosser: “...What do you mean, why's it got to be built? It’s a bypass. You’ve got to build bypasses...You were quite entitled to make any suggestions or protests at the appropriate time you know...the plans have been available in the local planning office for the last nine month.”

Arthur Dent: “...On display? I eventually had to go down to the cellar to find them.”

From *The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy* (Adams, 2009:9–11)

This exchange is from a well-known science fiction novel, but it outlines a scenario that is often found in the real world. Citizens who face the demolition of their property and eviction due to urban redevelopment plans protest like Arthur, but the response they receive from council workers or developers is often similar to that of Prostetnic Vogon Jeltz of the Galactic Hyperspace Planning Council in the novel:

“There’s no point in acting all surprised about it. All the planning charts and demolition orders have been on display in your local planning department on Alpha Centauri for fifty of your Earth years, so you’ve had plenty of time to lodge any formal complaint and it’s far too late to start making a fuss about it now ... What do you mean you’ve never been to Alpha Centauri? For heaven’s sake mankind, it’s only four light years away you know. I’m sorry, but if you can’t be bothered to take an interest in local affairs that’s your own lookout” (Adams, 2009:33–34).

Arthur’s powerless protest against the Galactic Hyperspace Planning Council resembles the protests against powerful growth machines discussed in the previous chapter. In the East Asian context, the undemocratic authoritarian developmental state has driven urban development and citizens have not participated actively in the urban planning process. Accordingly, there is more metaphorical distance between the attitudes of residents and the attitudes of developers than there is between Earth and Alpha Centauri. Some people do not even try to protest and leave their house and neighborhood with unsatisfactory compensation. Some people resist and protest, but many give up in the meantime. Eventually there are only a few people left to continue their

lonely fight. Sometimes, their protests are successful and manage to achieve reasonable solutions, but in many cases they end up losing. If Arthur had tried to stop a bulldozer along with others from his community, he might have halted the construction of the bypass. The only weapon ordinary people have against the powerful is collective action. When they take a stand through social organisations, they can make their problems a political agenda rather than a series of individual struggles – this could lead to transformative outcomes.

This chapter looks at the social consequences of the urban development process, and is particularly concerned with the social conflicts and urban social movements the urban development process can generate. It focuses on the circumstance of, and the scale and extent of, mobilisation, while also considering both its short term results and its long term effects. Also, it examines how organisations and leadership figures influence urban social movements. These questions can reveal why some movements succeed and others fail. The answers to these questions are important, since they provide lessons which can be applied to Korea. The characteristics of urban social movements in different countries are connected with economic changes, political intervention and the developmental history of urban civil society (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1985, Haumann, 2006, Holm and Kuhn, 2011). Looking at recent social resistance and urban protests over urban restructuring and housing in the West and East Asia, it is possible to find transferable lessons for the Korean context. This chapter will offer insights into discussions surrounding new-build gentrification and anti-gentrification movements (or the lack of them) in Seoul.

First of all, section 3.1 begins with a brief review of the history of urban social movements in the West and looks closely at urban redevelopment and housing issues. It then attempts to outline a typology of urban social movements in order to shed light on urban social movements in Korea through the creation of a comparative general framework. Section 3.2 seeks to examine urban social movements in East Asia, and is especially concerned with the ways East Asian urban social movements differ from Western ones. It shows how the developmental state has affected the characteristics of urban social movements in East Asia. The value and application of the right to the city concept in the context of urban social movements are examined in section

3.3, using sources ranging from the original concept by Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 1996) to more current interpretations (Harvey, 2008 , 2012, Marcuse, 2009, 2010). This concept can help us to find a new path for participation driven democracy which will help to enlarge citizens' decision-making capacity in the currently unbalanced power relations framework. Section 3.4 explores the implications of the right to the city concept in East Asian countries, where the developmental state has a strong legacy.

3.1 Urban Social Movements in the West

The city is a social product resulting from conflicting social interests and values (Castells, 1983:291).

Castells (1976:155) introduced the term 'urban social movements' (USMs) to describe collective citizen action designed to bring about structural social changes:

We can now define an urban social movement as the system of practices resulting from the articulation of a conjuncture of the system of urban actors and other social practices, such that its development tends objectively towards the structural transformation of the urban system or towards a substantial change in the balance of forces within the political system as a whole.

Castells (1983:319–320) suggested three distinct types and goals of USMs (Table 3-1).

Table 3-1 Castells's typology of urban social movements

Type	Goal
Collective consumption trade unionism	To obtain for the residents a city organised around its use values, as against the notion of urban living and services as a commodity, the logic of exchange value.
Community	The search for cultural identity for the maintenance or creation of autonomous local cultures, ethnically based or historically originated.
Citizens	The search for increasing power for local government, neighbourhood decentralisation, and urban self-management in contradiction to the centralised state and a subordinated and undifferentiated territorial administration.

These goals result from the uneasy relationship between capitalism, democracy, and participation in the urban system. Castells (1983:291) argues that mobilisation can transform

this urban structure, and this is why he calls this change of urban power relations a USM. In order to achieve change, people have mobilised themselves from the US civil rights movements in the 1960s through to contemporary movements like the Occupy Wall Street movement and the protests in Brazilian cities in summer 2013. USMs have changed in terms of their goals, mobilisation methods and characteristics since Castells first investigated them (Mayer, 2006, Rabrenovic, 2008). The rise and fall of USMs must be understood in terms of the broader political and economic contexts that lie beyond the urban level (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1985).

In her various studies, Mayer attempts to categorise USMs in Western countries in relation to political and economic transformations (Mayer, 1999, 2000, 2009, Mayer and Boudreau, 2012, Mayer, 2013). She argues that the first wave of mobilisation in the 1960s and 1970s was a response to the crisis of Fordism. This wave includes poor groups' claims to housing and anti-urban renewal protests from middle class students who led anti-war and leftist demonstrations for a more democratic society (Mayer, 2009). Popular collective action taken to push for improvements to the decision-making process and collective consumption created a variety of community organisations. Mayer argues that neoliberalism has affected the evolution of urban social movement since the 1980s. The dismantling of the welfare system under neoliberalism in the 1980s initiated the second wave of collective action. As the state promoted the privatisation of government functions, old social issues like housing and unemployment were brought back to the agendas of USMs from so-called new social movements. In this new form of USM, existing structural relationships between the local state and community organisations became cooperative and non-governmental organisations were included in the official governmental system as the third sector (Mayer, 1999). Mayer classifies USMs' action against neoliberalism in the 1990s as a third wave, but argues that the third wave of mobilisation was fragmented compared to the relatively coherent previous phases. The fourth wave of USMs is from the new century and is characterised by globally networked mobilisation (Mayer, 2009, Leontidou, 2010). The current USMs are global and connected to each other, protecting themselves from the threats of neoliberalisation and globalisation (Köhler and Wissen, 2003, Smith, 2012).

Squatters camped out in public spaces as part of the international 'Occupy movement' from 2011, are an example of globally connected USMs (Lubin, 2012, Pickerill and Krinsky, 2012).

Generally, urban social movements in advanced capitalist countries have had a similar trajectory to that Mayer argues, but the different political and economic systems in each country have led to various types, levels and patterns of USMs. Lowe (1986) has argued that local politics in the UK have strongly influenced USMs. The factors of race and ethnicity are important to interpreting the dynamics of USMs in the USA (Katznelson, 1982). Furthermore, USMs tackling the same issue in one country, for example squatter movements in Berlin and Amsterdam, have changed in relation to the squatter movements and urban development policies and squatting has been criminalised (Uitermark, 2004, Owens, 2008, Holm and Kuhn, 2011). Even though USMs have evolved through changes to historical conditions, USMs represent citizens mobilising themselves in reaction to social conflicts and using protest to find a solution to their problems.

Social movements are essentially political in nature though their main concerns are giving people a voice and to make sure their concerns are taken into account by government authorities. Their activities are based on a view of society in which the lowest strata should be acknowledged, consulted and encouraged to participate in solving problems that they encounter in their everyday life (Jagan and Chun, 2011:6).

As Jagan and Chun argue, USMs are one of the few means of expression especially for people who do not have enough opportunities to access socio-political resources; USMs have played an important role in resolving the problems faced by such groups. In particular, USMs are crucial challenges to urban politics, which has lost its ability to meet citizens' demands. Grassroots mobilisation helps to improve their bargaining position through collective action.

USMs can occur in response to a wide variety of issues, ranging from women's liberation to environmental conservation. One of the most common triggers has been housing issues (housing conditions, housing shortages, housing cost and gentrification-induced displacement) since everyone needs a place to call home. Displacement galvanises people into action and is resisted more strongly than any other threat to housing. Displacement, which involves direct residential dislocation against people's will, imposes great social and financial pressures on individuals.

Displacement from home and neighbourhood can be a shattering experience. At worst it leads to homelessness, at best it impairs a sense of community. Public policy should, by general agreement, minimise displacement. Yet a variety of public policies, particularly those concerned with gentrification, seem to foster it (Marcuse, 1985b:931).

Gentrification-induced displacement has been a longstanding issue. The impact of displacement on people has received significant attention in urban studies over the past 50 years. The conventional scenario featured in previous research on displacement can be summarised as low income families – usually those belonging to a non-white ethnic group and the elderly – being displaced due to rent increases caused by redevelopment; these displaced residents then move to neighbourhoods close to their former homes, since they do not have the economic or personal resources needed to seek a new house in a distant area (Hartman, 1984, Freeman and Braconi, 2004). If they are minority groups in terms of ethnicity and race, they tend to have stronger reasons for living in a particular area and are therefore likely to protest more strongly against gentrification and displacement.

To understand why the fight for the land here has been so intense, it must first be recognised why it is still essential for its existing residents to live there and especially for its Bangladeshi community. Spitalfields still provides the job and therefore the money to live (Forman, 1989:47).

Considering their social capital and job opportunities, it is a natural response for residents to resist development in order to preserve their community, as Forman noted in his study of redevelopment in Spitalfields. Where there are strong community ties, the negative impact of displacement, in terms of the psychological and emotional ramifications, is significant. Fullilove (2005:20) argues that it is “the traumatic stress of the loss of their life world which is called root shock” in her extensive qualitative research into the African American community’s experiences of displacement in three different cities, Pittsburgh, Newark, and Roanoke, under the Urban Renewal Act of 1949. Fullilove (2001:72) argues that the impact of displacement has continued in many ways.

The short-term consequences were dire, including loss of money, loss of social organization, and psychological trauma. The long-term consequences flow from the social paralysis of dispossession, most important, a collapse of political action.

It is necessary to trace displaced residents' movements to appreciate the full impact displacement has had on them and document the resulting economic, physical, neighbourhood and individual changes (Marcuse, 1985a:208). Nevertheless, a few empirical studies can be found that relate to displacement (e.g. Atkinson, 2000, Freeman and Braconi, 2004, Newman and Wyly, 2006). Sumka (1979) noted that little empirical research into displacement has been carried out to date, because "the implementation of a displacement study is costly, time-consuming and fraught with pitfalls, primarily because of the difficulty of tracing and locating movers" (Sumka, 1979:484). Therefore, while many authors have touched on the issue of displacement in their research into gentrification, tracing displaced residents' movements and the impact displacement has had on them has proven difficult to document empirically. In order to illuminate the impact of displacement, Marcuse's classification should be reconsidered. Marcuse (1985a) attempted to divide displacement into four different categories: direct last resident displacement, direct chain displacement, exclusionary displacement and displacement pressure. Along with direct displacement, Marcuse paid attention to indirect displacement, exclusionary displacement and displacement pressure.

Exclusionary displacement from gentrification occurs when any household is not permitted to move into a dwelling, by a change in conditions that affects the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, and that 1) is beyond the household's reasonable ability to control or prevent 2) occurs despite the household's being able to meet all previously imposed conditions of occupancy 3) differs significantly and in a spatially concentrated fashion from changes in the housing market as a whole and 4) makes occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous or unaffordable (Marcuse, 1985a:206–207).

Displacement pressure, which residents experience when their neighbourhood changes, can be a serious problem, since it is invisible and arises from subjective perception. However, it has actual effects on people and they may become displaced as a result of it. Even though disadvantaged groups have direct and indirect experiences of displacement, it is not easy for them to take action because of the unequal power relations between property interest groups and disadvantaged groups. Disadvantaged groups do not have many resources to solve their housing issues; for example, they are subject to insecurity of tenure and rent increases in the political and legal systems, which tend to be pro-landlords and developers (Lawson, 1986). Nevertheless,

tenants have continuously tried to resolve issues through collective action such as rent strikes. This form of collective action can be traced back to the rent strikes in London's East End in 1891, and the Glasgow rent strike of 1915 which led to the introduction of rent controls that sought to stop landlords' profiteering (LTF, 2006). Tenant movements have made progress in improving tenants' housing rights and opposing landlords' strong property rights (Lawson, 1986). Nevertheless, the battle between housing rights and property rights has been never-ending and housing movements continue to grow.

Squatter movements have been present in many Western countries since the late 1960s, and are one of the most representative housing movements, showing the impact and importance of citizens' collective action (López, 2013). Squatter movements have made radical changes over housing issues and urban planning for the last five decades. In the beginning, squatter movements were initiated as a self-help strategy in a context where there was a housing shortage despite there being many empty properties. However, they have developed into various forms and now include other housing issues.

They [squatters] place the housing shortage on the political agenda, expose abuse of ownership and increase the pressure on the authorities to tackle speculation in real estate effectively, to gear the programming of house building better to the demand and to improve housing distribution policy (Priemus, 1983:418).

As a result, squatter movements enabled people to obtain temporary housing or permanent housing from the government. Squatter movements in London in the 1960s and 1970s made local authorities license squatting in local council-owned properties and authorise some squatters' tenures (Kevin, 1979:591). In Amsterdam, local authorities rented out squatter-occupied housing to squatters after buying it (Pruijt, 2013:28). Squatting movements made the state control the housing market to meet the needs of people over the interests of profit, and many institutions were established for tenants (Uitermark, 2009). Squatting has taken place in resistance to urban redevelopment programmes which cause large scale displacement and gentrification (Mayer, 1993, Thörn, 2012). This type of squatting movement was pervasive in Germany during the 1970s. Squatting in many German cities was sparked by the undemocratic planning process which dismissed housing for local people in favour of building high-rise office

blocks and luxury housing that would attract investors (Mayer, 1993:154–155). These mobilisations have affected the direction of urban restructuring and protected communities from demolition and the gentrification processes (Thörn, 2012). Squatting movements have been diverse and the goal of squatting has varied from promoting an alternative housing strategy to making a political protest over the last five decades (Pruijt, 2013:19).

Grassroots action sometimes generates a new way of inhabiting the city beyond protest. The Coin Street case in London (Tuckett, 1988, Brindley et al., 1989) and the Eldonian Village case in Liverpool (McBane, 2008) show alternatives to dominant urban restructuring and housing policies. Two communities resisted inner-city urban regeneration programmes and tried to keep their communities intact in the 1970s and 1980s. They tried various protest measures, including petitions, campaigns and public inquiries. In the end, their protests succeeded and they obtained direct participation in the planning process which decided the future of their neighbourhoods. These are successful community-led urban regeneration cases that provide insights into how communities facing the threat of commercial development have coped. These two communities created their own organisations (e.g. a community trust, a housing association and so on) and solved their housing issues by themselves. They did not stop their collective action after achieving their goals around the projected demolition and urban redevelopment; they continued to be active and developed new goals centred around employment, education and safety in the community (McBane, 2008:31). This shows the importance of social organisations, especially community's 'own' organisations, in the success and consistency of USMs. Meyer (2007:61) defines the goals of a social movement organisation as:

[to] pressure government to affect the policy changes it wants, to educate the public and persuade people of the urgency of the problems it addresses it, to maintain its existence and the wisdom of its position, and to sustain a flow of resources that allows it to maintain its existence and efforts.

The role of social organisations is important in bringing individuals together and gaining attention and support from the general public. In the end, social movements can bring out alternatives through political and social changes. These two cases are not simply examples of

the victory of a community over a local authority, but instead represent innovative approaches to building communities in a cooperative way to create alternative cities.

Every step of what we did was normal and can be replicated. I think what I'm doing is what every housing manager should do; it's nothing out of the normal for me, but to others it apparently is (McBane, 2008:29).

The Director of Housing for Eldonian Village claims others can build their own sustainable communities elsewhere, but it is not usual to see similar cases. Fainstein (2010:124) comments that the Coin Street case, where residents changed the local government's decision, is exceptional. Grassroots attempts are more likely than others to fail when they attempt to alter public policies. In order to achieve success, support from the state is crucial. Jenkins and Kladermans (1995:3) emphasise the importance of the state in the politics of social protest:

Whether we look at the interaction between social protesters and party politics, the nature and development of social movements cannot be understood without reference to the central role of the state. As the institutionalised centre for the legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, the state is the ultimate arbiter for the allocation of socially valued goods. The state is therefore simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as the organiser of the political system and the arbiter of victory. As organiser of the political system, the state shaped the relationship between social movements and the institutionalised interest representation system.

However, as we have already discussed the role of the state in urban restructuring in chapter 2 we have found that the state is not perfectly neutral in the policy making process and it does not actively play a role as a mediator between conflicting interest groups. The state tends to have its own political and economic interests. Brindley et al. (1989:91) argue that the success of the Coin Street case was possible thanks to political support from Ken Livingstone's administration. In contrast, the Beckton protest in Newham, London, failed to halt the council's high-rise mass housing programme, since protesters did not get enough attention from national and local political forces (Dunleavy, 1977). Dunleavy's analysis found that community organisations did not have enough resources to utilise established political parties, and central and local government were in favour of building mass housing after slum clearance.

In light of this, Pickvance (1976) suggested defining USMs in relation to local authorities, institutional action and organisational resources in his study of them. He analysed the importance of policy environment in local authorities by using Ferris's research in Barnsbury,

which focused on community action against the traffic scheme of the local authority and the public's successful participation in the local authority's decision-making process (Ferris, 1972). Pickvance (1976:205) noted that the community organisation in Barnsbury had good networks with local councillors who took part in this activism and the central government was favourable to the community's traffic proposal. Pickvance argued that the community would have failed without this support. The success and failure of USMs is highly dependent on whether or not they are part of broader political movements. McGovern (1997:421) also emphasised that

Political change is the key to breaking out of the conventional pattern of limited urban policy making that generally benefits the interests of the downtown business community and its allies.

Political changes are important in making social protests successful, but Tarrow (2011:6) emphasises the importance of social protest in political changes. He argues that collective grassroots movements could trigger important political changes, even if they fail. However, it is now more difficult to make USMs successful and even to take collective action, since current urban policies subtly change the city to boost exchange values. Slater (2006:748–750) criticises the fact terms such as 'social mix' and 'social diversity' are used instead of gentrification in discussions relating to neoliberal urban policies, since they hide the realities of gentrification. Therefore, no protests or few protests happen in spite of the huge impact such policies have on people. Lees (2013:17–18) also explains that the lack of resistance against gentrification in the UK is due to the "guise of mixed communities policy" in state-led gentrification:

Part of the reason it has been so difficult to criticise British urban policy and resist gentrification in the UK has been because the British 'urban renaissance' is actually full of socially, economically and morally persuasive ideas, and because they have integrated protest and dissent over urban regeneration plans into the process itself. They have institutionalised public participation in the planning process.

Hackworth and Smith (2001:468) had previously claimed that anti-gentrification movements have declined in the third wave of gentrification. Uitermark et al. (2007:138) notice this tendency even in the Dutch context, where there was previously strong USM action against gentrification:

Residents themselves by and large accepted the dominant discourse that equated gentrification with neighbourhood improvement ... They perceived gentrification in the 1990s not as a 'class war', but as the only conceivable way to improve conditions in the neighbourhood.

Uitermark (2009) indicates three reasons for the lack of opposition to current neoliberal urban renewal policies that aim to facilitate gentrification in the Dutch context. Firstly, housing movements now only represent tenants' interests rather than those of the majority. Secondly, local community organisations have focused on getting better compensation for relocation rather than changing urban renewal policies themselves. Thirdly, scholars supported residents during previous social movements, whereas they now produce new formulations of social housing that favour corporations. Uitermark argues that the last two reasons result from high dependence on state funding. This Dutch case also shows the importance of communities' own organisations, which were crucial to the success of the Coin Street and Eldonian Village cases. All these cases show the interrelationship between social protest and urban policies. USMs and urban restructuring have long been interdependent. Social protests have changed urban policies and urban policies have changed the characteristics of social movements. Some of them achieved their goals, but others failed or lost their momentum. There is a need for a structure to allow for better comparisons and contrasts between USMs. Pickvance (1985:48) suggested five contextual features which affect the incidence of USMs as shown in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2 Pickvance's five contextual features affecting USMs

Dimensions	
Rapid urbanisation	yes/no
State action	towards movements (tolerant/intolerant) intervention in consumption(yes/no)
Political context	presence of broad political mobilisation(yes/no) cultural meaning of urban politics(class-based or not) effectiveness of political institutions in expressing political conflicts(no opposition parties/no alternation/alternation)
Development of middle class	yes/no
General economic and social conditions	Encourage/discourage protest

Pickvance outlined a typology of USMs in terms of collective consumption, local level political process and spatial proximity. The configuration of USMs mentioned above can be roughly categorised in Table 3-3. To some extent, Pickvance's typology is unable to categorise USMs clearly since there is some overlap between the categories, something Pickvance notes himself. However, this typology is useful for comparative analysis, since it can take into account the causes, circumstances and militancy of mobilisation.

Table 3-3 Pickvance's typology of USMs

Category	Goal	Example
Type 1	Movements for provision of housing and urban services	Glasgow rent strike Self-help squatter movements
Type 2	Movements over access to housing and urban services	Squatting movements as protest to housing issues in Western Europe in the 1970s
Type 3	Movements for control and management	Barnsbury community action Beckton protest
Type 4	Defensive movements against physical threats	Early movements of the Coin Street and Eldonian Village organisations

In the context of USMs in East Asia, Pickvance's framework may not fit well since East Asia has a very different cultural and political history from the West, as has been discussed in chapter 2. In addition, the evolution of urban social movements may not fit into Mayer's four waves of social mobilisation for the same reason. However, these frameworks could be useful when comparing the Western context to the East Asian context. Also, it could suggest how USMs in East Asian countries have evolved as they have caught up with advanced countries. Accordingly, the next section provides a background on USMs in East Asia in terms of Pickvance's framework. It can provide an answer as to why there have been widespread social movements in response to a wide variety of issues in the West, and explain why fewer social movements in this mould occur in East Asia. Also it can offer an insight into the evolution of urban social movements in Korea, which will be discussed in detail in chapters 6, 7 and 8.

3.2 Strong States and Weak Civil Societies in East Asia

Western notions, for example of civil society, community and the middle class, need to be applied tentatively to East Asia. Shack and Hudson (2003) insist that civil society in East Asia cannot be understood from the European perspective and emphasise that East Asian civil society is still in the process of development. Shack and Hudson (2003:5) further complicate applying European notions to East Asia by arguing that it is crucial to be aware of the region's very different history:

The older view that civil society refers to the self-organisation of citizens in contrast to state or government also needs to be questioned. In many Asian societies it is not clear that civil society is a distinctive sphere – that it is nongovernmental or that its institutions are voluntary ... Civil society in Asia can be a force for democratization and civility, but it can also be a force for contention (Schak and Hudson, 2003:4).

Kim (2003:193) points out that the influence of Confucianism, which suggests that the self, society and the world are heavily interwoven, is still strong in East Asia today. This means the borders between civil society and other spheres are blurred. In this cultural tradition, social order tends to be more important than freedom of speech and the state has had strong control over society.

They [East Asian societies] lacked a concept of universal public good or public rights, such as assembly, participation, or protest. Confucian attitudes and norms about propriety, education, self-cultivation, and social order still influence popular culture and behaviour (Broadbent, 2010:21).

Therefore, individual rights and democracy have been given less consideration and civil society has very limited power. Essentially, the state can use its power against citizens' will for the maintenance of social order and political stability (Kim, 1997d). In order to make social movements successful, it is important to obtain support from wider society as well as the state. However, the general public's perception of social movements is conservative due to the tradition of the Confucian paternalist state. Broadbent (2010) emphasises this cultural ontology in his study of the trajectory of urban social movements in East Asia. Broadbent (2010:20) argues that "the Asian values in East Asia support state-led corporatism rather than pluralistic democracy".

This characteristic can be linked back to the discussion of developmental states in chapter 2. To enable sustained growth, the state tried to secure “the cheapest, most productive, and least militant workers” (Brohman, 1996:125). Labour unions and social movements for the improvement of working hours and wage increases were severely repressed and faced state-directed violence (Brohman, 1996). The business sector was neither forced nor legislated to distribute profits more fairly or create better working conditions. Therefore, mass protests were not allowed and protests against business or social plans were considered opposition to the state (Broadbent, 2010:23). This attitude towards the business sector also affected the development of the middle class and its role in civil society (Schak and Hudson, 2003:4):

The European notion that civil society develops with the emergence or rise of the bourgeoisie, or even less precisely, the middle class also need to be questioned for Asia. In Europe the bourgeoisie is often alleged to have been the primary force in establishing civil society, and it has long been believed that free market economic activities will precipitate democratisation in less-developed countries ... In Europe, civil society is alleged to have been created by those with economic and/or commercial interests fighting for their particular interest, wringing concessions from the state.

Unlike the European experience, the state in East Asia retained control over the market and played an important role in creating the middle class. The emergence of the middle class in newly industrialised East Asian countries occurred at the same time as the rise of capitalism and the working class (Koo, 1991). The different development process of the middle class often created cooperative relationships between the state and the middle class. Pickvance (1985:43) argued for the importance of the middle class in the formation of social movements, pointing out that they have the resources necessary to mobilise. Also, he considered the middle class to have different views on urban development compared to growth machines. These explanations could be applied to current urban social movements in East Asia. However, the role of the middle class in East Asian social movements needs to be carefully approached. In particular, it is important to note the middle class’s different response to urban redevelopment. The emerging middle class in China has taken advantage of urban redevelopment through homeownership (Wu, 2004). The middle class in Korea has also tended to favour urban redevelopment, and this preference will be discussed fully in subsequent chapters.

The freedoms of speech, association and assembly have historically been restricted in East Asia. The state employed internal security institutions such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Korea and the secret police in Taiwan to repress people's resistance movements (Brohman, 1996). All media and communication networks in Singapore have been controlled by the state (Clammer, 2010). Some developmental states (such as Taiwan and Korea) have had an authoritarian political history, and experienced a post-war period characterised by de facto dictatorships or military governments where civil and individual legal rights were ignored. In both Japan and Singapore, one ruling party has dominated for a long time. Unlike Western Europe, the presence of left wing parties is difficult in the East Asian political system. As a result, it has not been easy to represent the demands of minority groups and the working class through party channels. This political characteristic has been described as 'soft authoritarianism' or 'Asian-style democracy' (Kim, 1997d). Hood (1998) defined this characteristic as a sign of an incomplete democracy in need of more transition.

However, Kim (1993) asserted that the positive relationship between economic development and less democratic regimes was temporarily possible in the period from pre-industrial society to industrial society. In particular, the Asian Crisis of 1997 caused rapid transition in East Asian developmental state countries (Minns, 2001). Deregulation and neoliberal reforms have been emphasised. Kim (1993) suggested a typology of developmental states, according to their economic orientation and political dimensions. For example, Korea has changed from a comprehensive developmental and authoritarian state into a limited developmental and democratic state due to a series of changes to its economy and political system (Kim, 1993, Minns, 2001).

In fact, the limitations of the developmental state were highlighted by the Asian Crisis and Japan's long stagnation in the 1990s (Crotty and Lee, 2005). Wong (2004) argued that the economy in developmental states faces international competition more directly in the modern era of economic globalisation, so the state can no longer protect its domestic markets as it once could. Earlier strategies for catch-up development were not able to adjust to a post-industrial

economic system focused on high technological innovation. There are many arguments concerning how globalisation and neoliberalism have impacted on East Asian developmental states. The developmental state still survives in East Asia (Radice, 2008), but it has been in the process of transition through adaption and innovation (Weiss, 2000) and has been transforming into various hybrid structures (Haggard et al., 1999, Park et al., 2011). Globalisation in East Asia has manifested itself differently from the previous forms of intervention in the economies of East Asian countries (Shin and Chang, 2005). Shin (2005) comments that the state has an important role in the globalisation process, especially in periods of financial crisis. Harvey argues that neo-liberalisation enables developmental states to keep their interventionist role (Harvey, 2005:72). Stubbs (2009) takes this further by explaining that the transformed developmental state in East Asia retains power in order to maintain its past economic success.

As a result, it is expected that grassroots mobilisation and the state's response to it have differed. Even though East Asian countries have strong developmental states, the socio-spatial trajectories in each country are dependent on the given space-time context. It is necessary to identify the differences and similarities between East Asian countries. In the case of Singapore, there have not been any collective social movements for the last five decades (Clammer, 2010). This tiny city state country has been controlled by a highly authoritarian state. The strong state has mitigated any possible discontent by providing a good welfare system that covers everything from housing to health care and implements various strict rules (Clammer and Broadbent, 2010). Furthermore, Clammer (2010:469) argues that there is not much room for USMs to take place in Singapore since potential activists are co-opted. By contrast, USMs in other East Asian countries have emerged and expanded. Even China has seen collective action to acquire political democracy and solve issues of economic inequality, as people have been aware of their rights after the late 1970s (Zhao and Broadbent, 2010). Grassroots movements in Korea and Taiwan led democratisation and political liberalisation in the late 1980s (Chung, 2010, Hsiao, 2010). These successful grassroots movements have triggered more social movements. Hsiao (2010:238) asserts that "the social movements and political democratization

had a dialectical or contradictory relationship”. Civil society in East Asia is more vigorous than it has been in the past (Chu, 2009). The topics USMs have been concerned with have ranged from political resistance and labour movements to the environment and the consumer experience (Chiu, 2010).

To sum up the rise and fall of urban social movement in East Asia by using Pickvance’s framework, it can be said that the state could not keep pace with rapid urbanisation, and the provision of collective consumption was not a high priority in state policy. The power of labour and the middle class were limited during the industrialisation period, whereas the authoritarian state had strong control over society and was intolerant of USMs. Social protests were thus brutally repressed for economic growth under authoritarian and military regimes. It was hard to initiate USMs. The goal of social movements in many East Asian countries was to build a liberal and democratic state instead of an authoritarian state. However, citizens in East Asian countries have recently been able to access more politically representative systems such as local electoral systems. Political conflicts have been more effectively expressed and state action against social movements has been more tolerant and flexible. Likewise, the history and trajectories of East Asian social mobilisation are different from those in the West, which Mayer used for her categorisations. In particular, East Asian mobilisations from the 1960s to the 1980s have few similarities to Mayer’s first wave, since it was the peak time of industrialisation and Fordism in East Asia. East Asia has been under the influence of globalisation and neoliberalism since the 1990s, like the West. However, neoliberalism in East Asia has manifested itself in different ways, contrary to its Western counterpart, due to the legacies of developmental states (Park et al., 2011). It is questionable whether social movements in East Asia have much in common with Mayer’s categorisation.

The emergence and development of USMs for fundamental social change has influenced social protests over urban redevelopment. As the East Asian economy has developed rapidly, property has become highly valued. It has induced social conflicts over property development and profit distribution. The strong states have pushed urban (re)development and housing policies in the

name of the common good, but the policies have triggered gentrification as indicated in chapter 2. There is no input from the public in top-down urban redevelopment practices and residents are only contacted when urban (re)development programmes occur in their area (Ng, 2002, Shin, 2008). Large scale displacement and eviction over urban (re)development is more common and direct in East Asian gentrification (Wu, 2004, He, 2012). Mega-events and large scale development have caused the loss of affordable housing and detrimentally affected the lives of the urban poor (Shin, 2009a, Davis, 2011).

However, anti-gentrification movements have not been easy to develop, as a result of a strong state and a weak civil society. Nevertheless, resistance against eviction and displacement has been building in many East Asian cities (Kim, 1998b, Wu, 2004, Smart and Lam, 2009, Weinstein and Ren, 2009, Shao, 2013). Since people now have more political and economic freedom, social movements have influenced the state's decision-making process which usually favours pro-growth policies. Chiu (2010:316) argues that new social movements have emerged in Hong Kong over the last decade against materialism, and that these movements have tried to protect heritage and communities which were disappearing as a result of fast economic growth. Smart and Lam (2009) also analyse the differences and similarities found in urban conflicts over housing and public spaces in Hong Kong. Smart and Lam outline urban conflicts and their influence on policy changes both in the 1950s and after 1997. Unlike the 1950s' movements, social activism after 1997 has brought about some solutions to urban policies controlled by the nexus of the state and developers by revealing the close connections between the two actors (Smart and Lam, 2009:205).

These bottom-up movements over urban restructuring have often failed and demonstrators have sometimes clashed violently with the police, since their targets are much more powerful than themselves. Developmental alliances often cause corruption and conspiracy between the two actors, so the state favours developers over residents (Shao, 2013). Even the courts are not independent from the state (Shao, 2013). Due to oppression from the state, it is not easy to develop citizens' voluntary and nongovernmental organisations. Social organisations have not

been powerful enough to bridge the gap between the state and civil society. Many social organisations financially depend on the state, or alternatively the state can be extensively involved in social organisations (Qian and He, 2012). In spite of various limitations, anti-urban redevelopment movements have flourished. Some protesters have acquired better compensation, relocation sites and hindered redevelopment projects by stopping developers (Shin, 2013). These movements have made progress in advancing protestors' housing rights in terms of legal procedures. Residents have become active in exercising their rights in the face of legalisation allowing forced demolition and eviction to make the way for gentrification. However, Ley and Teo (2014:1299) have found one interesting and important point of differentiation around urban conflicts not seen in Western cases:

When conflict arises it is rarely about the eviction itself, but usually about the scale of the compensation package. Neighbourhood change, to which Euro-Americans would apply the signifier gentrification, provides in Hong Kong an opportunity for residential upgrading for those who are displaced.

Wu (2004:496) also finds that residents displaced in Shanghai complained about displacement processes and the degree of compensation, not the displacement itself. Wu's research shows that most displaced residents were happy to be relocated, since the new housing would be better than what they were used to. This difference is also evident in Korean cases, which will be discussed in chapter 8. Therefore, Ley and Teo's observation about the goals of people fighting against urban redevelopment or gentrification in Hong Kong could be right and it could arguably be considered an East Asian characteristic. However, it is necessary to explain why this difference exists between the West and East Asian countries. In the case of new-build gentrification in the West, there are usually no existing residents so there are no community ties or anti-gentrification movements from residents claiming better compensation for their displacement. In terms of classic gentrification, the process of gentrification usually takes place little by little and is facilitated by individual newcomers; there is no legal duty for newcomers to give existing tenants legal compensation. Therefore, residents oppose gentrification and displacement rather than fighting for compensation.

In fact, the state in East Asia first triggers gentrification with urban redevelopment plans. Displacement is planned and deliberately initiated by the strong state. In contrast, residents have limited power to oppose urban redevelopment and civil society cannot have high expectations for their protests, because of previous suppression of the state. In Chinese urban redevelopment, the state has been able to relocate millions of people quickly without much organised opposition, since the state has controlled land ownership and easily exercised compulsory purchase orders (Shao, 2013). Given the inadequate compensation system and the lack of confidence around protest, it is not easy for residents to take action demanding an end to policies. It is instead easier to demand better compensation; it is a more rational decision to protest for a better deal. Therefore, it is important to consider how the contexts in the West and East Asia differ.

In short, Pickvance's type 4 defensive movements against threats induced by urban (re)development have prevailed in East Asia, since East Asian cities have developed very rapidly. However, the goals of movements have led and overlapped to the other type of movements such as Smart and Lam's case in Hong Kong (Pickvance's type 3: demanding participation in decision-making process of urban redevelopment). In spite of the progress made in political environments, the classic instruments of citizen participation are still limited to protecting the government's interests when it comes to urban restructuring. The state no longer uses direct violence, as was the case in the past, but it is still powerful and now uses more subtle strategies to drive urban redevelopment. In order to increase opportunities for citizen participation, it is crucial to think about a new way of overcoming the legacy of the authoritarian developmental state. In order to fully realise civil power, it is necessary to combine citizens rights with the progressive concept of 'the right to the city' which Lefebvre (1996) defined, as will be explained in the next section.

3.3 The Right to the City and Urban Social Movements

The right to the city is like a cry and a demand ... it cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life as long as the 'urban' place of encounter,

priority of use value, inscription in a space of a time promoted to the rank of a supreme resource among all resources (Lefebvre, 1996:158).

Lefebvre's concept of the right to the city has become a popular buzzword in recent years, and current global social protests have mobilised under the right to the city slogan. Many scholars from the West to the East have paid attention to the term's value and meaning (Fernandes, 2007, Harvey, 2008, Boer and de Vries, 2009, Mayer, 2009, Weinstein and Ren, 2009, Leontidou, 2010, Morange, 2010, Sorensen and Sagaris, 2010, Shin, 2011a, Uitermark et al., 2012). The potential usefulness of this right has been argued in relation to various topics: homelessness (Mitchell and Heynen, 2009), urban redevelopment (Shin, 2011a), public spaces (Van Deusen, 2002, Mitchell, 2003), and housing issues (Fenton et al., 2012). However, the right to the city is a highly abstract concept and can "be anything that is existentially meaningful in everyday life" (Merrifield, 2011:478). The concept of the right to the city can embrace a variety of different claims to the city by different groups prompted by different issues at different times. Harvey (2012: XV) argues that

To claim the right to the city is, in effect, to claim a right to something that no longer exists. Furthermore, the right to the city is an empty signifier... We inevitably have to confront the question of whose rights are being identified... The definition of the right is itself an object of struggle, and that struggle has to proceed concomitantly with the struggle to materialise it.

Harvey (2008:23) argues that the right to the city is one of our human rights, enabling us to change both our cities and ourselves. However, the right to the city is a collective and shared right that can improve individuals' human rights (Mathivet, 2010:24):

It is important to clarify that the right to the city is not an additional human right; rather it is the right to enforce other rights that already formally exist.

This is a new type of right, and it is not clear yet what kind of right and whose right is implied in the right to the city. Along with on-going debates about the definition of the right to the city, it is also important to distinguish it from legal, moral, economic and other rights (Attoh, 2011:699). Fernandes (2007:202) also points out that right to the city literature has only dealt with the concept in terms of socio-political and philosophical values, so there have not been enough debates about its legal status. Therefore it is not easy to represent this concept in

legislation, with the exception of a few cases like 'City Status' in Brazil (Fernandes, 2007). Instead, the right to the city has been approved via international agendas like 'Urban Policies and the Right to the City' of UN-HABITAT (Brown and Kristiansen, 2009). Attoh (2011) emphasises the importance of critical approaches to the right to the city concept because of its intrinsic openness and fuzziness.

While David Harvey among others defines the right to the city as a collective right to the democratic management of urban resources, Don Mitchell's work on homelessness speaks to the ways in which a right to the city may also be conceived of as a right against 'democratic management' (Attoh, 2011:676).

These different approaches face confrontations which rights are the first between individuals' rights and collective rights. Meagher (2010:431) describes this confrontation as a zero-sum game in which one gains what the other loses. On the contrary, Purcell (2008:92) argues that the power of this concept is its flexibility since it can be applied to various urban political contexts; however, he also emphasises the importance of defining what the right to the city means. Marcuse (2011:30) has attempted to define the right to the city, and his definition can help us to narrow down the meaning of the concept. Marcuse (2011:32) suggests that the right to the city is the cry and the demand of the deprived and discontented rather than a universal right. He argues that some people with political and financial power already have the right to the city, which they have enacted. Therefore, when disadvantaged groups demand the right to the city conflicts over rights emerge. However, Marcuse (2011:35) argues that it is a win-win game for all in the long run, not a zero-sum game. Marcuse fleshes out the definition of the right to the city in terms of what right and what city:

The right to the city is a moral claim founded on fundamental principles of justice. It is a right to social justice which includes but far exceeds the rights to individual justice ...It is not the right to the existing city that is demanded, but the right to a future city, indeed not necessarily a city in the conventional sense at all, but a place in an urban society in which the hierarchical distinction between the city and the country has disappeared (Marcuse, 2011:34–35).

For Marcuse, the right to the city is defined as the right of the oppressed to social justice and a future city. In other words, the right to the city aims to rebalance the power dynamics between the least powerful groups and the most powerful groups. Purcell (2002) argues that this concept has profound potential to give urban inhabitants rights to participation and appropriation.

Inhabitants of urban areas can participate in decision-making processes related to the production of space more directly and centrally when they claim their right to the city. This enables them to appropriate urban space beyond the existing socio-spatial hegemony, use the city for its maximum exchange value and increase ownership (Purcell, 2002). As the right to the city enhances users' rights, it can define the future city in terms of "cities for citizens" (Douglass and Friedmann, 1998) or "cities for people, not for profit" (Brenner et al., 2011). The right to the city can empower the oppressed to take charge of their lives and surroundings by asserting their power as citizens.

However, this raises a question around how the right to the city can be achieved. Lefebvre did not provide an explicit answer on how to practice the right to the city, but collective social movements using direct citizen action can help to achieve the right to the city (Mathivet, 2010). USMs are clearly a struggle over the right to determine the present and future of the city for socio-spatial justice. Soja (2010:23), who defined the right to the city as spatial justice, argues that "seeking spatial justice brings together different social movements and organisations beyond destroying the dichotomous relations on race, class and gender". Boer and de Vries (2009:1328) also discuss the value of the right to the city for USMs:

The right to the city offers the possibility to build bridges between social movements with different backgrounds, themes and agendas. Besides linking movements with different themes and backgrounds, the right to the city also offers the possibility to bring together different groups within a social issue (Boer and de Vries, 2009:1328).

Boer and de Vries (2009:1329) emphasise that the right to the city can be a general conceptual framework with a very clear message. Parnell and Pieterse (2010:149) also assert that the right to the city has "a strong ethical base and (interlocking) actions which can work across the local, city, city–region, national and international scale". It gives an insight into the meaning of participation and appropriation of the city at the neighbourhood scale which enables citizens and communities to improve their self-control and self-determination by exercising their collective rights. This is connected with Arnstein's novel concept, 'the ladder of citizen' (Arnstein, 1969:217). Her work shows the difference between citizens' control and manipulation. It can

serve to reinforce the concept of the right to the city. Arnstein (1969:216) has argued that citizens' participation is citizens' power:

It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parcelled out. In short, it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society.

The right to the city can help to strengthen citizens' participation, sustained collective action and the solidarity of people for USMs. Conversely, sustained collective action and solidarity can help to achieve the right to the city. Lefebvre's right to the city provides a radical new approach to concepts such as the state, capital and democracy (Purcell, 2008:92). It raises new ideas and suggests it is distinctly possible to improve the unbalanced power relations between the state, capital and citizens. However, the concept of the right to the city differs according to the space and time context in which it evolved. The right to the city in East Asia could have a different meaning, since distinct relations between the three actors; the state, capital and citizens have developed there.

3.4 The Right to the City in East Asian Developmental States

Most right to the city literature considers the Western context, and there is not much research about East Asia. The existing research on East Asia has focused on people's struggles over housing rights, eviction and urban redevelopment (Weinstein and Ren, 2009, Shin, 2011a, He and Chen, 2012, Qian and He, 2012). As discussed in section 3.2, public participation in East Asia is still constrained in many ways. Many countries in East Asia have liberalised political systems and the people are able to elect their government and parliament by casting ballots. However, democracy is still rather formal and top-down processes dominate. Local governments also tend to take a developmental state stance rather than engage with social welfare issues. The general public is still excluded from existing power relations by the state, and ordinary people continue to be powerless. This is because the voters' government is not

made up of voters, as Canadian politician Tommy Douglas (1944)'s analogy in his 'mouseland' speech made clear. People do not have many options since mice simply switch back and forth between two options:


All the laws were good laws for cats. But they were hard on mice. And life was getting harder and harder. And when the mice couldn't put up with it any more, they decided that something had to be done. So they went en masse to the polls. They voted the black cats out. They put in white cats ... And when they couldn't take that anymore, they voted the white cats out and black ones in again... The trouble wasn't with the colour of the cat. The trouble was that they were cats. And because they were cats, they naturally looked after cats instead of mice (Douglas, 1944:no page)

Just as mice's lives become tougher under laws which are good for cats, people in East Asia are oppressed by the governments which they elect. Visible oppression such as violence by dictators is no longer common since many East Asian countries have been democratised, but more subtle oppression is systematically exercised in everyday life:

Oppression in this sense is structural, rather than the result of a few people's choices or policies. Its causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those rules ... We cannot eliminate this structural oppression by getting rid of the rulers or making some new laws, because oppressions are systematically reproduced in major economic, political, and cultural institutions (Young, 1990:40).

This is because East Asian social structures and social values have not changed enough to protect citizens' liberty and rights. East Asians have had opportunities to participate in politics and decision-making processes at the local level, and this is progress considering the total nonparticipation under dictatorships. However, citizen participation and community involvement are understood and operated in very different forms because there are different relationships between the state and citizens. It is used as a means to stimulate the state's development plans rather than achieve community benefits (Plummer and Taylor, 2004, Kyung, 2006). As Plummer and Taylor (2004:42) illustrate in their ladder of Chinese community participation, shown in Figure 3-1, notification without any interaction between community and the state is seen as a form of participation, although it is not counted on ladders of participation elsewhere.

Figure 3-1 A ladder of community participation in China



source: Plummer and Taylor (2004:42)

Kyung (2006) argues that Koreans in urban redevelopment areas show high level participation, but it is a highly tokenistic form of participation which can be seen as equivalent to the third form (expression) of participation in China. Residents can express their opinions on urban redevelopment, but their opinions do not have any impact on the actual process of urban redevelopment. Kyung (2006:242) describes residents' participation: "we (local people) said yes to their (local authority) project". The present institutional and organisational contexts and structures around participation in East Asia mean the right to the city in the East Asian context should be primarily concerned with the right of ordinary citizens to be free from state interference that threatens their individual rights. It means to demand an end to the state's dominance, suppression and manipulation of citizens. The right to the city in East Asia means to enhance individual's rights by allowing them to manage their lives and neighbourhoods free from state interference, and make citizen participation meaningful and worthwhile.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has reviewed the literature on social protest around housing and urban development with regards to USMs in the West and East Asia. It has examined the relationship between economic and political changes and USMs by considering both the national and the local contexts. We have found there are serious limitations which control the production of urban built environments in capitalist societies, since the right to the city is not universal and is instead reserved for a few people in power. Urban conflicts have thus continuously been

generated over urban growth and development due to the unbalanced power relations in the urban system. Social challenges that aim to change the existing mechanisms of power and powerlessness have also continued. USMs could be the most powerful form of collective opposition over socio-spatial development. USMs are diverse in each country, and are not identical even in a single country over time. In order to compare and contrast the characteristics of USMs in the West and East Asia, Pickvance's classification has been used. It is useful for improving our understanding of how and why each urban social movement occurred at different times and in different countries, and is helpful when accounting for the outcomes of USMs.

There is a long history of urban social protest in the West and USM research has been dominated by discussion of developed Western countries, perhaps reflecting their greater tradition of democracy. In contrast, the states in East Asia have played a central role in shaping political and economic systems and civil society, so research into civil society in East Asia is relatively underdeveloped. The dominant role of the state should be paid more attention when the twists and turns of USMs in East Asia are being interpreted. East Asia's outstanding economic growth has been at the cost of other areas. The strict control of the state for rapid economic growth has affected society and politics, as well as the economy. The limited power of organised civil society and the less developed democratic political systems have hindered the development of USMs. However, East Asian urban societies have become more vital and grassroots movements have emerged demanding extensions to democratic rights and citizens' involvement in decision-making processes.

The right to the city can help to raise new ideas relating to socio-spatial political and economic transformation and citizens' participation in the process of reshaping the city themselves. The right to the city cannot provide a perfect solution and achieve a perfect balance between rights, urban space and socio-spatial justice. However, it can give us a reference point that we can use to approach current problems from a different perspective and take further political action to reshape urban spaces that have been influenced by unbalanced power relations. The right to the

city can be useful in East Asia, where democracy in effect operates in a rather procedural way. The right to the city overcomes the limitations of participation in quasi-democratic systems. Chapters 2 and 3 have provided a preliminary discussion of how urban built environments in market based economies are produced, and have considered how the general public is involved in this process. These issues have been discussed in a way that identifies the differences and similarities between the West and East Asia. Based on these theoretical frameworks, I shall make sense of how these contextual differences interact with urban structuring and USMs in Korea in the following chapters. Chapter 4 documents the background of the case study areas and the data collection and analysis methods used. It gives the rationale for this research by explaining the research design.

Chapter 4: Researching the Role of Power and Powerlessness

The overall research question is: how and why have anti-urban redevelopment movements evolved and influenced urban redevelopment in Korea after the Yongsan incident? To answer this, the following sub-questions were asked.

1. How do the state in Korea and capital influence urban redevelopment and the decision-making processes surrounding it?
2. What is the nature, scale and form of gentrification in Korea ?
3. How have anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea evolved from tenants' movements to become movements led by property owners?
4. To what extent have urban social movements contributed to urban redevelopment policy-making processes?

These questions were examined through a case study of Yongsan redevelopment in Seoul (see section 4.2). After selecting case study areas, the next step of data collection was to identify who the key players and interest groups were in the gentrification and anti-gentrification movements. As can be seen from the next chapters, five different key actors are mainly involved in these movements: local authorities, construction companies, property owners, tenants and social organisations. They are the most important informants who can help us to develop a greater understanding of the key research questions. Once key actors were identified, the second step was to identify their main interests, and how they shape the overall dynamic. This chapter outlines the research design adopted to answer these questions, combining an outline of the methodology with personal experience gained from fieldwork. Section 4.1 explores a case study approach, and then addresses the selection of the case study area and its background. Section 4.2 outlines the data collection methods utilised in this research and the limitations of each method. Section 4.3 presents data analysis methods and some issues that arose during data analysis and

when writing up this thesis. Finally, section 4.4 discusses some personal reflections on conducting research in practice.

4.1 Taking a Case Study Approach

A case study is a valid research strategy when interpreting the key aspects of the current urban changes observed in Korea. Research questions are the most crucial determinant in designing research (Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) suggests that a case study is useful in exploring ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions about contemporary events that are beyond the researcher’s control (Yin 2003:9). The overall research question of this thesis asks ‘how and why have anti-urban redevelopment movements evolved and influenced urban redevelopment in Korea after the Yongsan incident?’, so a case study approach was first considered. The phenomenon that this thesis has researched has evolved dynamically, so it is not easy to understand the contextual complexity of rapid social changes that are ongoing. In particular, movements led by property owners are quite a recent phenomenon, so there is a lack of sufficient research or available data to study. It is important to build up empirical materials for analysis and provide a description of the phenomenon itself in order to investigate the research questions. A case study approach was chosen to gain a more holistic view of the ebb and flow of this social phenomenon, since it enables researchers to gather data sources of a current social transformation in rapid progress (Noor, 2008).

Studying a case which is an ‘integrated system’ makes it possible to understand the case itself. Stake (1995:xi) argues that a case study is the study of the peculiarities and complexities of a single case with important circumstances. A case study approach enables researchers to consider multi-perspectival aspects of a case (Tellis, 1997). Tellis (1997) argues that one benefit is reflecting on the voices of the powerless, since researchers look at various relevant groups and their interaction. Although the voices of the powerless are crucial in understanding gentrification and anti-gentrification movements, they have not been sufficiently present in existing studies. In spite of these various advantages of a case study approach, it is widely

believed that case study research is not a good method for generalisation. However, The main aim of a case study is not to generalise and develop a theory from the analysis of empirical materials, but to provide an in-depth understanding of the complexity of a particular case (Simons, 2009:21). Flyvbjerg (2006) claims that this is a common misunderstanding about case studies and he argues that

One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas “the force of example” is underestimated (Flyvbjerg, 2006:228).

In his case study in Aalborg, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that an in-depth approach is sufficient for understanding the real meaning of power and rationality beyond the surface of a phenomenon. An in-depth case study helps to develop a deep understanding of what happened at a particular moment in time and how the event fits within the wider social context. Yin (2003) states that a case study is a distinctive research method that makes it possible to “investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003:13). He also argues for the role and value of this research method:

[T]he distinctive need for case studies arise out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena. In brief, the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as individual life cycles, organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood changes, international relations, and the maturation of industries (Yin, 2003:2).

In order to maximise our understanding, it is necessary to select good cases. Good cases do not always have to be typical cases. Stake (1995:4) argues that both representative cases and extreme cases can help us to understand social phenomena, since ordinary and unusual cases can offer different perspectives. Ordinary or typical cases are useful in explaining causal relationships and describing what happens (Yin, 2003). Gerring (2007:101–102) claims that rareness also makes a case valuable, since extreme or unusual cases are those are not affected by the social phenomenon, unlike the majority of cases, and so they can give clues as to why the phenomenon does not happen, and, in doing so, help to explain why it does. Therefore, both typical and atypical cases can encapsulate what we study. Stake (1995:3) emphasises the intent

behind conducting a case study in choosing the most appropriate one. He divides cases into two categories: intrinsic cases and instrumental cases. When the case itself is unique and needs to be explored, it is studied as an intrinsic case. In contrast, the instrumental case is chosen in order to help general understanding and explore other cases. In this context, Yongsan can be explained as an instrumental and a representative case to best explore the research questions, since Yongsan has become the key symbol of urban redevelopment interests, property policies and the wider, long-lasting problems with the Korean urban redevelopment system (Cho, 2011b). However, Yongsan where significant anti-redevelopment protests took place is also worth studying for its intrinsic merit as the Yongsan incident is regarded as the definitive national turning point for urban redevelopment. In many ways, Yongsan is the highest-profile and emblematic case in regard to urban redevelopment and anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea. Therefore, Yongsan was chosen because it was both meaningful to study as a unique case in itself and also useful in exploring the research questions. The selection and background of the case study area will be further discussed in the next sub-section.

4.1.1 The Case Study Areas

Seoul is the primary city in Korea, so Korea is often referred as to the “Seoul Republic” (Lee and Lee, 2011:54). Most policies which the Seoul Metropolitan Government (hereafter SMG) has implemented have influenced other regions. The policies which the SMG drives are collectively regarded as a barometer of national policies. While this research (2011–2014) was ongoing, the new mayor of Seoul came to power in the 2011 by-election after the former mayor, Oh Se-Hoon, resigned because of a referendum failure on the expansion of free school meals. Park Won-Soon was an independent candidate, unlike the former mayor who was from the conservative party, and has attempted various different policies since his election as mayor. The two former mayors of Seoul (Lee Myung-Bak and Oh Se-Hoon) were both from the conservative party and favoured pro-growth plans such as the ‘New Town Project’. The new mayor has focused on social welfare and distribution policies over pro-growth policies. This has significantly affected urban redevelopment policy in Korea and citizens’ resistance to urban

redevelopment. Over the past 10 years, new high-rise flats have been erected in Yongsan an area close to the central business district after the two former mayors actively drove urban redevelopment there. Although Yongsan is the geographical centre of Seoul, as shown in Figure 4-1, the area has deteriorated due to the huge rail yards (0.44km^2 , area A in Figure 4-2) and the US army base (2.67 km^2 , area B in Figure 4.2 located in the middle of Yongsan. However, since the relocation of these two facilities from Yongsan was decided in the 1990s, many urban redevelopment projects have been planned and progressed. These redevelopments are regarded as the largest scale projects ever recorded in Korea, so their effect is very substantial. Yongsan has become attractive to high income households and has received attention because of its new-build residential developments. For example, when a new super high-rise luxury flat complex sale began in Yongsan many people queued overnight to purchase flats and the success rate for new flat applications was just one applicant out of every 350 (*Pressian*, 25th March 2004).

Figure 4-1 Location of the case study area in Seoul





Figure 4-2 Three case study neighbourhoods in Yongsan Gu



A: The huge rail yards; B: The US army base; H: The H urban redevelopment area;
S: The S general flats; P: The P super high-rise flats

source: Google map (2014)

When the urban redevelopment plans were first published, there was little interest in the impact the neighbourhood changes in Yongsan would have on existing residents, even though redevelopment was known to take place not in brown field areas but in existing residential and commercial districts. Most people and the mass media were concerned only with the profit to be gained from the redevelopments and did not pay much attention to side effects such as demolition and eviction. In fact, 20 per cent of the total Yongsan Gu land area (21.87 km²) and about 40 per cent of all land except for green space was designated for redevelopment in urban

redevelopment plans such as the ‘Yongsan Secondary Central Business District Development’, ‘River Han Renaissance Plan’ and so on (YGG, 2004). The Seoul municipality claimed that these transformations would attract more global capital and elites and strengthen urban competitiveness (SMG, 2006). The local state has undertaken the transformation of Yongsan into another CBD linked with the current CBD. However, it is doubtful whether these projects will be successful. Major development projects are being run not by the state but by private developers, although most of the designated redevelopment districts are owned by the state (Hong et al., 2010:16). Hence, one key question is how the public can benefit from private sector-led redevelopment. Furthermore, all new-builds are luxury residences rather than business or commercial properties, even though the initial objective of the redevelopment was to facilitate business transactions. Structural alteration to convert office units into residential units is not allowed by law, but is still commonplace under developmental alliances (Im and Jeon, 2009b). Therefore, these redevelopments in Yongsan have introduced conflicts and are barely acceptable to some residents.

I chose three neighbourhoods in Yongsan: the H urban redevelopment area, the S neighbourhood and the P neighbourhood, as shown in Figure 4-2. The latter two areas are already gentrified, whereas the first is now facing gentrification. The P neighbourhood was redeveloped as a site for luxury super high-rise mixed-use flat complexes¹ where ordinary people can hardly afford to live. The S neighbourhood was transformed into ‘general flat complexes’ which are purely residential flats. The reason I chose two different types of flats is to investigate the differences in residents’ social characteristics between the two different types of housing. The type of housing is determined by urban redevelopment plans, so this shows how urban redevelopment policies reshape neighbourhoods. The urban redevelopment plan in area H was changed from a Residential Environment Redevelopment Project to an Urban Environment Redevelopment Project in 2010. Due to the plan change, property owners in this area can now transform their area into a site for a luxury super high-rise flat complex rather than a general flat

¹ This kind of building is designed as a mixed-use building (with flats, offices and commercial space) but is normally used for residential flats.

complex (see Figures 4-3 and 4-4 for the differences between the two flat complexes). The property owners in the H urban redevelopment area (hereafter area H) established their association in 2012, and have driven urban redevelopment. Researching the H urban redevelopment will show who plays a pivotal role in development and make it possible to understand how the key actors affect the characteristics of gentrification in Korea. In addition, it will help us to understand how social conflict and resistance to gentrification are generated and, if they are not generated, it will help us to examine why there is no resistance movement in the area. Exploring these two gentrified areas will give insights into newcomers. In light of this, these case study areas were chosen to investigate the central aim of this research.

Figure 4-3 Differences between a super high-rise flat complex (A) and a general flat complex (B)



Figure 4-4 The P super high-rise flat complex (A) and the S general flat complex (B)



A



B

4.2 Creating Data with a Mixed-Methods Approach

Understanding the complex relationships that are bound up in Korean urban redevelopment cannot be achieved through one method. The quality of the case study is dependent on an in-depth understanding of the case (Creswell, 2012:98). It is crucial to consider many reliable data sources to develop a good quality case study. For this research, four main methods were employed to build a rich pool of data: official urban redevelopment plan document analysis, questionnaire surveys, in-depth interviews and participant observation. Quantitative data from official documents, such as censuses and questionnaire surveys, gives objective characteristics through specific figures and numbers, so it is useful in showing tendencies in the social characteristics of gentrifiers and the gentrified, along with the economic cost and benefit of urban redevelopment in Yongsan. However, it does not provide depth, since the analysis of those data sets is less useful in conceptualising the dynamics of social interaction in the Korean urban redevelopment arena. Therefore, we need to utilise qualitative data from in-depth

interviews and participant observation. This data can help to understand subtlety and nuances embedded in a specific context, since it provides insights into how people make decisions and what affects their decision making. This research focuses on the changes in people's responses to urban redevelopment and anti-redevelopment movements over the Yongsan incident. Answers to the research question – which is concerned with the reality of power relations around urban redevelopment and their effect on mobilising interest groups – can only be reached by understanding the unobservable structural relationships underpinning social phenomena through analysing qualitative data.

Exploring the research question using many different sources of evidence enables different but complementary data to be amassed through variation in data collection (Creswell and Clark, 2007). It is also helpful to avoid any biases or constraints that could result from the use of a single method (Brewer and Hunter, 1989:59). It leads to improved validity and credibility of research. In this context, a mixed-methods approach was adopted to provide a rounded picture of how political economic processes and social cultural processes influenced the birth and evolution of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea. Using a case study with multi methods approach, data collection was conducted during six months of fieldwork in Seoul between June and December 2012. The following sub-sections discuss the issues with and limitations of each data collection method. This approach also involves different data collection methods, depending on the key actors in different institutional settings. I took all the photos used in this research, unless otherwise indicated.

4.2.1 Urban Redevelopment Plan Documents

Official urban redevelopment plan documents which record the historical context around urban redevelopment plans enhance our understanding about each project in terms of its background, providing, for example, insights into why the final decision about each project was made and the reasons for it. Documents are useful for further investigation (May, 2001:175). Official urban planning documents about redevelopment plans are available from the homepage of the Yongsan Gu Government (hereafter YGG) and the website of the SMG. Urban redevelopment

plans are hierarchically structured, as shown in Table 4-1. In particular, individual development project plan documents cover a variety of data sources about the present and future of a single neighbourhood, including information on household numbers, property ownership, housing type and so on. This archival research provided the preliminary materials for the interview stage and helped to indicate how one urban redevelopment project was designed to fit within the urban planning hierarchy.

Table 4-1 The publicly available documents on urban redevelopment in Yongsan

Comprehensive National Territorial Plan	4 th Comprehensive National Territorial Plan
Urban Foundation Planning	1995 Yongsan Development Foundation Plan 2010 Seoul Fundamental Urban Planning 2020 Seoul Fundamental Urban Planning
Urban Management Planning	Yongsan Urban Planning
Individual Development Project	The H Urban Redevelopment Plan

However, the most important documents covering how each urban redevelopment project is run in practice are produced and kept by the property owners' associations for each redevelopment (see chapter 6). The property owners' association for redevelopment (hereafter POAR) records all information relating to the process of redevelopment from beginning to end, such as how much compensation it gives to tenants and how much profit it will make from the redevelopment project. These documents from the association are a potentially rich source of information when investigating the roles of the key actors and their relationships to one another. These documents are not published for public consumption, but obtaining this data is key to carrying out this part of the research. After the property owners in area H actively promoted their redevelopment project from 2012, the property owners' association published two

documents and distributed them to property owners. I succeeded in obtaining two books from one leader of the association in area H.

These two documents contain very specific information about budget, details of board members, committee members and contractors, and the regulations the property owners' association was subject to. I utilised this information to analyse how urban redevelopment has evolved and who was involved. Board members and committee members play a pivotal role in the decision-making process, so it is important to understand who they are. I analysed their socio-economic characteristics by using their personal information from one of the two documents: age, education, occupation, and property address. Their property address is essential for obtaining their property certificate.² The property certificate contains property details, ownership rights, transaction history, lease rights and mortgage rights. Analysis of the property certificate provides more information about the key players. Analysis of these urban redevelopment plan documents will help us to discover how policy makers and property owners influence urban redevelopment processes.

4.2.2 Questionnaire Surveys

Questionnaire surveys (see Appendix 1 for examples of the questionnaire and accompanying cover letter) were conducted with existing residents in area H and newcomers in the two already gentrified areas to investigate their socio-economic characteristics and recruit people for follow-up interviews. Newcomers started to move into the two new flat complexes in late 2008 and 2010 respectively, so there is a limit to how much information on their socio-economic characteristics can be found in the latest 2010 census. Census data is generally published by the smallest administrative unit, called the 'dong'. The total population in each dong varies from 1,000 to over 10,000. It is not possible to understand newcomers' socio-economic characteristics through this census data, since each flat complex is home to about 900 households. Recently, census data at the collection district level (census output area) became available to the public. The census data collection district is 1/25 size of one dong, and the

² This certificate can be obtained at the website of the Supreme Court after paying a charge. In order to obtain or read this certificate, only a property address is needed.

average population size is 500 (Lee, 2007:74). Available data is population (total population, gender, age, education and marital status), household (total number of household, tenancy, and household structure) and housing (building year, total size, type). Newcomers' occupation and income information is important when grasping their socio-economic status, but it is not available from the census data. Furthermore, the census data collection districts do not completely match my case study neighbourhoods. Therefore, a questionnaire survey was used to compensate for the limitations of the census data.

Questionnaires were posted to 100 households randomly sampled in each gentrified area, and 50 questionnaires were hand delivered in area H. This sample size covers about 10 per cent of the total households in each neighbourhood. The reason for the different delivery methods was that access to the two gentrified flat complexes was not granted. Survey respondents returned their questionnaire sheets by using a stamped addressed envelope provided within the questionnaire package. The questionnaire was divided into three parts. Part one examined people's views and perceptions of the effects of urban redevelopment and their neighbourhoods. The second part collected household information like tenure type, length of residence, household composition and previous residence. Demographic and personal information such as age, occupation and education was requested in part three. This method makes it possible to score people's attitudes and perceptions using numeric measurements alongside their socio-demographic information (Cloke, 2004).

However, the response rate from my questionnaire surveys was too low to allow for statistical analysis, as shown in Table 4-2. It was not a face-to-face survey setting and there was no reward or incentive given to respondents. This scenario is less likely to achieve a high response rate than a face-to-face survey scenario where a reward is offered. The response rate was low, but similar to the response rates encountered in other research projects conducted in the same way. Research by Jung (2003) on 12 super high-rise flats shows the response rate ranged from 6 per cent to 19 per cent. Other questionnaire based research into residents in super high-rise flats also presented difficulties in obtaining a sufficient number of responses (Sun, 2004, Park, 2012).

Due to the low response rate, the information gathered cannot be considered representative of all residents. In spite of this low response rate, all the respondents who completed all the questions engaged with the open questions very well. Accordingly, their responses were used in an illustrative way to describe their views and social characteristics alongside the other research results.

Table 4-2 The number of respondents by each neighbourhood

Neighbourhood	The H urban redevelopment area	The S general flats	The P super high-rise flats	Total
Distribution	50	100	100	250
Response	2	12	10	24
Follow-up interviews	0	2	0	2

4.2.3 Semi-Structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews (see Appendices 2–4 for examples of the interview questions) lasting between one and two hours were conducted with key informants such as experts, residents, protesters and newcomers to gather views and perceptions not represented in formal papers. Interviews allowed us insights into a wider range of experience and offered a better understanding of the key informants compared to the questionnaires, since they could express themselves in their own words (Flowerdew and Martin, 2005). The questionnaire structure, which focuses on “ask[ing] a rigid set of simple questions”, does not provide respondents with a chance to explain “the complexities and contradiction of their lives” (Flowerdew and Martin, 2005:110). Testimony from the key actors provided more vivid accounts, and interviews are helpful in obtaining up-to-date information. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out interviews (Table 4.3).

Table 4-3 Profile of interviewees by institutional category

Category	Interviewee		Date
Area H	Property owners	One leader of property owners' association	20.08.12 12.10.12
		Absentee landlord/board member	20.08.12 12.10.12
		Owner-occupier 1	20.09.12
		Owner-occupier 2	20.09.12
	Tenants	Residential tenant 1	20.09.12
		Residential tenant 2	21.09.12
		Residential tenant 3	21.09.12
		Business tenant 1	20.09.12
		Business tenant 2	21.09.12
		Business tenant 3	21.09.12
		Business tenant 4	30.09.12
		Business tenant 5	30.09.12
		Business tenant 6	05.12.12
Urban planning and housing experts	Urban planner in Yongsan government		06.08.12
	Civil servant working for the dispute mediation committee in the Yongsan government		06.08.12
	Mediator working with the public-private partnership in Seoul Metropolitan Government		08.08.12
	Urban planner in Seoul Metropolitan Government		09.08.12
	Ex-urban and housing planner in Seoul Metropolitan Government		21.08.12
	Real estate agent/professor in the department of real estate		22.08.12
Social activists and protesters	Organiser of the National Coalition for Victims of Forced Evictions (NCFE)		01.08.12 02.11.12
	Four protesters in the NCFE		01.08.12
	The founder of the Seoul Council of the Centre for Victims of Forced Evictions (SCFE)		01.08.12

	Social activist in the South Korean Federation Against Housing Demolition (SFHD)	02.08.12
	Organiser in the Residential Environment Organization (REO)	07.08.12
	Social activist 1 in the Korea Coalition for Housing Rights (KCHR)	22.08.12
	Social activist 2 in the KCHR	28.10.12
	Organiser in Share and Future Organisation (SFO)	01.11.12
	Organiser with the Nationwide Coalition of Property Owners for Immediate Counteraction to Urban Redevelopment (NCPO)	31.10.12
	Participant 1 in the NCPO weekly meetings	11.10.12
	Participant 2 in the NCPO weekly meetings	18.10.12
	Participant 3 in the NCPO weekly meetings	18.10.12
	Participant 4 in the NCPO weekly meetings	20.10.12
	Two organisers with the Nationwide Coalition for Housing Countermeasures (NCHC)	11.10.12
Newcomers	Resident 1 in the S general flats	10.10.12
	Resident 2 in the S general flats	27.11.12
	An owner-occupier in the P super high-rise flats	04.07.12 19.09.12 14.11.12
Total interviewees = 40		

It was relatively easy to arrange interviews with experts like civil officials, social activists and a real estate agent, since many of them are clearly identifiable compared to the residents in the three case study areas. Interviewees were found through the snowballing method, developing relationships and taking opportunities. For example, the interview with the founder of the Seoul Council of the Centre for Victims of Forced Evictions (SCFE) was conducted during an anti-poverty seminar hosted by the Korea Centre for City and Environment Research. At the seminar, I met some social activists and experts. They introduced me to other interviewees. Sixteen experts whom I interviewed offered in-depth knowledge based on their experiences, so

the interviews with them provided general and comparable insights. Finding tenants or property owners taking part in anti-gentrification movements was also carried out without any major difficulties. The interviews with four participants in property owners' opposition movements were carried out during participant observation (see section 4.3.4). Interviews with the four participants from the tenant movements grew naturally out of an interview with the head of the National Coalition for Victims of Forced Evictions (NCFE). By contrast, it was not easy to find residents from case study areas to interview. Interviews with the existing residents in area H and newcomers in the two gentrified areas were recruited via the questionnaire surveys. However, the response rate was very low (about 10 per cent in the two gentrified areas) and only two newcomers expressed an interest in follow-up interviews. In order to recruit interviewees from the existing residents in area H, I had no alternative but to knock on doors.

Most residents I tried to interview were not reluctant to express their opinions. However, a few of them responded aggressively and refused to be interviewed. A few of them were not well-informed about their changing neighbourhood or were not interested. However, I conducted interviews with 13 residents, including one leader of the property owners' association and one absentee landlord in area H. As mentioned earlier in section 4.2, area H is mixed-use, and business tenants were slightly more accessible than residential tenants since they usually keep their shops open at all times. Two owner-occupiers whom I interviewed also run their shops in this area. They run their businesses on the ground floor and live on the first floor of their building. They can offer various perspectives on urban redevelopment as both owner-occupiers and rental landlords. The interviewees are not statistically representative of the entire neighbourhood population on account of the method employed to recruit interviewees. However, residents have various backgrounds in terms of age, ranging from early 30s to late 70s, and length of residency, ranging between about one year and 50 years. Consequently, they can tell different stories based on their experiences and provide a range of opinions. In contrast, it proved impossible to gain access to newcomers in the two gentrified areas. It is very difficult to access residents unless researchers live in the flat complex being studied. Both flat complexes are gated with door entry systems, so it is difficult to get inside the building and knock on doors.

The interviews with newcomers were conducted with two residents in the S general flats recruited by questionnaire surveys and one resident in the P super high-rise flats whom I had established contact with before. Interviewees responded differently to being recorded. Many civil officials and social activists did not mind being recorded, but residents and some protesters found being recorded more difficult. When recording was not available, jotted notes from the interview were fully written up in the field notes immediately after the interview finished.

Interviews with some respondents were carried out more than once. This proved helpful in clarifying interviewees' vague feelings and opinions in a more natural atmosphere (Crang and Cook, 2007:73). Open-ended interviews were conducted for the second and third interviews. These were with the organiser of the NCFE, one leader of the POAR in area H, an absentee landlord working as a board member of the POAR in area H, and an owner-occupier in the P super high-rise flats. The owner-occupier in the P super high-rise flats had worked as a board member for 10 years, when the P super high-rise flats were being redeveloped. He was thus interviewed several times regarding the role of board members and the characteristics of newcomers. The last three interviewees hold positions of power within the POAR, which is one of the key institutions to this research. Urban redevelopment in Korea is like a business and the POAR is run like a company (see chapter 7). The head and board members in the POAR are directly involved in running urban redevelopment processes in practice. They deal with all issues that arise with the local state and their contractors, including chaebol construction companies. They are indeed 'elites' who exercise power in matters of urban redevelopment, as entrepreneurs run their businesses. They have valuable information, so interviewing elites is very crucial in understanding complicated and sensitive matters. It is very important to understand business complexities, networks and behaviour, since this allows new insights into business (Schoenberger, 1991, McDowell, 1998). However, few research projects exploring urban redevelopment have attempted to interview this group, since it is difficult to gain access to elites for interviews. Therefore, my interviews are unusual since they gained the testimony of elites on complex urban redevelopment processes.

4.3.4 Participant Observation

Participant observation is a powerful method for understanding what people do. It enables us to expand our understanding beyond people's claims about what they do. Participant observation contributes a great deal to understanding society, communities, and people's interactions with their environment (Silverman, 2011). In particular, observation of closed or private settings where access is not granted to the public is helpful for data-gathering. Therefore, participant observation was carried out in settings where gatekeepers control public access: the first inaugural assembly of the H urban redevelopment area, the NCPO's weekly meetings and the meeting of the Seoul Citizens Supporters.

During my data collection period, the property owners' association for the H urban redevelopment area held their first inaugural assembly on 22nd September 2012. It was a very important meeting for property owners, since they made decisions on who they would hire to run their urban redevelopment project and their board members, architects, professional management company,³ contractors and budget. One leader of the property owners' association allowed me to attend the first inaugural assembly. I could observe their meeting, since about 100 people, including 62 property owners and 48 non-property owners, participated. Some attendees left early and some arrived late during the course of the assembly, which lasted six hours. Unlike the next case, this was totally non-participant observation since I had no right to a voice. This observation was very valuable in understanding how the association functions and how property owners and their contractors work together. This observation and the interviews with property owners in this area offered pro-urban redevelopment coalitions' views. It proved to be useful for understanding gentrification processes in Korea. Unlike active pro-urban redevelopment coalitions in area H, there were no significant anti-urban redevelopment movements from tenants and property owners in this area. In order to supplement this limitation, I contacted social organisations representing tenants' movements and property owners' movements respectively.

³ Property owners are not usually experts so they tend to hire a professional management company to assist them. The management company helps to complete all of the administrative paperwork connected with the government on behalf of the POAR.

The National Coalition for Victims of Forced Evictions (NCFE) and the South Korean Federation Against Housing Demolition (SFHD) have both worked on tenants' issues over urban redevelopments since the early 1990s. These two organisations were contacted to represent tenants' movements. Property owners' opposition movements have been more active than tenants' movements since 2008, so there were more opportunities to observe their activities close at hand than there were to observe tenants' movements. The Nationwide Coalition of Property Owners for Immediate Counteraction to Urban Redevelopment (NCPO) and the Nationwide Coalition for Housing Countermeasures (NCHC), which both represents property owners against urban redevelopment, were established in 2008 and 2011 respectively. Since the NCPO was the first organisation to be established, it has a longer history and is well organised. Consequently, it was contacted in order to examine how property owners' opposition movements have developed.

The NCPO runs weekly meetings and online forums. My access to the online forum and the offline meetings with the NCPO was accomplished through explicit negotiations with an organiser who has been running meetings since 2008. I attended the NCPO's weekly meetings, which lasted between two and three hours, on 11th and 18th October 2012 and a special meeting held for the 2012 Seoul Social Policy Exhibition on 20th October 2012. An overt approach was taken during my participant observation for these events, since only a small number of people (about 15–20 people) were involved in the meeting and a formal introduction was required at the beginning of each meeting. I did not take an active part in their meetings, but I sometimes asked questions where necessary during the observation. Participants in this movement were in favour of telling their stories to me and the organiser expressed an interest in what my research could do to help his organisation. Accordingly, I was able to have conversations with participants in a relaxing environment about what they had experienced and their thoughts. These unstructured interviews helped me to gain greater insights into why they participated in the movement and what they wanted to achieve from their participation. As property owners' opposition movements have become more active, the SMG introduced a new temporary

committee called ‘the Seoul Citizens Supporters’ in order to listen to citizens’ opinions about how to tackle urban redevelopment problems. The SMG recruited 100 volunteers via their homepage. I had a chance to become a member of this committee, and my participation in it enabled me to gather opinions about urban redevelopment problems and solutions from people ranging from ordinary citizens to stakeholders.

Half of all members were property owners directly affected by urban redevelopment plans and the rest were ordinary citizens who were not involved in urban redevelopment. They discussed whether it was fair and necessary to use tax revenue to help people halting urban redevelopment and also the level of government subsidy which was fair and necessary. The SMG introduced more detailed regulations after six months of activity. All members gathered for a meeting on 10th August 2012, but their main communication platform for six months was an online forum. I observed this online forum along with that of the NCPO. This observation was a great opportunity to obtain some supplementary data to improve understanding about two organisations. Two online forums were monitored daily and hard copies of posts were made in case some posts disappeared. The online forum of the Seoul Citizens Supporters group was temporary, so it was not updated after the introduction of legislation in 2012. However, the NCPO still updates its online forum. When new policies which the organisation would be interested in were released, I accessed the NCPO forum to obtain opinions even after finishing my fieldwork. Online posts of the NCPO were tracked from the beginning of the resistance and this helped to appreciate past activities. This integrated approach to online and offline participant observation enabled me to overcome time and space limitations.

4.3 Data Management and Data Analysis

The quotes in this research either come directly from my research notes or from my interview recordings. All recordings were transcribed and analysed in Korean. When interview extracts needed to be quoted, they were translated into English. Language reflects our knowledge and way of communication. Evaluating how interviewees communicated and the words they used is

vital. During analysis, it was not difficult to understand participants' implicit language but it was often challenging to translate Korean into English. Some words are not compatible between Korean and English. For example, the English term 'gentrification' has no equivalent in the Korean language. One term or sentence in Korean sometimes needs to be translated into several English sentences in order to accurately capture interviewees' expressions. Awareness of this semantic compatibility when collating findings is vital (Sayer, 1992). In spite of this semantic compatibility, I used direct quotations throughout the research to illustrate how individuals have engaged with urban redevelopment. They give rich descriptions through their experiences of particular situations. As first-hand dialogues provide more vivid accounts than third-party observations, they are powerful evidence in support of the themes. Also, it is important to give voices to people who have limited powers of self-determination.

However, any identifying information from respondents was removed and they are referred to anonymously in order to ensure confidentiality. Through the information sheet and consent form given to interviewees (see Appendix 5), explanations about anonymity and confidentiality of information were provided before interviews were conducted. In particular, anonymisation of information relating to residents and protesters is crucial to protect them from any harm in the event of their private details being revealed. However, this causes difficulties in distinguishing between plural interviewees in the same category, so they are differentiated by basic descriptions with numbers like 'business tenant 1'. However, social activists and civil officials are referred to with a basic description and their institutional affiliation, such as 'civil servant in the Seoul Metropolitan Government'. This is due to the fact that each institution has different approaches and views on the same phenomenon, according to its characteristics.

In analysing my data, purely qualitative approaches were used rather than statistical methods since most of the collected data was qualitative. In order to produce meaningful information, thematic analysis was used to interpret underlying ideas, assumptions and concepts below the surface data. Boyatzis (1998:vii) defines thematic analysis as a process of "encoding qualitative information". Braun and Clarke (2006:78–79) argue that thematic analysis is a "foundational

method for qualitative analysis to identify, analyse and report patterns within data”. I manually developed codes which are “words or short phrases that symbolically assign a summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute” (Saldaña, 2012:3). Coding was iterated in order to find patterns and generate overarching theme in relation to research questions.

At first, I read the transcripts carefully several times and highlighted issues. I made a summary of each transcript to indicate each interviewee’s opinion on urban redevelopment. Based on the notes, I categorised all collected data by the type of key actors in response to urban redevelopment. I coded and developed themes by using ‘a hybrid approach’ (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2008). A deductive thematic analysis driven more by the theoretical framework was conducted, along with a data-driven analysis. Although the inductive approach is not limited to any theoretical frameworks, it is not possible to conduct the study without reference to them. In spite of that, I tried to find emerging patterns from the data and to develop theories on the basis of data. One of the themes that became evident was the negative statements about the state made by all interviewees. While doing inductive thematic analysis, similarities and differences within and between groups were observed. It gave opportunities to examine consistency or any conflict in ideas between and within groups. These differences and similarities were examined to see if there were relationships or connections between groups. Each data group was initially identified by the responses to urban redevelopment, so differences were not expressed within the same group. Conflicting views and potential conflict were indicated between each group, but there was an area of consensus between pro-redevelopment groups and anti-redevelopment groups in response to the state. I generated themes which were often expressed in all transcripts and were important aspects underlying these people’s stories. I used some of the themes as section headings in the following empirical chapters. Under those headings, I first describe and provide an overview of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Yongsan. I complete the case findings by developing theorised explanations in the Korean and international context, which I present in the last section of each chapter.

4.4 Reflections on Research Practice

As discussed in earlier sections, the key to a successful case study is to choose a good case and provide many sources of evidence. When I decided on the case study area, the underlying assumption was that a variety of different responses to and views on urban redevelopment could be found in Yongsan from the early stage of urban redevelopment. Residents in this area would have been in a position to take more action than those in other redevelopment areas, since they had observed the outcome of the Yongsan incident more closely. However, no significant collective action was taken by tenants or property owners in the case study area, and it seemed that the urban redevelopment plan in the area had progressed smoothly, while I was doing my fieldwork. The POAR in area H steamrolled their urban redevelopment, so progress was made very quickly. In spite of that, it was surprising that no movements from anti-urban redevelopment groups were observed, unlike those in other areas.

The protesters that I interviewed expressed their anger and were desperate to protect their rights, whereas residents in area H were not active at that time. I wondered why residents in area H did not take action from an early stage of urban redevelopment. Although they were not yet informed about their compensation, their response was in considerable contrast to that of protesters who consistently highlighted the detrimental effects of urban redevelopment. I was puzzled about this unexpected situation and worried about my case study selection at the beginning of the fieldwork. The interviews with participants in anti-urban redevelopment groups in other areas and social activists gave me insights into why there was not any significant protest at all in area H; it was connected to the lack of choice, communication and information throughout the urban redevelopment processes. It was a sign that the sense of powerlessness generated a range of impacts that affected residents in that area. In this context, Yongsan, which was not generated by anti-urban redevelopment movements, was equally meaningful in that it provided unique opportunities to assess such groups' specific ways of seeing and experiencing urban redevelopment, as did the cases with anti-urban redevelopment movements. In fact, Yongsan, where movements led by property owners are absent or weak, is

more useful than a case where those movements are present, since it captures views that can be compared with those in a case where movements led by property owners are present and active. Furthermore, this case study helped in understanding the mechanisms embedded in the Korean urban redevelopment system and the lack of community-based protests.

In order to explore movements led by property owners, I examined the social organisations representing them, rather than finding a case where the movements were in progress. The lifespan of these protest movements was not long, so at that stage it was too early to find a successful example of a movement led by property owners which had completely halted urban redevelopment projects. Around the end of my data collection period, I finally found a case. While writing this thesis, a couple of successful cases were reported in the newspapers. It would have maximised our understanding about the characteristics of movements led by property owners if I had researched a specific movement based in a single urban redevelopment area, along with the social organisations which I researched. However, I met people from various stages of urban redevelopment through participant observation at the NCPO weekly meeting. It helped me to understand how protesters have changed their attitudes and strategies as their urban redevelopment project has developed.

Along with the selection of the right cases, sampling is important for the validity and reliability of the research. Due to the difficulty in finding and accessing participants, sampling of interviewees was totally dependent on opportunities to assess research participants and their openness to a researcher. It is difficult to decide sample size and sample structure in advance when there is insufficient information about the basic population, such as the residents in area H and the movements led by property owners. Given the lack of time and resources, it is not possible to collect data indefinitely. While carrying out interviews, I found myself listening to very similar stories from different people within an interview category. At this point, I thought that it was time to stop interviewing and to identify patterns. For the same reason, I reduced my interview data from 50 to 40 interviewees for analysis.

Research findings from research practice are based on researchers' own interpretation. Research practice processes have been presented here as a linear procedure, yet it was a reflexive process. It is not possible to avoid being affected by that which is being researched. In particular, experiences from the fieldwork affected my values and views, and these changes affected the analysis and how I constructed arguments later on. The purpose of social research is to explain phenomena, rather than to specify what should be done (Flyvbjerg, 1998). However, it became more important to stress issues of social justice in urban redevelopment, because I encountered more negative than positive stories about urban redevelopment, regardless of people's attitudes to it. Those changing values have been embedded in the analysis of the data and the arguments presented in the thesis. Despite the limitations in my case study selection and sampling, I was able to build my argument differently because of rich empirical materials, as will be seen from the rest of the thesis.

4.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has mapped out the research design and methodology adopted in this research. In summary, this research employed a case study strategy with mixed-methods to explore the nature of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Seoul, Korea. Data was created by using mixed-methods: in-depth interviews, participant observation, questionnaire surveys and document reviews. Thematic analysis was used to find meaning in the data and study the relationship between the characteristics of anti-gentrification movements and the wider contexts in which they arose.

The next two chapters set the stage for a detailed examination of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea by presenting Korean transformations in terms of spatial development and its responses. Chapter 5 provides the Korean political and economic historical background in connection with urban development and housing policies. Chapter 6 offers a more detailed consideration of the institutional framework of the urban redevelopment system, the role of the middle classes in the urban redevelopment arena, and the scope of the 1980s anti-

urban redevelopment movements. The subsequent three chapters unfold the findings of this empirical fieldwork in greater detail and contextualise them in relation to the Korean socio-political past and present. Chapter 7 focuses on the formation and mobilisation of pro-gentrification coalitions in Seoul. It highlights how the characteristics of gentrification in Korea can be traced back to the authoritarian developmental state. Chapter 8 presents the evolution of anti-gentrification movements in terms of property owners' opposition movements, retracing how social movements and citizen participation in urban politics have emerged and interlinked over the last three decades. Chapter 9 suggests some political implications of the research, and features a discussion of the concepts of the just city and the right to the city within the Korean gentrification and anti-gentrification movements context. Final conclusions are reached in chapter 10.

Chapter 5: Developmentalism, Urbanisation and Housing

“The problem is speed. We should launch this project like a bolt of lightning and push forward with it like storms and gales” (Park, Hee-Tae, the leader of the ruling party, from *Jungang Daily*, 15th December 2008).

When President Lee Myung-Bak launched his ambitious canal construction project in 2008, it caused fierce controversy and divided the country. The quote above expresses the opinion the ruler of the leading party shared with the President during a meeting. Even though this is just one politician’s speech, it clearly shows how Korean politicians and the government have dealt with spatial development policies and how social conflicts over spatial planning and policy making have been resolved. A series of authoritarian presidents from the 1960s to the 1980s had all-encompassing power to control society in order to achieve economic growth and industrialisation; consequently, the state became eagerly interventionist. This strong role of the state in Korea has sometimes been referred to as “Korea, Inc” (Chibber, 1999:313). Successive military governments (1961–1987) tried to justify their legitimacy through rapid economic growth, pushing ahead with pro-development policies across society.

These factors affected not only the economy but also the spatial development sector, including urban and housing development (Green et al., 1994, Jang, 2006, Sonn, 2006). Urbanisation accompanied rapid industrialisation. As with industry, the state has had a dominant role in reshaping the urban landscape. Rapid urbanisation and housing shortages increased property prices and rents rose rapidly and continuously. However, the state has not paid enough attention to supplying affordable housing and housing benefits to non-homeowners. The basic housing policy of the state has focused on creating a large supply of new flats for the middle classes and the expansion of homeownership for economic growth (Kim, 2011b). Politics and economics are thus key contexts for understanding urban transformation and housing development in Korea. It is necessary to summarise and analyse the evolution and key characteristics of the Korean state (Table 5-1). Political transformation in Korea can be divided into three stages by

the characteristics of the governments it has had over the last 50 years, and these are outlined in depth in the rest of this chapter.

Chapter two discussed the developmental state thesis and its application in Korea. This chapter provides a more detailed analysis to highlight the role of the developmental state in Korea. Section 5.1 considers the political and economic development of Korea and its transformation from an authoritarian developmental state into a democratic state. Local governments in the authoritarian developmental state did not have any autonomous power, but local autonomy has been regained since the early 1990s. Section 5.2 investigates urban politics in local states following democratisation, and their role in determining urban and housing policies. After the evolving processes of political and economic development in Korea since the 1960s have been set out, sections 5.3 and 5.4 shed light on the comprehensive background of urban development and housing policies and clarify how these processes have interwoven urban policies and housing policies based on industry and capital. Section 5.5 reviews civil resistance movements over economic and political changes in Korea. It shows how Korean society and social movements have developed and are interconnected with political and economic transformations both internally (political liberalisation and democratisation) and externally (globalisation and neoliberalism).

Table 5-1 The transformation of government in Korea

Stage	President	Tenure	Political Transformation	Economic Transformation	Social Transformation	Urban Transformation
1	Park, Jung-Hee	1961–1979	Authoritarianism, dictatorship (coup)	Economic Development Five Year Plan	Chun Tae-Il incident / Gwangju Daedanjee incident	National spatial development plan
	Chun, Doo-Hwan	1980–1987		Heavy industry to semi-conductor industry	Democratisation movements Anti-eviction movements	The centralisation of Seoul Urban redevelopment
2	Rho, Tae-Woo	1987–1993	Restoration of directly elected president system	Drive to high-tech industry	Democratisation movements Anti-eviction movements	Building five new cities close to Seoul
3	Kim, Young-Sam	1993–1998	Directly elected civil president / local governor elected from 1995	Financial liberalisation, 1997 Asian financial crisis	From centralised political system and economy to development of local economic and political systems	The centralisation of the Seoul Metropolitan area is intensified
	Kim, Dae-Jung	1998–2003		Globalisation of economy, overcoming IMF crisis		
	Rho, Moo-Hyun	2003–2008		FTA		Capital change movement
	Lee, Myung-Bak	2008–2013		G20 summit host country	Property owner anti-urban redevelopment movements	Large scale urban redevelopment
	Park, Kun-Hye	2013–				

5.1 From Authoritarian Developmental State to Democratic State

Park Chung-Hee took control of the government in a military coup in May 1961; as a result, his political legitimacy was questioned throughout his entire regime. To compensate for this, Park intensively propelled state-led industrialisation to achieve economic development, which was the most important goal for the Korean government at the time (Kim, 2011d). Park became a more severe and authoritarian ruler late in his tenure, repressing people who stood against his regime. Despite his lack of political legitimacy, Park retained the presidency for approximately 20 years. The main reason for this was the visible success of his economic growth policies. Annual economic growth averaged around 10 per cent during his regime. Another reason was that he used the ideology of the Cold War to strengthen his political control. The Park regime was able to make people who had different views about the government obey its rules due to a shared stance of anti-communism (Kim, 2007). In this context, Park launched a five-year plan of economic development in 1962, which was the biggest national project focused on export-led industrialisation Korea had ever seen. The government guided industrial policies logistically and regulated them financially. The government directly intervened in all economic fields, from the location of manufacturing facilities to industry structures (Kim, 2011d). This fundamental policy can be summed up by one phrase: ‘growth first and distribution second’. Since the capital to drive industrialisation was limited, the government selectively developed certain industrial sectors, firms and regions (Chang, 1993). In order to do this, Park’s regime employed “state apparatuses in charge of planning and policy-making” (Park, 2003:822). In other words, the centralised political power and bureaucratic structure of Park’s regime made rapid capitalist industrialisation possible.

The most important characteristic of the Korean developmental state is the close relationship between the state and the private sector (Johnson, 1982, Kim, 1997a, Johnson, 1999). Öni (1991) has claimed that this factor strengthened Korea’s developmental capacity. He argued that the state could carry out development plans more effectively by using public-private cooperation. Private businesses acted as agents of the state’s industrialisation policy. The emergence of chaebols, ‘chaebol’ being a general term for a big company that can produce

anything from household electronics to ships, can be explained by this.⁴ Chaebols were closely connected with the government, and this relationship needs to be explored to understand the economic growth of Korea. Lee (1995) has explained that chaebols developed rapidly because of the financial support they received from the government. Lee also analysed how the government facilitated the expansion of chaebols. According to his analysis, the government provided industrial properties to chaebols at almost no cost and gave them preferential treatment that allowed them access to loans and grants from foreign sources. Park's regime controlled the flow of all capital resources through state-owned banks (e.g. the Industrial Development Bank) and provided chaebols with tax exemptions or reductions along with direct subsidies (Chang, 1993, Lee, 1995). Furthermore, the state regulated wages and working conditions, and also limited the movement of labour to assist with economic growth and global competitiveness (Nam, 1995). As a result, chaebols developed into large monopolistic or oligopolistic companies thanks to the support they received from the state. However, this resulted in small and medium sized companies being excluded from the construction of the new economic infrastructure (Nam, 1995). Nam states that the relationship between the state and chaebols was one of patron and client:

In return for favours from the state, chaebols often financed the election campaigns of the ruling party, again the typical patron-client relationship that involves the particularistic exchange of favours between unequal partners (Nam, 1995:362).


The alliance between the state and chaebols has been the motivating power behind economic development (Choi, 2010:102). They have interacted very closely over political decisions, and the close connections between the state and chaebols have led to Korea being called the "Chaebol Republic" (Kim, 1997a, Kalinowski, 2009). Kang (2002) defined this business-state relationship as "money politics" which "subsumes both corrupt practices such as bribery and legal practices such as campaign finance" (Kang, 2002:178). Likewise, the state implemented export-oriented economic development, import controls, and subsidies through direct industrial and financial policies.

⁴ In 1996, the top 30 chaebols held central roles in the Korean economy, accounting for 46.3 per cent of total assets, 45.9 per cent of total sales, 13.1 per cent of total value-added, and 4.2 per cent of total employment (Shin and Chang, 2003:32). All figures increased until President Lee's government. The top 10 chaebols made up 69.1 per cent of total sales and 66 per cent of total assets in the Korean GDP in 2011 (*Mediatoday*, 16th September 2012).

All of these policies were strengthened under the dictatorship called the Yushin (revitalisation) system, which was established in 1972. Park declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution. Park also limited political rights by using the Emergency Act and the National Security Law. In addition, Park disallowed any criticism of the government by implementing surveillance, facilitated by the Central Information Agency, and censorship of the press (Im, 1987). Park further emphasised economic growth by changing the focus of Korea's industrial strategy from light to heavy industry, and controlled society by using highly centralised mechanisms to maintain his rule (Lie, 1992, Soh, 2004, Kim, 2007). Kim (2007:119) defined this political leadership style as that of an 'authoritarian developmental state' and claimed that the authoritarian political system strengthened to implement diverse socio-political and economic methods. These tools were ultimately effective and allowed Park's regime to consolidate its power. The regime played an important role in driving the Korean people towards economic growth, and ignored anti-government activities (Kim, 2007).

After Park's sudden assassination in 1979, General Chun Doo-Hwan took power in a coup and Chun Doo-Hwan drove stronger authoritarianism until 1987 in order to solve several economic problems and repress mounting uprisings (Douglass, 2000). Korea encountered multiple economic problems such as inflation, a decline in export and increasing unemployment rates in the contexts of a global recession and the oil shock of the early 1980s, so economic growth decreased markedly (Figure 5-1). Restructuring the heavy and chemical industries proved difficult, so the effectiveness of state intervention became questionable (Lee, 1981). In addition, chaebols attempted to gain autonomy from the government as they now had enough power and wealth to do so (Lee, 1995, Kim, 1997a). Even though Chun strengthened social control of economic growth and had success in industrial restructuring, the government encountered strong and widespread opposition. This change resulted in the restoration of a direct presidential election system in 1987. Roh Tae-Woo was elected in a direct and open election in 1988, but his regime was considered an extension of Chun's government (Kim, 1997c). Pro-democracy movements continued and became stronger during his tenure, until Kim Young-Sam was democratically elected as the first civilian president in 1993.

Figure 5-1 Annual growth rate of GDP in Korea



source: Bank of Korea (various years)

Kim Young-Sam pushed ahead a number of different policies to distinguish his regime from the previous military governments and consolidate democracy. Kim strove to reform politics, the economy and society, and gradually transformed Korea from a developmental state into a democratic state. The government took steps to build up a market-oriented economy and liberalise the economic system, privatising state-owned banks and opening the capital market to foreign capital (Chang et al., 1998). The government sought to join the OECD and the World Trade Organisation in line with this policy. This led to an acceleration in and liberalisation of Korea's economy, and was a move away from Korea being a developmental state (Kim, 2011d). Even though, to some extent, he succeeded with reforms across all areas, the economy reached its lowest point in Korean history and growth rates became negative in 1998. In the end, Korea received a financial rescue package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Kim Dae-Jung (1998–2003) took office as Korea's first president from the opposition party. He undertook structural reforms in an attempt to overcome the economic crisis during the first three years of his tenure. Kim's government pursued profound reform plans such as labour-market flexibility, government administrative reform, and a restructuring of the country's financial institutions (Kim, 2000, Krueger and Yoo, 2002, Kihl, 2005). "Chaebol Capitalism" or "Crony Capitalism", which is the main characteristic of the Korean economy, was regarded as the most important cause of the financial crisis (Krueger and Yoo, 2002:601). The IMF asked for radical reform of the chaebols, which had a large share of responsibility for the nation's debt, and accelerated economic liberalisation (List-Jensen, 2008). The IMF wanted to move Korea from a

developmental state to a neoliberal state (Kim, 2011d). The aim was to transform the Korean economy into “a lightly regulated, globally integrated, free market economy” (Crotty and Lee, 2002:668). The government changed its role to become a supporter of economic development, rather than an initiator as had been the case in the past (Kim, 2000).

These reforms were, however, enabled by “the nationalisation of the banking system” (Crotty and Lee, 2002:672). A large amount of public funding was invested into the restructuring of Korean banks and the government forced insolvent banks to merge or close. This enabled the government to push for structural reforms to chaebols (Haggard et al., 1999, Crotty and Lee, 2002). Furthermore, the government attempted to expand direct foreign investment in Korea. A number of laws were established to attract foreign capital and special foreign investment areas called ‘free economic zones’ were established in 2002. Foreign direct investment (FDI) doubled from 1998 to 1999, and foreign ownership in both the manufacturing sector and the financial sector saw a big increase. The growth in the financial sector was particularly remarkable. The growth rate of the banking system increased 30 times between the end of 1997 and 2002 (Lee and Han, 2006:319). The expansion of FDI was regarded as a positive that gave a boost to the Korean economy. It helped to increase the credit of Korea and chaebols experienced more pressure about reforms, since foreign businesses emerged as major players (Lee and Han, 2006). In the end, the traditional relationship between the government and the business sector started to collapse as there were now alternatives. There was social conflict and protests around these changes from chaebols and workers, but the government finally paid back its debt to the IMF, five years in advance, in 2001. Two civilian governments that promoted political democracy and liberalisation stabilised the country to a large extent, and Korea’s economic sector experienced rapid industrial restructuring and globalisation throughout this period.

The national state has played an absolutely crucial role in the development process in Korea. Since the Park regime, the national state has led all forms of transformation. However, the effectiveness of powerful and authoritarian states becomes doubtful in the new economic system, which is global and knowledge-based. Pirie (2006) suggested that the developmental state in Korea was already weakened by neoliberal reforms from the early 1980s, and its final

demise was triggered by the 1997 Asian crisis. However, the state actively pushed economic restructuring and managed to recover, as can be seen from the process of reforms in Korea during the Asian crisis. Hundt (2012) comments that the developmental state in Korea is still intact due to the Asian financial crisis, in spite of the fact that Kim Young-Sam's regime attempted liberalisation. Choi (2012:33) argues that neoliberal policies in Korea enhanced the objectives of the developmental state by introducing a new round of catch-up developments, as well as expanding market mechanisms.

As economic globalisation has been accelerated, the state is usually forced to reduce its role and encourage market growth to stimulate foreign investment. However, Shin (2005) insists the role of the state is crucial, especially regarding the inflow of FDI and the protection of economies from financial risk. The state could not play the same role it had in the past, but it should have an important role as "the ultimate system manager" (Shin, 2005:384). Therefore, the state has still kept its developmental role to supervise national economic development "to enhance competitiveness and reduce cronyism and corruption" and the developmental state itself has experienced only minor reforms (Kim and Kim, 2005:65). When considering the role of the developmental state, it is necessary to take into consideration the evolution of local government. This is because the national government in Korea has recently promoted decentralisation, and the country is moving away from being a developmental state. However, local governments have tended to copy or follow the model of the developmental state since their local autonomy has been guaranteed (Shin et al., 2010). The role of the developmental state in urban spatial restructuring should be explored not only at the national level but at the local level as well.


5.2 Local Autonomy and Urban Politics

As noted earlier, the national government had strong centralised powers and was responsible for appointing the mayors in charge of local governments for over 30 years (since Park's tenure). The direct election system for the presidency was revived in 1987, and the local election system for electing mayors of cities and the heads of Gu's was reinstated in 1995. City councils, which disappeared following Park Jung-Hee's coup in 1961, were re-established in 1991. Therefore, local residents' participation in local politics was impossible until the early 1990s, and the role

of local governments was very limited. Local governments were not granted autonomy, and carried out policies decided by the central government. In 1994, the central government directly performed 75 per cent of all government functions, whereas the functions of local governments were far more limited (Kim et al., 2011:15). In these circumstances, it was not possible for local residents to voice their opinions on the urban and housing developments which directly affected their daily lives. Until the early 1990s the objective of urban development was building an effective spatial structure for economic growth, so the central state and planners formulated all urban planning and policies with the objective of maximising development in a short period (Cheon et al., 2005). It is therefore important to consider how the characteristics of urban politics changed after the reintroduction of local elections. This history explains a lot about the lack of citizen involvement that was excluded.

Before arguing how urban politics have influenced urban and housing policies, it is necessary to outline the structure of local government to better understand how urban politics in Korea work. As can be seen from Figure 5-2, the local government structure is divided into two systems: (1) upper-level local governments including Seoul metropolitan city, metropolitan city and Do; (2) lower-level local governments including Si, Gun and Gu (cities, counties, and autonomous districts). The local government in Seoul has a special status since it is both the capital and the biggest city in Korea, and as a result the mayor of Seoul has equivalent level of political power to other national government organisations that deal with administrative affairs (Kim et al., 2011:8). Within the metropolitan city, the autonomous districts called ‘gu’ are allocated some duties by the metropolitan government to meet the complex demands of local residents and the growing demand for active citizen participation. Local residents vote for their mayor and council members every four years, but did not have any other way of taking part in local politics until the establishment of Roh Moo-Hyun’s government.

Figure 5-2 The local government system in Korea



source : Kim et al. (2011:11)

During President Roh Moo-Hyun's tenure, new laws were introduced to improve local democracy and increase local residents' decision-making power. In 2005, the Local Referendum Act was legislated, and the Local Ombudsman Regime and the Local Petition Against the Abuse of Local Finances were introduced in 2006. The Local Recall system for the election of mayors and councillors was introduced in 2007. Along with this, residents' movements groups and NGOs have been established and now play an active role in local politics, especially when compared to the suppression they faced under the previous authoritarian governments. Since the Roh Moo-Hyun government emphasised decentralisation and indeed established it as the one of its main national agendas, there have been significant developments. Under previous governments, the policy of decentralisation focused on the gradual division of functions and responsibilities between central and local government; conversely, the Roh government took drastic measures to build cooperative partnerships between them (Cha et al., 2003). Local governments were granted autonomy over all local policies, and each subsequent local government has tried to develop its power further since the Roh regime.

Decentralisation, however, is still an ongoing process. One reason for this is that local governments are financially dependent on the central government to a large extent (Kim, 1997b). According to statistics from the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, the

financial independence of Seoul was the highest at 90 per cent in 2011; much higher than the national average of 52 per cent. Since most local governments are highly reliant on centrally provided supplements, local governments have limited decision-making powers. Only the SMG is almost independent and free from financial reliance on the central government. Another factor that restricts local autonomy is that local elections, along with the national assembly election, are held in the middle of the president's tenure, functioning as interim judgements about the central government (Park, 2006). Therefore, the results of local elections are affected by the role played by the ruling party and the president, not the influence of local mayors. Within the context of local government, there is also another problem to hinder decentralisation. The mayor has had control over policy making and administration like the president has in the national government, whereas the council has been relatively weak (Park, 2006). It was common for the majority of council members to be from the same political party as the mayor. Since councillors from opposition parties were poorly represented, it was difficult to check and balance the mayor. This dynamic in the Seoul local government has changed to some extent, since most members of Seoul city council in 2010 were elected from the opposition party rather than the Seoul mayor's political party (Table 5-2). Nevertheless, the mayor still has a strong role in the decision-making process.

Table 5-2 The political party distribution of Seoul Metropolitan Council members

	Grand National		Democratic		others		Mayor's party
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
1991	103	78	22	16.7	3	5.3	Appointed Mayor
1995	17	11	130	89	0	0	Democratic
1998	22	21.2	80	77	2	1.8	Democratic
2002	86	84	15	14	1	2	Grand National
2006	102	96	3	2.8	1	1.2	Grand National
2010	27	24.1	78	68.8	8	7.1	Grand National

source: National Election Commission (NEC, various years)

Since local governments were released from the central government's control, they have taken more active roles in urban and housing development. It has been almost 20 years since local governments gained autonomy from the national government, but housing policies are still largely driven by the national state (Lee et al., 2008). On the contrary, all local governments have established local public development corporations, local development research institutes and local public companies since they were granted local autonomy. Local development corporations such as the Seoul Housing Corporation are funded and run by local states and play important roles in land development, housing provision, urban redevelopment and local industrial complex development. The main objective of local development corporations is to benefit and promote the interests of the public. However, their interest is not the public benefit but rather their own profits, since they earn only 2.8 per cent of their total income from running public rental properties and derive the majority of their income from selling properties (An and Lee, 2008:12). During the past two decades, the central government has tried to reduce the number of public companies; meanwhile, the number of local public companies has doubled (Yeo and Lee, 2008). This shows that local states have taken an entrepreneurial stance to boosting growth in the local economy and promoting competitiveness (Harvey, 1989).

Local economic growth and urban development are the most pressing concerns for local states, and local governments have attempted to create attractive cities to attract capital investment (He and Wu, 2005). Lee and Shin (2011:239) interviewed a civil officer in central government and found that the local state tends to be pro-growth, since tax revenue is heavily reliant on housing acquisition tax and registration tax. According to Kim et al.(2011:43), for Gu governments, property tax is the most important revenue source accounting for 81.8 per cent of total local revenue. Therefore, local governments now act as facilitators that promote local growth using a similar approach to that the central government took with its developmental strategies from the 1960s until the 1980s. Unlike the president, local mayors can be elected more than once, so local economic growth seems to be the best way for local mayors to guarantee second term victory in elections because it is seen to have social as well as economic benefits. Local mayors have mobilised the resources needed for growth, and this has made their cities function as growth machines (Molotch, 1976, 1993).

It is crucial to understand the local political economy around redevelopment strategies and the roles of the various players; analysis of this will enable us to enrich our understanding of urban redevelopment processes. However, the mechanisms of the local political economies involved in the urban redevelopment processes are under stress in Korea. This might be because of the impact central government control has had on local political economies, especially since many local governments still depend on the central government in many respects. In contrast, the role of local political economies has become stronger and this trend is especially important in big cities like Seoul. When the mayor was appointed by central government, the Seoul mayor's political party was always the same as that of the president and the ruling party. However, after the introduction of the direct election system, as shown in Table 5-3, this was no longer the case. This has caused conflict between the central government and the SMG.

Table 5-3 The political party of the President and the Mayor of Seoul

Tenure	Mayor of Seoul	Party	President	Party
1995–1997	Cho Soon	Democratic	Kim Young-Sam	Grand National
1998–2002	Goh Kun	Democratic	Kim Dae-Jung	Democratic
2002–2006	Lee Myung-Bak	Grand National	Roh Moo-Hyun	Democratic
2006– 8.2011	Oh Se-Hoon	Grand National	Roh Moo-Hyun/ Lee Myung-Bak	Democratic Grand National
10.2011–	Park Won-Soon	Independent/ Democratic(New Politics Alliance for Democracy)	Lee Myung-Bak/ Park Kyun-Hye	Grand National Saenuri

In particular, there were some disputes over the 'New Town' redevelopment policy in Seoul between Mayor of Seoul Lee Myung-Bak and President Roh Moo-Hyun (Shin et al., 2010). At that time President Roh was trying to reduce the functions and population of Seoul and the capital region, so any big development projects proposed for the capital region were not approved. However, the Mayor of Seoul wished to strengthen the competitiveness of Seoul through a large scale redevelopment project called the New Town Project which he had proposed in his mayoral election pledge. At first they disagreed over this project, but ultimately the central government approved it after long negotiations and accepted most of the demands

from the SMG (Shin et al., 2010). Thus, local government power has been enhanced relative to the power of the central government. In conclusion, local governments now have more power and autonomy compared to the past, but there is still a need for local governments to become more financially autonomous. It is necessary to explore the role of the local state and the national state alongside the role of capital in urban redevelopment, since this is necessary to examine the role of growth machines.

5.3 Uneven Urban Development

For a long time, urban policies in Korea have focused on constructing urban infrastructure for the purposes of industrialisation (Kang, 1998). The characteristics of the developmental state have had a large scale impact on the spatial development process, especially on the geographic structuring of industrial facilities. This development process has been described as building military encampments (Markusen and Park, 1993:165). Forming urban spaces has been considered a key function in the structure of capital accumulation. The top-down nature of planning means the state has largely been responsible for the design of urban and economic developments (Lee, 2000). Kang (1998:113) described urban development as “a means to the end of economic growth”. The government introduced the first National Territorial Development Plan in 1972 to control urban development and industrialisation effectively and systematically. This totally transformed the national spatial system because it was an overall national physical development plan (Table 5-4). This first plan aimed to create an effective physical environment with the goal of accelerating industrialisation (Aleman, 2004, Kwon and Lee, 2010). In order to support the development of the heavy chemical industry, despite limited investment and capital, the government established industrial parks and facilities. In addition, it helped to promote these industries indirectly by providing key infrastructure such as transportation, energy and water supplies.

Table 5-4 Korea's Comprehensive National Territorial Plan

Plan	Main Policy
The 1 st plan (1972–1981)	To develop a concentrated industrial complex belt with strategic locations in the capital region and the southeast coast area for rapid economic growth
The 2 nd plan (1982–1991)	To decentralise the population concentrated in and around the capital, improve the living environment and push ahead with balanced regional development
The 3 rd plan (1992–1999)	Push ahead balanced development policies over the west coast, the industrial belt and provincial cities
The 4 th plan (2000–2020)	Balanced national development plan from coastline development to inland development, in order to become a leading country in Northeast Asia

source:KLHC (2012)

The spatial division of labour emerged in the 1970s but became more marked during the 1980s and early 1990s (Park, 2009b). The Seoul metropolitan area specialised in producer services and higher value added industries, and global business services developed in the city (Douglass, 2000). Almost fifty per cent of firms in the high technology industry were concentrated in Seoul in 1986, and over half of all jobs in producer services were created in Seoul (Kwon and Lee, 2010). This development attracted more people and capital to Seoul, as shown in Table 5-5. This caused land price increases and property speculation in the Seoul metropolitan area, and led to “Korea’s own bubble economy” (Douglass, 2000:15). The primacy of the Seoul metropolitan area (the capital region including Seoul, Gyeonggi-do and Incheon) intensified, even though the second comprehensive national territorial plan (1982–1991) aimed for more balanced national development and less marked regional disparities (Seo, 2009). In 1985, about 50 per cent of GDP was produced in the capital region and this figure has remained steady up until the present day. This uneven regional development, caused by state-led industrialisation, has led to social conflict and been reflected in Korea’s spatial structure and urban hierarchy. (Park, 2009a).


Table 5-5 Changes in population share by region (%.)

	National Population	Capital region	Middle region	Southeast region	Southwest region
1966	29,159	23.6	21.5	31.1	23.7
1975	34,678	31.5	18.3	30.5	19.8
1985	40,419	39.1	15.1	29.8	15.9
1995	44,553	45.2	13.2	28.7	12.9
2005	47,041	48.1	13.2	26.9	11.8
2010	48,580	49.1	13.4	26.2	11.4

source: KOSIS (various years)


As more people moved to Seoul, housing shortages and high housing prices in the capital became more problematic. In 1982 the government implemented the Capital Region Management Law to regulate this, but it was not effective enough to control the growth of Seoul. The government tried to supply more housing units through the ‘Joint Redevelopment Project’ policy during the 1980s (see chapter 6). This project helped to increase housing provision, but it was still not sufficient to meet the growing demand. The government finally released a plan to develop five new towns (1988–1992) on farmland, which at that time was within a 25 km radius of Seoul city centre and would supply two million housing units. State-owned companies took a dominant role in this development, similar to the process of state-led urbanisation in the 1960s and 1970s (Crotty and Lee, 2002). The Korea Land Development Corporation (KDLC) expropriated land and private companies and the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) bought land from the Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) to construct more housing. Ultimately, this heightened the primacy of the capital region in many respects. First of all, about one in two Koreans have lived in this area since 2005 and the urbanisation rate reached over 80 per cent in 2010 (Figure 5-3). In particular, the concentration of wealth in the region has been a serious concern (Figure 5-4). The uneven development between the capital region and the rest of the country has long been the most important issue for policy makers, and also for the Korean president. They have focused on balanced development since the second Comprehensive National Territorial Plan, but the dominance of the capital region has not lessened until recently.

Figure 5-3 The urbanisation rate in Korea



source: KOSIS (various years)

Figure 5-4 The agglomeration of activities in the capital region



source: adopted and modified from Kwon and Lee (2010:369–370)

The economic restructuring caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis had an impact on spatial restructuring as well. The private sector's role became more important after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the government deregulated land and housing development (Kim and Kim, 2000, La Grange and Jung, 2004). According to Douglass (2000), national territorial development patterns after the Asian financial crisis were characterised by promoting Seoul as

an international city in Northeast Asia and localising and democratising economic planning (Douglass, 2000:8). As regulations for FDI were dismantled after the Asian financial crisis and local governments were assigned more authority regarding spatial economic planning, local governments tried to attract more FDI and transnational companies (alongside the efforts of the central government) and developed industrial parks focused around high technology (Douglass, 2000). In contrast, the central government is still involved in the management of Seoul for national competitiveness in the context of globalising the economy (Douglass, 2000). The government has relaxed their earlier policy of regulating the location of industries in Seoul to promote the growth of high-tech industries (Park, 2005a). As a result of this, Seoul's specialised knowledge-based industries have spread to Gyeonggido (Park, 2009b). When it comes to the IT industry, the capital region has over 90 per cent of all jobs and Seoul itself has a share of 56.6 per cent (Kwon and Lee, 2010). Furthermore, foreign investors prefer the capital region; almost half of FDI was invested there in 2001 (Seo, 2009:651). As a result, managers, professionals, administrators and technicians have become focused in Seoul, as it carries out most of the country's control functions. The regional disparity between capital and non-capital regions intensified and Seoul experienced skyrocketing land prices.⁵ Chronic overpopulation in the capital region and various urban problems such as housing shortages have become problematic (Table 5-6).

Table 5-6 The housing supply rate⁶ in Korea (%)

	1995	2000	2005	2010
Whole country	86	96	106	113
Capital region	77	86	97	104
Seoul	68	77	90	97
Gyeonggido	84	92	101	107
Incheon	90	98	108	114
Southeast	85	97	107	115
Southwest	99	109	119	126
Middle	103	112	119	127

source: KOSIS (various years)

⁵ According to the 2010 census, the size of Seoul is 605.25 km² which represents only 0.6 per cent of the total area of the country. The total population of Seoul is 10,575,442, which account for 21 per cent of Korea's overall population. Seoul has a relatively high population density, at four times that of London, twice that of Paris and 1.7 times that of New York.

⁶ Housing supply rate = Housing stock/total household × 100

The three earlier plans and improvements of physical infrastructures contributed to economic growth. However, these were centralised planning systems and were no longer appropriate when a more market-orientated economic system was adopted (Seo, 2009). From the third Comprehensive National Land Development Plan onwards, the state has tried to balance national spatial developments but failed to achieve this due to a lack of significant effort. In light of this, the fourth Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (2001–2020) underlined new policy directions meant to foster regional competitiveness and globalisation in order to reduce this regional disparity. However, Choi (2012:108) argues that

. . . Despite its language of balanced development, innovation, learning and openness, neoliberalism has been associated with an extremely skewed or distorted urban policy repertoire based on capital subsidies, place promotion and local boosterism.

Choi concludes that the state has not stopped playing a salient role in spatial development and its intervention has been explicitly strengthened along with neoliberal ideology in Korea (Choi, 2012:164). Contemporary spatial development is still managed by the developmental state's legacy, although the state emphasised deregulation after the 1997 crisis (Lee and Shin, 2011:243). Ultimately, the spatial development plan over the last two decades has tended to be dualistic (Lee, 2009). The central government has focused on two aims: the first being to realise balanced spatial development between the capital region and the non-capital regions; the second being to improve national competitiveness in the context of a global economy. The central government has implemented various policies to relocate industries and populations from the capital region to other regions. In the meantime, the central government has placed emphasis on making Seoul a global city and relaxed the regulations that were limiting the development of the capital region. These two policies seem to be a pair of parallel lines, with the former aim sometimes being ignored or weakened because of the latter. As a result, social conflict and problems have emerged around these two aims between the various bodies involved.

As local governments now have more liberty and authority to manage their political, economic and spatial development, their focus is also on globalisation and competitiveness. Many local governments have announced urban regeneration projects and redeveloped dilapidated city centres for local growth. In particular, the Seoul Metropolitan Government has implemented

many urban redevelopment policies. These plans have been instigated by explicit government policies and have yielded similar results to those produced by the urban redevelopment project implemented by the federal government in the USA between the 1950s and 1960s (Anderson, 1964). Because redevelopment has focused on physical restructuring it has caused many severe social problems such as rent increases and large scale displacement of residents. These issues will be elaborated on in chapter 6,7 and 8.


5.4 Housing Policies and Homeownership Developmentalism

Housing is essential to all, so the housing issue should be approached in terms of the proper functioning of society. However, housing developments in Korea have only been covered by relatively liberal policies when compared to the state-regulated urban development policy (Doling, 1999). The state gave less priority to housing in its developmental strategy (Kim and Cho, 2010). Shin (2009:907) also notes that “housing provision in South Korea has been market-oriented with minimum involvement of the state to address urban poor families’ housing needs”. This is due to the country’s predominant economic policies and the nature of the state, which is dependent on a growth alliance with chaebols. Shin (2011c) coined the term ‘Homeownership Developmentalism’ to explain these characteristics of housing development in Korea. He argues that Korean residential capitalism has a unique structure which does not fit the typology of Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) comfortably. The number of owner-occupiers and the level of mortgage debt to GDP are both low, but there is not enough public input into the consumption and production of housing. Because of the lack of public intervention in housing policy, the private sector (e.g. construction and investment companies) and those social classes with purchasing power have controlled the housing market (Shin, 2011c:132).

However, when political crises emerged the central government encouraged the growth of housing supply and seriously considered housing policies for the stability of the regime (Lim, 1995). Park launched the 2.5 million housing units construction ten-year plan in 1972 after establishing the Yushin system (see section 5.1). Chun launched the five million housing units construction ten-year plan in 1981 after he took office following a coup. In 1988, when the

labour movement was at its peak, a two million housing units construction ten-year plan was legislated by Roh after the June Democracy Movement. However, the success of this policy depended on the country's economic situation since the central government relied on private funds and speculative development (Lim, 1995). Also these policies were impossible to achieve because the number of housing units the government proposed to build in 1981 was almost the same as the total national housing stock (5.3 million); the number of houses proposed in 1988 was almost the same as the total housing stock in Seoul (GBT, 2007:128–131). Korean governments dealt with housing policy on an ad hoc basis according to short term political considerations. Housing policy was viewed as a part of industrial policy, so the state encouraged housing production but this was not for the reproduction of labour power (Yoon, 1994:84). The Korean state did not play an important role in the provision of housing, but established quasi-governmental companies (such as the KNHC and the KLDC) to increase housing provision in the 1960s. However, this was not enough to solve the serious housing shortage, so the state reorganised private housing construction companies in the 1970s. The profit-oriented private sector has predominantly constructed housing as shown in Figure 5-5, and this has influenced housing commodification (Lee, 2003). The government has implemented housing policies in favour of housing suppliers in order to increase housing provision and economic growth and avoid the use of public funds (Ronald and Jin, 2010).

Figure 5-5 Housing construction rate by the public and private sector in Korea



source: KOSIS (various years)

The state has granted many concessions to construction companies. For example, construction companies can sell flats before they finish construction so they do not need much money to build flats. The state has provided direct subsidies to the manufacturing sector, but the house building industry has been subsidised indirectly as it has been able to obtain cheap public land from the state. These subsidies have been given to chaebols rather than other companies. The large construction companies run by chaebols have had better chances of being chosen as contractors for housing construction (Yoon, 1994). Since many small and medium sized construction companies went out of business after the 1997 financial crisis, the dominance of chaebol construction companies has increased (Ryu, 2007). Ryu (2007:692) stated that the seven leading home builders accounted for 50.8 per cent of total sales in 2001. Therefore, chaebol owned construction companies have become key beneficiaries of large scale housing provision along with the middle classes, as will be discussed in chapter 6.

The close affinity between the state and chaebols emerged due to investment in infrastructure during a period of state-led development, but it has become intense around both urban development and housing development. It is often referred to as a development alliance (Hong, 2005) or construction alliance (Hong, 2007, Kim, 2008a) consisting of state-owned development companies, politicians and private construction companies. This term is parallel to the term 'iron triangle', which McCormack used to highlight the most crucial mechanism of the 'construction state' in Japan (McCormack, 2002). Park (2009a) argues this Korean characteristic is indicative of a construction-oriented developmental state. The close state-business relationship has led to corruption, since businesses have been given unofficial or illegal assistance from the state in exchange for political funds provided to politicians or presidents (Moran, 1998). These alliances have affected the urban redevelopment process in Korea since they have acted as growth coalitions.

Housing policy has focused on boosting homeownership and meeting middle class demand. Housing consumption is constrained by individual households' economic ability to pay, since the Korean state focuses on a filtering down strategy rather than direct interventions like rent control or social housing provision (Ha, 2002). By relying heavily on private investment to meet

the demands of housing, there is not enough social housing for poor or middle class households. In addition, even state-developed housing has been intended for sale rather than rent (Ha, 1994). However, the government began to change their focus from supplying houses to those on a middle income to catering for the needs of those on a low income after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. As social polarisation and homelessness have become social problems, new attention has been paid to housing provision for low income families and the concept of housing welfare has been developed. The one million public rental housing units construction plan was in operation for those on low incomes during the governments of Kim and Roh (1998–2008), but it does not mean the aim of housing policy has changed in favour of the demand-side mechanism which emphasises decommodification and socialisation (Ronald and Lee, 2012). After the policy of constructing permanent social housing for rent (which was implemented in the early 1990s) was discarded, most newly built public housing was supposed to be sold after five years.

Although the state has not provided reasonable policies to promote housing provision, the urban population has grown rapidly. The increasing demand for housing and the inadequate supply have caused large increases to house prices and property speculation. As a result, the price of land in Seoul increased 1,176 times between 1963 and 2007; in contrast, the consumer index went up just 43 times in the same period (Son, 2008:24). Land prices in Seoul have increased at 70 times the rate of an urban worker's income increase (Son, 2008:25). The increase in housing prices has been much higher than the increase in the average worker's income. The average housing price to household income ratio (PIR) has increased from 2.6 in 1975 to 7.6 in 2012 (10.1 in Seoul metropolitan areas), and the average housing rent to household income ratio (RIR) has increased from 9.8 per cent to 26.4 per cent (30.5 per cent in Seoul metropolitan areas) (Shin, 1994, LHI, 2012a).

Accordingly, property speculation has become a profitable activity and this has resulted in social differentiation (Jang, 2006). For example, while 2.3 million homes were built between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the total homeownership rate increased by just 0.9 per cent during this period (Chang, 2002:130). The state has continuously made attempts to expand homeownership, but the homeownership rate has declined since the 1950s (Table 5-7).

Widespread property speculation has caused lower and even middle income households to experience difficulties in becoming homeowners. People criticise property speculation, but they expect their own property values to increase at the same time (GBT, 2007:71). The state has implemented various anti-speculation measures, but they have not been effective at tackling speculation (Ronald and Jin, 2010).

Table 5-7 The changing housing tenure system of Korea

	1955	1975	1980	1990	2000	2010
Own	79.5	63.1	58.6	49.9	54.2	54.3
Chunse ⁷	5.9	17.3	23.9	27.8	28.2	21.7
Monthly Rent	10.8	15.5	15.5	19.1	14.8	21.4
Others	3.2	3.2	2.0	3.1	2.8	2.7

source: KOSIS (various years)

In fact, the state has stimulated speculation on land and housing in order to boost the economy. Development plans and construction work have been used as important growth machines, since construction has been considered the most effective industry for increasing jobs and boosting the economy, due to its forward and backward linkage effects. The proportion of construction in Korean GDP was around 10 per cent, which was a fairly high figure compared with other OECD countries from 1980 to 2000 (Park, 2009a). The leader of the ruling party has emphasised the importance of the construction sector in Korea:

“The proportion of the construction sector in our economy is huge. 15% of GNP and 8% of employment are from this sector, so the construction sector has to be promoted in order to promote the economy. People can have hope for economic growth when all land looks like construction sites and sound of a hammer resounds across the country” (Park Hee-Tae, the leader of the ruling party from *the Kyunghyang Sinmun*, 22nd December 2008).

The construction industry has played an important role in the Korean economy, so the construction sector and the related property sector have long been regarded as important vehicles for driving economic and urban growth. Therefore, the state has deregulated or

⁷ Chunse is a rent system in which the tenant pays a lump sum, that exceeds 50 per cent of the value of the property, to the landlord, and receives the money back when they leave the rental unit (which is typically after two years). Landlords benefit by investing the deposit and renters also benefit by not having to make monthly payments for the duration of the contract. Chunse is a widely used rent system in Korea, especially in big cities. According to the 2010 census, Seoul’s tenure structure is made up of 41 per cent of home ownership, 33 per cent of chunse and 25 per cent of monthly rent.

removed various conditions which were introduced to prevent speculation when the construction and housing industries are in crisis. In addition, the state has tried large scale new developments, such as urban redevelopment, for the same reason. National and local politicians have also created several development plans around the election period to win votes. Therefore, the costs of land and housing have continuously increased. As a result, a belief in the idea that property value never decreases emerged and became widely believed. Over the last four decades, many people have come to favour of property investment or speculation. More than half of respondents to a survey about citizens' view to property in 2006 chose property investment over running their own business (7.6 per cent) if they had surplus funds; in 1979 property investment constituted less than 30 per cent of responses, and about 40 per cent of respondents preferred business investment (GBT, 2007). Property speculation in search of profit has become a 'national hobby'. It has continuously increased the property bubble and created property classes that will be discussed in chapter 6. In summary, housing policies in Korea have suffered from a lack of long term vision. The state has focused on housing provision for homeownership expansion, so there have been insufficient policies to help low income households. Property speculation has been a chronic problem, but the state has not effectively dealt with it since the property market and economic growth have relied on each other. These characteristics of housing policy in Korea have much in common with those observed in other East Asian countries.

5.5 Power and Powerlessness: The Rise of Urban Social Movements

Previously the compressed urbanisation and economic growth referred to as a miracle was possible at the expense of labour and rural areas, but this became more difficult in the 1970s and 1980s (Douglass, 2000). Unequal development produced many social problems and resulted in public tensions from the early 1970s onwards. The movements in the 1970s led to changes in people's perspective of the authoritarian regime. The most prominent protest is that of Chun Tae-Il in 1970. Chun was a 22-year-old garment worker who burnt himself to death to protest against the notorious working conditions in the industry and demand that employers observe the Labour Standards Act. His death prompted the creation of the organisation of labour unions

against government oppression and proved a turning point for the labour movement (Aleman, 2004). It also stimulated democratisation movements by leading to gatherings of students and intellectuals (KDF, 2005).

After Park's sudden assassination, which was expected to restore democracy, the people's hopes were frustrated by the establishment of a new military dictatorial government. Nationwide protests demanding the resignation of Chun Doo-Hwan took place in 1980, led by students and the general public (Yea, 2002). The Gwangju Uprising lasted about 10 days in May 1980, but it was suppressed by military forces, and democracy and liberalisation were repressed under martial law until 1987. In this situation, urban social movements were almost identical to the anti-dictatorship and anti-authoritarian regime movements which students, intellectuals and religious groups led. However, most of these movements failed due to harsh repression. In terms of class based movements such as labour movements and urban poor movements, it was difficult for people to gather collectively.

However, students in the 1980s made an effort to mobilise workers and the urban poor by working at factories with them and living in shanty towns alongside them to further democratisation movements (Park, 2005b). The democratisation movements resulted in changes in the late 1980s, as the middle class was increasingly developing in opposition towards the authoritarian regime (Saxer, 2004). The middle class grew in line with the growth of the chaebols and the state's drive for modernisation and economic growth, so the middle class has benefited directly from these political and economic transformations. Members of the middle class were also perceived as good citizens who could serve the developmental state despite its authoritarian orders (Hart, 1993, Yang, 2012). However, their political orientation varies depending on economic and political conditions, as they played a critical role in the democracy movement of the late 1980s (Jee, 1997). In the end, a democratic political system was achieved. After the June democracy movement, workers went on strike for better wages, working conditions and labour rights. These changes influenced tenants and the urban poor's anti-urban redevelopment movements to a large extent, as will be discussed in the following chapter. The democratisation movements and labour movements of the 1980s were successful in bringing

about significant progress for liberalisation and democracy in Korea. The demand for democracy and liberalisation from 1980 to 1992 was related to the transformation of people's feelings around injustice and unfairness, which emerged from rapid state-led economic growth (Johnson, 1989). This change raised questions around economic equality and democracy for underprivileged people who had previously been repressed (Pak, 1998).

After a more liberal and democratic regime was established in 1993, civil society in Korea expanded and started to hold more political sway (Cho et al., 2012). After candidates from the labour centred party the Democratic Labour Party were elected as MPs in 2004, social movements were institutionalised (Kim, 2005). These democratic changes provided opportunities for the emergence and growth of new urban social movements. In 1999, a law promoting the establishment of NGOs was enacted (He, 2010a). Ordinary people now have more channels through which to participate in various social movements and develop their political participation (Kim, 1999). NGOs have played an important role in national politics due to the weak and unstable party system in Korea (He, 2010a:277). However, many NGOs are not fully independent of political power, since they are financially assisted by the state. Secondly, the focus of urban social movements has varied around topics such as the environment, women's rights and the community. Post-1987 urban social movements in Korea have been considered new social movements in the West (Kim and Cho, 2001). New urban social movements have emphasised democracy in everyday life rather than political transformation (Kim, 2006d). Thirdly, methods of struggle have become more diverse and now include demonstrations such as candle light protests – protestors are no longer limited to militant forms of protest (Lee et al., 2010).

To sum up, power and powerlessness between the state and civil society has evolved due to persistent demonstrations from civil society against dictatorships and authoritarianism since the 1970s. Urban social movements in Korea were dominated by calls for political reform, democracy and freedom until the early 1990s, when oppositional alliances against the authoritarian state strove to gain greater rights and justice – these alliances played a critical role in achieving democracy. After the transition towards democracy, civil society emerged and

expanded during the progressive Kim and Roh (1989–2003) periods. Urban social movements have diversified over various issues such as quality of life, personal liberty, gender and sexuality, and are no longer just focused on political democratisation and liberalisation. However, in many ways the state remains a dominant influence even after the democratic transition, so even new social movements that emerged during the last two decades have focused on national politics and democratic political transformation (Kim, 2006d). Korean civil society is still making efforts to improve democracy and expand opportunities for political participation in order to overcome the state’s legacy of dictatorship and authoritarianism (Cho, 2012).

5.6 Concluding Remarks

Korea has experienced compressed changes across all areas – its economy, politics and society– over the last half century. This chapter has reviewed the political and economic transformations experienced in Korea after the Korean War finished in 1953 to provide a historical context for these rapid changes. Historical and external influences led to Korea’s becoming a developmental state, as discussed in section 5.1. The characteristics of Korea as an authoritarian developmental state led by a military government affected all aspects of the country between the 1960s and 1980s. The strong link between the state and the chaebols drove economic growth and reshaped urban structures. The authoritarian developmental state facilitated fast industrialisation and transformed Korea from a poor agricultural country into a modern industrialised country, but this outstanding economic growth was at the cost of other areas. The strict state control, implemented with the goal of creating rapid economic growth, affected society and politics as well as the economy. Individual rights and democracy were given less consideration than the maintenance of social order and political stability. Kim (1997d:1121) has pointed out that the developmental state has many problems like “excessive groupism, communitarianism and [a] lack of flexibility”.

However, the role of the Korean developmental state changed after the 1980s democratisation movements. Korea has been more a liberal and democratised state since the 1990s. Together

with political changes, the economic structure of the economy started to shift from industrialisation to post-industrialisation and a greater connection was forged with the global economy. Accordingly, the state changed the pattern of its intervention from “bureaucratic regulation toward market orientation” (Kang, 1998:115). Nevertheless, the characteristics of the developmental state were reshaped by the 1997 financial crisis. In some respects, the role of the state in Korea was revitalized around the time of the Asian crisis. State intervention has retained a neoliberal influence to a significant extent. In particular, the local states have redefined their roles after regaining autonomy and they seem to be following the path of the developmental state. Therefore, the developmental state and its legacy are key factors when it comes to understanding socio-economic restructuring and the urban development mechanisms and housing market in Korea.

State policy determined spatial policies and housing developments in order to promote and assist economic activity, so it barely fulfilled people’s actual needs during the period through from the 1960s to the 1980s. Accordingly, uneven urban development for economic restructuring has caused population growth and an excessive concentration of wealth in the capital region. Housing policies have been subordinate to economic policies and pricing strategies, so they have not met the needs of low income households (Lim, 2005:325). As housing and land policies have been dealt with as commodities rather than social goods, property speculation has created opportunities for mobility and class differentiation and social inequality has increased.

The nature of the state in Korea, the relationship between the central and local states, and the processes of urban development (as discussed so far) can explain the differences between Western and Korean gentrification and anti-gentrification movements. Based on this historical context, the next chapter aims to shed light on the evolution of the urban redevelopment system to help further understanding of these differences. The middle class, housing and property rights are important factors that decide the scope, form and degree of resistance around gentrification and anti-gentrification movements. After reviewing the Korean urban redevelopment system, the background surrounding the development of the middle class in Korea is examined. A

discussion centred around weak housing and property rights is followed by a discussion of displacement.

Chapter 6: New Flats, the Middle Class and Urban Redevelopment

“It becomes your name, Raemian.”⁸

This is a piece of advertising copy for a chaebol-brand flat that featured in an advertisement aired on television during prime time. Advertisements for flats give the message that a luxury flat will speak volumes about you, and encourage people to buy expensive flats which are beyond the reach of city workers on an average income. As discussed in chapter 5, the state has not paid enough attention to supplying affordable housing and housing benefits for general non-homeowners. Instead, the state has implemented housing policy as one of its economic policies and focused on housing provision for middle class households based on the housing filtering theory. As Korean society has experienced compressed modernisation and industrialisation, dominant social values and the promotion of individual goals have been important to achieving economic growth. In this context, housing is an effective symbol of one’s economic success as well as an important asset.

In the name of nationwide modernisation and industrialisation, Korea has experienced dramatic changes to its housing, cities, society and people’s relationships with them. In particular, the introduction and evolution of flats has changed Koreans’ lives. To own a flat of over 30 pyung⁹ has become one of the standards of a middle class lifestyle (Kim, 2011a). Many people have tried to buy their own flat, but only those in the middle and high income groups have succeeded. After they have obtained means of acquiring wealth, they have used it to increase their property assets. They have had greater choice and power in the housing market. As a result, the gap between those with property and those without has expanded and increased social inequalities. Homes have become things to buy rather than places to live.

⁸ Raemian is the brand name of a string of high-rise flats built by the biggest chaebol in Korea, Samsung.

⁹ This is a standard measure of area in Korea. One pyung is equal to 3.3m².

Under these circumstances, urban redevelopment has fuelled demand for flats and property speculation. Wholesale clearance for flats construction has been met with opposition from residents in urban redevelopment areas, but many urban redevelopment projects – with very few exceptions – have been completed after suppressing neighbourhood resistance. While the coalition between the state, chaebols and the middle class has made urban redevelopment irresistible since it feeds into their own interests, communities and homes for low income households have been broken apart by bulldozers. Tenants' rights have been insecure and illegal eviction of tenants has been common. As a result, most of them are made to leave permanently and gentrification takes place. This has been criticised, with people highlighting the lack of concern given to the negative effects – such as displacement, resistance and conflict – on the original and poorer occupants. Nevertheless, gentrification has been widely viewed as a positive process and another name for economic development in Korea. These redevelopment processes show how materialist values – which were constructed by the rapid socio-economic transition – are expressed in reality.

Considering this background, this chapter provides a more detailed consideration of the institutional and organisational contexts and structures surrounding urban redevelopment. It focuses on the relationship between housing, the middle class and urban redevelopment in Korea. Section 6.1 investigates how urban redevelopment in Korea works as a gentrification process. It reveals how cities have been developed as growth machines by pro-growth coalitions and how large scale displacement is systematically induced by urban redevelopment. Section 6.2 looks at the compulsory purchase and compensation system with regard to weak property rights and housing rights. These two sections show how the urban redevelopment system has induced severe social conflict and socio-spatial inequalities. In section 6.3 the evolution of the middle class in Korea is investigated, since the middle class plays a crucial role in gentrification. In section 6.4, the chapter goes on to consider how housing and urban redevelopment have been conceptualised within the Korean middle class. Urban social movements around housing and urban redevelopment follow in section 6.5. Section 6.5 sets up the context for understanding new anti-redevelopment movements, which will be discussed in chapter 8.

6.1 Korean Redevelopment Processes as Gentrification

After the Korean War, chronic housing shortages were among the most severe social problems. The unbalanced political economy transformation resulted in rapid urbanisation and the decline of the rural economy and population. Economic growth in the 1960s was based on labour intensive light industries, and the associated low wages were a significant factor in this growth. The government implemented this policy to keep the price of food low for workers in urban areas (Lee, 2000). This policy largely affected people living in rural and urban areas. Farmers did not earn enough money from their produce due to the policy of keeping grain prices low, so the rural economy shrank and many people moved to cities in search of jobs. This movement of the population supplied a huge number of workers, well over the demand for labour, in industrialised cities such as Seoul. This policy caused the expansion of squatter settlements in major industrialised cities, especially in Seoul. About one in three people were reported to live in squatter settlements during Park's government (Lee, 2000:3). Urban squatting in Korea is different from urban squatting in European cities, since it arose due to housing shortages rather than out of social struggles. Empty public land was occupied by the urban poor and they built their own houses there as an alternative housing strategy. In particular, this kind of squatter settlement was common during the rapid urbanisation period and the government, which was unable to provide sufficient housing, unofficially endorsed with it. Squatting on vacant public land was thus implicitly accepted to some extent compared to squatting on private land, in spite of the fact it was still a breach of property rights.

The state tried several residential redevelopment policies to solve the housing shortage and prevent squatting. One involved clearance and redevelopment, and another focused on on-site redevelopment. The first policy was more popular and the main tool used for upgrading residential conditions. Residents could not afford to renovate their housing by themselves in the on-site redevelopment system, since they did not have sufficient financial support from the government (Lee et al., 2003a). In the early 1980s, a new redevelopment policy called the Joint Redevelopment Project (the Hapdong Redevelopment Project in Korean, hereafter JRP) was adopted. Even though current urban redevelopment projects have different names, this urban

redevelopment system has remained the same for the last three decades. In the Korean urban redevelopment process, the key players are the redevelopment association formed by property owners and construction companies; this contrasts to the 1970s when the local state facilitated urban redevelopment processes, including the demolition of squatter settlements and the relocation of residents to outlying areas (Lee, 2000). The redevelopment associations are a peculiarly Korean institution and give many local property owners a vested financial interest in redevelopment.

Urban redevelopment plans are drawn up and approved by the local state. Urban redevelopment plans include many details that indicate how urban redevelopment is happening. For example, they include the type of building, the number of new properties and the height of the new building. The local state decides urban redevelopment plans and designates areas where urban redevelopment can take place. The local state also changes the zoning of designated areas for redevelopment to enable high-rise and dense redevelopment. After this, property owners can decide whether to drive their plans forward or not. When 50 per cent of all property owners agree to a redevelopment plan, they establish a 'Preparatory Committee for Property Owners Association for Redevelopment', which is a steering group meant to manage their redevelopment business. To actually start urban redevelopment, 75 per cent of all property owners must agree. When 75 per cent of them agree, they establish a 'Property Owners Association for Redevelopment' (hereafter POAR). This association is crucial to redevelopment since its members take on roles as developers. Even if 25 per cent of all property owners disagree with the plans for urban redevelopment, this association can exercise a compulsory purchase order (hereafter CPOs) and drive urban redevelopment without their consent. If opponents do not leave their properties, the POAR can vacate properties and evict opponents using court orders.

Once a project has been officially approved by the local state, the POAR appoints a builder and carries out all the processes from the demolition of property to the relocation of residents. Given the lack of support from the state, property owners have to raise all the money needed to manage an urban redevelopment project, from the construction costs to the compensation for

existing tenants. While they have land, they do not generally have enough money to drive urban redevelopment. They generally cooperate with a construction company, which is usually a chaebol-owned company. Property owners provide their land and chaebols provide the money for urban redevelopment. Chang (1989) and Park (1988) have argued that the urban redevelopment process and housing provision were effectively privatised by speculative property capital through the JRP. This market-driven redevelopment policy has received tremendous interest. Chang (1989:228) argued the mechanisms of a JRP (Table 6-1). First of all, property owners do not need to pay much money to get a new flat since they provide their land to the construction companies. Secondly, construction companies can earn profit through selling additional housing thanks to the high density of redevelopment allowed by the state. As the state allows construction companies to build almost double the housing stock compared to what was previously on the site, the construction companies can sell the spare housing after distributing housing to property owners. Construction companies can make profit easily without the effort of searching for land, application for planning permission and marketing. Lastly, the state can earn more revenue from new housing stock because it is much more expensive to run than old, dilapidated housing (sometime illegal housing). It also gains profit from selling state-owned land located in urban redevelopment areas (Chang, 1989:228).

Table 6-1 The mechanisms of a JRP, adapted from Chang (1989:228)

	Provide	JRP	Obtain
Property owners	Land		New housing
The state	Administrative support		Increase revenue
Construction companies	Capital		Development profit

This new redevelopment system has brought about many changes in urban redevelopment processes. Ultimately, urban redevelopment projects have led to dramatic changes in the physical environment due to the wholesale demolition of existing residential areas (Figure 6-1), an increase in the social status of residents and population changes resulting from the direct displacement of existing dwellers; this occurs because redevelopment is carried out to allow the

sale of property. In conclusion, this transformation could be viewed as state-led or state-facilitated gentrification, or what McIntyre (2008) terms state mediated gentrification, a type of gentrification which she added to the typology of gentrification. McIntyre (2008:8) has explained that “mediated gentrification takes place within an area that would have been unlikely to undergo change at the same speed and degree if [the] state had not intervened”. Along with the important role of the state and urban planning, this redevelopment process can also be considered a “landlord-initiated gentrification” process (Ha, 2004a) or an “owner-initiated gentrification” process (Lee et al., 2003a), since property owners initiate it themselves.

Figure 6-1 Before and after urban redevelopment



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6.2 The Seeds of Conflict: Compulsory Purchase Orders and Compensation System

The new urban redevelopment system has caused a number of problems and social conflicts. Urban redevelopment was devised to facilitate neighbourhood revitalisation and regeneration, but it resulted in a decrease in the number of small houses and a shrinking rental housing supply

(Ha, 2010). Of primary concern was that there was no compensation for tenants at the beginning of the process. Tenants did not have any right to participate in the redevelopment process. Tenants had no choice but to accept displacement and eviction. As tenants' rights started to receive more attention in the 1980s, they were finally given two options: one was to receive moving compensation to cover three months' living costs, and the other was to move into social housing. This statutory compensation package has developed over the last two decades and tenants are now entitled to claim home loss payments, disturbance payments, temporary accommodation and the right to be rehoused in social housing. This change in the compensation package is a great step forward, but it still has some problems.

Tenants have difficulties retaining the right to stay put. Tenants make up about 70 per cent of all residents in the current urban redevelopment areas covered by the New Town Project (Jang and Yang, 2008:iii). However, only 17 per cent of newly built flats in urban redevelopment areas are social housing. Tenants sometimes have to move into social housing in other areas since social housing is provided across the whole of Seoul. Sometimes, the new housing is too far from an individual's workplace and the rent is not cheap, so the tenants cannot afford to stay there. In addition, the property size and structure of social housing are often not suitable for the household size and the age and gender of the family members (Kim, 2011e:193). Therefore, tenants usually do not take the option of moving into social housing. In other situations, they cannot find appropriate new housing near their existing neighbourhood with the offered compensation and their deposit. Due to the redevelopment, rents around redevelopment districts also increase considerably, thereby reducing the affordability of local housing. Tenants either have to move away or relocate to another planned redevelopment district because of the affordability of such areas. Therefore, tenants' housing rights are not protected and they are often displaced. Tenure security has been ignored historically and legally for a long time. Private rental housing has almost totally dominated the rental housing sector. The 2010 census shows that 17 per cent of rental housing is supplied by the public sector. Even though half of Koreans are not homeowners, there is not strong enough legislation in place to prevent displacement over urban redevelopment. In fact, direct displacement and eviction are very easy to recognise.

Property rights have also been weakened under the law of the CPOs, whereas the acquiring authorities have significant power. Even property owners have difficulties keeping their right to stay put. The return rate of owner-occupiers to the area is also low. The figure varies depending on the redevelopment district. According to Ha's research, only 20.8 per cent of owner-occupiers succeeded in moving back in (Ha, 2004a:384). The reasons for low resettlement rates are weak property rights and CPOs. Private property rights in Korea have been (relatively speaking) much weaker than those in the West due to the legacy of the developmental state (Lee and Shin, 2012). As the central state took a dominant role in industrialisation and spatial development projects, huge amounts of land were expropriated by the Land Expropriation Act which was established in 1962. This act gave the state power to purchase land needed for public projects, even if the state failed to consult the land owners (Jung et al., 2008). The laws relating to land acquisition and compensation were used to acquire industrial land, infrastructure and urban development areas cheaply to achieve rapid economic growth (Jung et al., 2008). Between the 1960s and 1970s, the state relied excessively on compulsory land acquisition, particularly in industrial land development (La Grange and Jung, 2004).

In 1980, during Chun's government, a new law – the Housing Site Development Promotion Act – was introduced to expand housing provision. Private developers started to take an active role in urban redevelopment through the JRP. The state gave the private sector, which mainly involves POARs and chaebols, compulsory purchase powers to help increase housing provision in the 1980s (Jeong, 2010). New legislation was introduced in 2007 to offer more effective help to private businesses. Prior to 2007, private developers could only use CPOs for urban redevelopment with the approval of four-fifths of landlords; now, they only need the approval of three-quarters of them. When the private sector expropriated lands before 2007, they were required to own over two-thirds of the total land and also have the approval of two-thirds of landlords. However, the new law relaxed this clause so private companies can now expropriate land when only half of all landlords agree (Cho, 2011a). Cho (2011a) argues that these amendments give private companies greater powers, and is concerned by the private sector's misuse of CPOs. Even though, in line with the law, the private sector can only exercise CPOs in

accordance with the public good, the new legislation obviously restricts individuals' property rights and forces people to move out of their homes and businesses.

Even though CPOs play a vital role in promoting urban redevelopment, their effect is significant and sometimes very cruel. Therefore, there are many restrictions over how CPOs can be exercised. Just compensation for expropriation of property is legislated. The law guarantees that compulsory purchase power is used only for public necessities and that fair compensation should be given for expropriation. The compensation amount is a basic land price assessed by the government under the Act for the Acquisition and Compensation of Public Lands at the time of consultation. The compensation price in Korea has been based on the officially assessed individual land price, as established by the central government, but this is far less than the market price. The officially assessed land price ranges from 20 to 80 per cent of the market value, depending on the location of the land and other factors (Min, 2010:67). Compensation prices are thus readjusted by appraisers (Jung et al., 2008:53). However, the valuation price is still below the property's market value and this creates severe conflict between property owners and the acquiring authorities.

Even though the land compensation price was usually below the market price, property owners were not able to resist expropriation under the authoritarian state. The compensation price was sometimes just one-tenth of the market value in the 1970s (La Grange and Jung, 2004:565). After the democratisation of the state, property owners had more power to oppose those exercising compulsory purchase powers. Now, when property owners disagree with the valuation price appraised by two surveyors nominated by the local mayors they can ask to have their property reappraised, and negotiate with the acquiring authorities to some degree. However, their lack of bargaining power and legal redress are still problematic. Furthermore, once the urban redevelopment plan is released, property prices in areas designated for redevelopment increase. There is nothing in place to bridge the gap between property owners' expectations for compensation and the actual compensation which is offered to them. Agreements between land owners and developers are not easy. In essence, these factors are all favourable for the acquiring authorities rather than the property owners.

As a result, the return rate of existing residents, including tenants and owners in redevelopment districts, reportedly stands at only 20.7 per cent in Korea (Ha, 2004a:384). According to a recent report by the Seoul Institute, 40 per cent of all property owners moved back into the same area after redevelopment (Jang and Yang, 2008:72). When tenants are included for calculation, the total return rate of original residents is around 10 per cent (Jang and Yang, 2008:72). Therefore, gentrification in Korea is associated with direct displacement triggered by large scale redevelopment. Many people have agreed that the current resident 'return rate' is too low and should be increased. However, there is no social consensus about what an acceptable return rate is. One survey was conducted amongst professional groups who took part in the planning of the New Town Project in Seoul, and professional groups published articles about the project without having had any involvement in its planning (Jang and Yang, 2008:72). They were asked what an acceptable return rate of existing residents would be, including tenants. About seven in ten respondents suggested that over 30 per cent is the minimum acceptable return rate. However, the response varies according to the characteristics of the group consulted.

The two groups that participated in the planning of the project saw over 40 per cent as an acceptable rate of return, whereas the group that had not participated in the planning suggested a return rate of over 50 per cent. Some people may not want to return. However, this survey shows that many people involved in the redevelopment do not expect many of the original residents to return, and instead expect more affluent newcomers to move in. This shows that urban redevelopment implies gentrification from the early stages of its planning. The Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) has driven a large scale urban redevelopment project which could affect 15 per cent of the total Seoul population (Kim, 2008b:133). Therefore, anti-gentrification movements from tenants and property owners are likely to increase further around the current, large scale planned urban redevelopment projects. In contrast, the middle classes are one of the beneficiaries of urban redevelopment. The middle classes have played an important role in the Korean urban redevelopment system. The next section discusses the evolution and role of the Korean middle classes.

6.3 The Middle Class in Korea

Korea did not experience the growth of commerce and manufacture over an extended period of time prior to industrialisation. Thus in Korea, the older social structure of estates derived from Confucian ideas of social stratification had barely begun to transform into a capitalist class system prior to industrialisation as had occurred elsewhere. That is, because commercialisation barely preceded industrialisation in Korea, those classified as having old middle class occupation[s] did not appear on the scene much if at all before people with new middle class occupation[s]. The old middle class in South Korea grew along with the growth of manual production workers, urban professionals and salaried white collar workers. Thus middle class itself is new in Korea (Lett, 1998:202).

Lett made a good case for why Korea has different characteristics from the West. The occupation based distinction between the old and new middle classes found in Western industrial societies does not explain the Korean class structure effectively. The concepts of the new middle class and the middle class are new in Korea. ‘New middle class’ and ‘middle class’ can be used interchangeably in literature (Jee, 1997, Yang, 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to examine how the middle class has developed in Korea and how to approach the term ‘new middle class’ in the Korean context, as the history of social class in Korea is different from that in Western countries.

The term middle class should be applied tentatively to the Korean context. The use of the term ‘class’ was not allowed even in academic discourse during the military regime, due to the dominant anti-communist ideology (Shin et al., 2003). Instead of ‘middle class’, a new term – ‘chungsancheung’ – emerged and was used in academia, journalism and even ordinary conversation. This term has been often translated and introduced as ‘middle class’ in English language social science literature. It needs to be noted that the Korean middle class as discussed in English literature is not directly analogous to the concept of the middle class found in the West. The term middle class, as used in the most of the literature discussed in this thesis, is a translation of the Korean term ‘chungsancheung’. Even though there is not an academic and social consensus around the definition of ‘chungsancheung’, policy makers and a succession of presidents have aimed to expand the chungsancheung and have made policies intended to accommodate this group. Without clear conceptualisation, this term has been generally used to refer to the middle stratum of society or the middle class in terms of socio-economic ability (Jo,

2006). There are still ongoing debates around the definition of ‘chungsancheung’ and whether it can be replaced as a term in social science literature with ‘middle class’ or ‘middle stratum’ (Chang, 2007). However, the term implies many facets of the middle class and gives a sense of the Korean middle class (Koo, 2007). Therefore, the Korean term used in the Korean literature and interviews is replaced with ‘middle class’ in this thesis.

In advanced industrialised countries, a large new middle class emerged long after the advent of capitalism and a substantial period of time after the establishment of the working class. By contrast, the old middle class developed simultaneously with the new middle class as a result of industrialisation in Korea; this is different from the West, where the decline of the old middle class led to the rise of the new middle class (Koo, 1991). As the newly industrialised countries in Korea underwent compressed industrialisation, the formation of the new middle class involved a distinctive process (Koo and Hong, 1980, Koo, 1991, Hart, 1993, Lee, 1994, Yang, 2012). In particular, it is necessary to focus on the instrumental role the state has played in the creation of the middle class (Hart, 1993, Shin, 1999, Yang, 2012). As the state took a powerful role in distributing resources for rapid economic growth and industrialisation, it made an effort to construct the middle class (Yang, 2012). Yang reveals that the authoritarian state in Park’s regime played an instrumental role in the formation of the middle class to assist its political legitimacy. A significant middle class was considered a good indicator of a stable and homogenous society where people enjoy a good quality of life. Yang pointed out that the middle class in Korea should be seen as a product of both industrialisation and modernisation, and also as an outcome of the state’s political ideology.

White collar workers in Korea started to expand in numbers during the 1970s as a consequence of the heavy chemical industrialisation policy (Koo, 1991, Yang, 2012). The developmental state created chaebols which expanded rapidly thanks to the support of the state; the chaebols wanted to restructure economic policy, and move from a focus on light industry to a focus on heavy industry. They provided many white collar jobs – such as managerial, engineering and clerical positions – for people with high skills and a higher education. From the 1970s to the

1980s, the middle class was often synonymous with the workers employed by chaebols.¹⁰ Shin (1999) has argued that the emergence of the Korean middle class resulted from the developmental alliances between the state and the industrial labour sector. The proportion of white collar jobs has increased gradually since the 1970s (Table 6-2).

Table 6-2 The rate of employed people by occupation in Korea (%)

Year	Managerial professionals	Clerks	Service and sale workers	Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	Production workers ¹¹	Others	Total
2010	22.2	16.3	22.2	7.5	21	10.8	100
2000	22.2	13.6	22	12.8	21.6	7.8	100
1990	9.5	15.3	22.6	20.6	31.5	0.5	100
1980	5.7	9.5	19.2	37.6	28	0	100
1970	4.1	5.8	16.8	50.7	21.6	1.0	100
1960	3.7	2.6	17.3	65.6	10	0.8	100

source: KOSIS (various years)

In particular, the proportion of professional and technical workers has increased remarkably since 1990 (Table 6-3). The proportion of clerical workers has levelled off, whereas the managerial and professional groups have increased significantly since the 1990s, as the state restructured its industry towards high technology and the financial sector starting in the late 1980s. The proportion of managerial and professional groups in Korea grew dramatically from 9.5 per cent to 22.2 per cent over the course of a single decade. In summary, state-directed rapid industrialisation has been a crucial factor in the creation of the middle class.

¹⁰ A new term for this group, 'Salary Men', was introduced during this period and was often synonymous with the term 'middle class' in Korea (Hart, 1993).

¹¹ This category includes craft and related trades workers as well as plant and machine operators and assemblers.

Table 6-3 The changing occupational structure of the white collar sector in Korea (%)

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Professional and technical workers	2.4	3.2	4.6	7.4	16.9	19.4
Managerial and administrative workers	1.3	0.9	1.1	2.1	5.3	2.8
Clerical workers	2.6	5.8	9.5	15.3	13.6	16.3
Total	6.3	9.9	15.2	24.8	35.8	38.5

source: KOSIS (various years)

In light of its different occupational structures, socio-cultural and political practices, the Korean middle class after the 1990s can be distinguished from the middle class dominant in the 1970s and 1980s. The early middle class enjoyed mass consumption and mass suburbanisation, having their own housing and families. The middle class was largely homogenous. In contrast, the middle classes of the 2000s are more diverse. Its members share fewer similarities. Since employment status became more diverse following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the number of fixed term contracts and the use of agency staff have increased. Contract type is one of the main factors considered in analytical accounts of class structure in Korea (Koo, 2007). Along with the diversification of employment status, Koo emphasises the importance of property assets in explaining the restructuring of the middle classes. The affluent class accumulated their property assets during the crisis, and property assets have affected the stratification and fragmentation of the middle class. Property assets are the most important base for social collectivities and class stability compared to other assets, since they can be stored and transmitted (Savage et al., 1992:212). In particular, the relationship between homeownership and class status has been debated for a long time. Rex and Moore explained this relationship with their term ‘housing class’ (Rex et al., 1967:6).

Although the concept ‘housing class’ has been criticised in many ways (Saunders, 1978, 1984), no one can dispute that homeownership and housing tenure are salient components of political struggles and social movements. Taking this approach, the significance of homeownership and social mobilisation in Korea is discussed in the following section. Specifically, the next section

focuses on condominium ownership and flats, since these factors need to be considered when investigating gentrification and the middle class in Korea.

6.4 Condominium Ownership and Socio-Tenorial Polarisation

As high-rise flats have been a common form of housing, they have been getting much higher and more luxurious. Nowadays, super high-rise flats with names such as ‘Tower Palace’ have become symbols of the well-to-do. Flats were introduced as the optimal option for the working class in order to solve a housing shortage in the 1960s; however, flats have now become the ideal homes of the middle and upper middle class (Sonn and Shin, 2013). Almost all housing units have been built since 1979. Most traditional Korean residences were demolished and rebuilt in modern styles, especially in the form of flats. When it comes to classic gentrification, which involves the renovation of older residential areas in central and inner city areas, it is almost impossible to find a prototypical case in the Korean urban context since very little traditional housing stock remains. Victorian and Georgian houses have been the targets of renovation by gentrifiers using their sweat equity in the UK. However, there was not enough historical housing stock suitable for renovation by the middle classes in Central Seoul and other Korean cities. This is because many traditional Korean houses were destroyed during the Korean War and the subsequent period of rapid urbanisation. Very few traditional Korean houses, called ‘hanok’ in Figure 6-2, are left and they now account for just one per cent of the total housing stock (NHC, 2012).

Figure 6-2 Hanok



source: KTO (2014)

Over the last five decades, the proportion of properties accounted for by flats has reversed (Table 6-4) and flats are now the most common form of housing as shown in Figure 6-3. According to the 2012 housing survey by the Land and Housing Institute (LHI), Koreans prefer flats to other types of housing. 54 per cent of respondents reported wanting to live in a flat if possible, and flats constituted 60 per cent of the future housing which they hope to move into (LHI, 2012c:36–40). Respondents expressed high satisfaction with flats (at 66.6 per cent), compared with other types of housing (LHI, 2012c:29). This survey shows radical changes in the Korean housing market and Koreans' high preference for flats. Also, Koreans now have little choice for anything except a flat.

Table 6-4 Housing type in Korea (%)

	Detached house	Flat	Other types	Total
2010	27.3	59.3	13.4	100
before 1979	86.2	9.1	4.7	100

Source :KOSIS

Figure 6-3 Block of flats in Seoul



source:Yonhapnews (2013b)

Flat ownership has become a very important factor in explanations of the characteristics of individual socio-economic status, as flats are positional goods. Recently, socio-economic groups have been classified according to the type of flats they occupy. Whether or not you live in a super high-rise luxury flat has become more important. This phenomenon has produced and strengthened socio-political, economic and spatial inequalities in Korea. Gelézeau (2007) terms the relationship between flat ownership and wider Korean society the republic of [the] apartment. The characteristics of neighbourhoods are also determined by the prevalent housing type. As a result, flats even decide the result of elections. Son (2010) found that areas where the approval rating for the conservative party was high were marked by a high rate of homeownership, multi-housing owners and flat owners. There is a considerable degree of overlap between an individual's socio-economic group and the type of housing they occupy. As Table 6-5 shows, detached houses constitute the most common type of home in low income groups, (52.5 per cent). By comparison 52 per cent of the total middle income group and 60.4 per cent of the high income group occupy flats. Because the correlation between housing type and socio-economic status is very high in Korea, housing type can be seen as an attribute of class (Hamnett, 1999).

Table 6-5 Housing type by income group in Korea (%)

	Detached houses	Flats	other
Low income household	52.5	35.1	12.4
Middle income household	33.2	52.2	14.3
High income household	26.0	60.4	13.6

source: LHI (2012a:13)


Homeownership in Korea is important when deciding the boundaries of the middle class, but a more important factor is whether the homeowners are flat owners or not. Considering the high level of homeownership in the higher income groups (Table 6-6), it can be argued that the housing market is socially stratified according to housing type, tenure and socio-economic group. This correlation has strengthened social polarisation, since housing price increases have differed according to housing type. In Figure 6-4 there is a clear trend for house prices to increase according to housing type. Flat prices increased more than the price of any other type of property between 1986 and 2011.

Table 6-6 Housing tenure by income group in Korea (%)

	Owner-occupiers	Chunse	Monthly rent	Others	Total
Low income	50.4	13.8	32	3.8	100
Middle income	51.8	26.9	18.6	2.7	100
High income	64.6	27.7	6.4	1.3	100

source: LHI (2012a:12)

Figure 6-4 Housing prices index by housing type in Korea from 1986 to 2011



source: KOSIS (various years), Index (2011=100)

The average price of a detached house of owner-occupiers in 2012 was about £85,000¹², whereas that of a flat in Korea was £120,000 (LHI, 2012b:52). This disparity and the increasing tendency for housing price increases have affected the availability of loans. Flat residents tend to obtain loans easily. Table 6-7 shows that flat owners were the largest group to use bank loans to pay for their homes. Eventually, property assets – determined by housing tenure and housing type – affect political opinions. Once people own a flat, their political attitudes are often totally changed in spite of the fact their income does not increase (theKyunghyangSinmun, 2010:224). The relationship between flat ownership and a person's political views has created a new term, 'flat politics' (Cheon, 2013).

Table 6-7 The proportion (%) of loans used to finance housing by housing type in Korea

	Homeowners	Chunse	Monthly Rent
Detached houses	23.1	8.2	1
Flats	47.1	17.7	12.3
Others	44.8	18.4	5.6

source: LHI (2012a:21)

¹² Korean Won-Pound exchange rate is about 1,800 won to 1 pound in February, 2014, but 2,000 won to 1 pound is used in this for simplicity.

This relationship between socio-tenurial polarisation and political views has resulted from the characteristics of Korean developmentalism, which were discussed in chapter 5. Housing has been seen not as a resource for collective consumption but rather as a vehicle for promoting economic growth. Housing has remained a form of individual consumption, and housing consumption is directly determined by an individual's ability to pay the price determined by their individual labour market position. Therefore, middle and high income groups have been more likely to become condominium owners because of their strong purchasing power. In fact, flats were envisaged as a "by-product of [the] growth machine" in the authoritarian developmental state (Kim, 2011a:32). As the state and the chaebols reshaped spatial structures, their alliance also transformed the housing culture. In order to increase housing provision and obtain support from the middle class to boost its political legitimacy, the state in the 1970s turned public land into flat construction sites by using its planning and zoning powers; the state offered tax relief or tax exemptions for flat construction (Sonn and Shin, 2013:379–381).

The growth of the middle class and their demand for decent housing (in an environment where housing provision was always less than demand) made flat construction one of the most profitable businesses for chaebols and the most effective means of capital accumulation for the state (Lim, 2005). The emerging middle class also benefited from their flats, since they obtained advantages from their properties (flats being considered a good type of housing to live and invest in). Lim (2005:77) explains that new flats became a good speculative investment due to high inflation in the 1970s, so affluent households have played a role as both speculative investors in and actual occupiers of flats. Thus, people have an effective means of wealth accumulation when they become homeowners. In particular, flat owners have enjoyed an increase in their flats' value more than other types of homeowners. This has caused social inequality in terms of housing consumption and distribution. Flat-owners have enjoyed the increase in their properties' value, and have speculated on other properties using their flats. Homeowners have become a "rent based class which is a class based in property rights defined as the ability to receive the return on an asset directly or indirectly through exchange" (Sørensen, 2005:121). Homeowners have supported the growth-oriented state in order to keep

or increase their property value. In this environment, the state has maintained its power and driven economic growth with support from the middle class. Since social inequality has increased between non-homeowners and homeowners, housing status (tenure and housing type) accounts for 95 per cent of an individual's status in a socio-economic group in Korea (theKyunghyangSinmun, 2010:262). Some people argue that property classes exist in Korea (Son, 2008) and that Korea has become a housing class society (Choi et al., 2010). Son (2008) divides property classes into six categories according to homeownership status and housing price, as shown Table 6-8.

Table 6-8 The structure of property classes in Korea

Ownership	Class	No. Households	No. Houses	Proportion	Characteristics
Owners	1	380,000 (230,000) ¹³	1,130,000 (980,000) ¹⁴	2	Housing price over £375,000
	2	8,360,000 (820,000)	11,340,000 (3,800,000)	54	Housing price under £375,000
	3	670,000	670,000	4	Homeowners but not owner-occupiers
Non-owners	4	950,000		6	Deposit over £25,000
	5	4,810,000		30	Deposit under £25,000
Under class	6	680,000		4	Slum dwellers
Total		15,850,000	13,140,000	100	

source: Son (2008)

Renters comprise about half of Korean households, but they do not ask the state for support such as social housing, rent controls and so on. Instead, they have put all their effort into becoming homeowners, and especially into getting condominium ownership since housing assets guarantee individual welfare and security in Korea where the social safety net is basic and generally for the least well off. Therefore, even non-homeowners, especially potential buyers, tend to be in favour of urban redevelopment, since more flats would be built. Urban

¹³ This is the number of multi-housing owners.

¹⁴ This is the quantity of housing owned by multi-housing owners.

redevelopment has been the main means of meeting the changing demands of the housing market. For potential homebuyers, redeveloped high-rise flats mean a chance to improve their lives. This response is based on a similar mechanism which Ley and Teo termed “aspiration for improved housing”:

The new luxury high-rise apartments for a local and transnational elite become ‘the image of the good life’ and an aspiration for a much larger population who have known only much poorer residential quarters in the past. The redeveloped high-rise apartment building also remains a source of consumer aspiration for a growing middle class for whom it represents an improved quality of life (Ley and Teo, 2014:1289).

As discussed earlier, housing prices have risen faster than any other prices, and the value of flats has increased more rapidly than the value of any other type of housing. As condominium ownership has shown big returns, it has been a subject of speculation and investment. Urban redevelopment and condominium ownership can be explained as the essence of Korean developmentalism and the Korean middle class. These two elements have induced gentrification and strengthened over the last three decades.

6.5 Opposition to Urban Redevelopment

Clearance programmes of slums and squatter settlements to increase housing provision for the middle class were enacted under the authoritarian state during the 1970s and 1980s, and thousands of low income residents were threatened with large scale eviction and displacement as a result (Lim, 2005). Over 18 per cent of the urban poor in Seoul are reported to have one or more experiences of eviction due to housing demolition (KNHC, 1989). Urban redevelopment programmes tore people and communities apart, but there has not been much research into the negative impacts of eviction and displacement aside from exploration of the economic implications. In spite of their huge impact on people and their communities, the organisers behind urban redevelopment projects do not appear to have considered their effects on community dynamics. As a result of such projects, those in low income groups have been forced to move into more run-down areas and lost their social capital (Ha, 2004b). In addition, urban redevelopment processes have not been fully open to the public and run by democratic planning

decision-making processes. Therefore, urban redevelopment has induced many social problems and been confronted with strong social opposition.

The urban poor and self-help squatters rarely responded to urban redevelopment-led eviction in a collective way (discounting a few cases from before the 1980s), since they did not have any legal rights to the land designated for urban redevelopment because they had been illegally squatting there. In addition, civil society was not yet developed under the authoritarian rule imposed by the military regime (Kim, 2003:196). Anti-eviction movements were regarded as anti-dictatorship movements, and protesters were considered communists (Kim, 1998b, Cho, 2005). Furthermore, grassroots movements were not widely supported by ordinary people because they felt that such movements destabilised society (Kim, 1998b). Social protests were severely suppressed by the authoritarian state. Therefore, it was difficult for anti-eviction movements to collectively break out and succeed.

In these circumstances, the first collective squatter protest (the Gwangju Daedanji incident) took place in 1971. Squatters protested about large scale relocation of squatter settlements from Seoul to peripheral areas such as Gyeongido (Kim, 2006c). The SMG deported squatters to areas where there was no social infrastructure. The squatters were effectively abandoned by the state and left without means to live (Shon, 2003). The squatters could not find jobs in the areas they were relocated to, and could not afford to build homes on the land provided by the government. The SMG forced the squatters to pay all the costs for the land¹⁵, and this ultimately instigated the protest. This protest lasted only one day, but it had significant implications and marked the beginning of a major urban social movement (Kim, 2006c).

More resistance and protests against eviction and displacement broke out in the 1980s and they became more serious and widespread after Joint Redevelopment Projects were implemented in 1983. Compared to the 1960s and 1970s, squatter homeowners could gain some redevelopment benefits since the government accepted their illegal homeownership in the new urban redevelopment policy. Unlike homeowners, however, tenants did not receive any compensation.

¹⁵ The SMG bought this area from the Gyeonggi government at cheap prices and provided it to squatters. Since the land was not free, the squatters had a severe financial burden. Many residents sold their rights for this land, it was purchased by speculators and the price of this land rapidly increased (Shon 2003).

They were economically and politically powerless both as individuals and as a group. In the past, social conflict over urban redevelopment had involved the state and low income groups; however, this changed into social conflict between interest groups in the 1980s. Therefore, the local state did not take action to resolve this conflict because the problems induced by the JRP were considered the results of a private conflict between the property owners' association and tenants (Hwang and Yoo, 1989). Even though the poor made claims to their local authorities, the lack of a local election system meant protesters lacked a political connection to their local mayor or opposition parties (Lee, 1990). As urban redevelopments were accelerated by the JRP and city beautification movement for mega projects (the 1986 Asian Games, the 1988 Olympic Games), tenants were involved in a crisis of mass eviction and displacement during the 1980s (Davis, 2011). In addition, they suffered from physical harassment from demolition thugs that the construction companies hired to help facilitate rapid demolition (Choi, 2009, Im and Jeon, 2009a).¹⁶

Accordingly, many tenants took collective action against property owners and construction companies. Anti-eviction movements received support from democracy movements and labour movements in the late 1980s (Kim et al., 1998). Religious groups also started to actively help the mobilisation of the urban poor's anti-eviction movements, and served as a shield that protected the urban poor from brutal suppression by the state (Kim, 1998b:241). Religious groups and students' groups contributed to strengthening anti-eviction movements by helping people to set up meetings and organising committees. Protesters resisted forced demolition and violent eviction through marches, street demonstrations, vigils and hunger strikes. They fought ferociously and often clashed with police and demolition thugs. When they did not succeed in achieving any fundamental changes, some protestors chose suicide as an extreme form of

¹⁶ Construction companies and the POAR subcontract a demolition company. Its main work is to demolish and clear buildings and land. Demolition companies often use violent methods for rapid demolition since they tend to be awarded more money when they finish their job ahead of schedule. It is reported that many workers and owners at this kind of company are ex-gangsters. This is why they are called demolition thugs. In 1998, 12 social organisations (e.g. the Urban Poor Women Federation, MINBYUN-Lawyers for a Democratic Society, and the Catholic Urban Poor Federation etc.) published a report about various brutal crimes which a notorious demolition company called Dawon committed from 1991 to 1998. The report claimed that Dawon was responsible for 47 cases of violence, 16 cases of sexual assault, 2 murders, 55 cases of housebreaking, 5 cases of property destruction, 10 cases of threats and 9 cases of infringement upon children's rights. This barbarous demolition company has been widely criticised, but many demolition companies still continue to operate.

protest. According to research by Kim et al. (1998), 11 protesters committed suicide between 1986 and 1998.

However, these movements were distinguished from previous anti-eviction movements by squatters, who squatted in order to focus attention on housing and the basic necessities of life. Tenants started to realise the social injustice and unfairness of urban redevelopment, which excluded them from the economic gains of such projects. People started to demand just law enforcement and housing rights from the state (Kim, 1998b). Tenants demanded just compensation from the state and landlords, such as alternative housing (Cho, 1989). Urban social movements over urban redevelopment began to widen out beyond calls for compensation and anti-eviction movements. They started to demand social welfare systems and greater governmental responsibility over the lack of affordable housing and urban redevelopment policies.

In addition, another new trend appeared in terms of the key actors and mobilisation methods. While previous movements were sporadic, protesters in the 1980s began to continuously resist redevelopment in spite of imprisonment and injuries inflicted as a result of intense suppression. They started to collaborate with other people in the face of these problems. As a result the first organisation for evictees, the Seoul Council of the Centre for Victims of Forced Evictions (the SCFE), was established in 1987 by victims of eviction; the organisation was established independently of other groups like university students and religious groups, which had helped evictees in the past. Social protests against eviction and displacement became more systemised. Tenants facing similar problems gathered to fight for their housing rights together with others from urban redevelopment areas all around Seoul. The establishment of the SCFE enabled people to access institutional support for protest activities in each neighbourhood, and facilitated the growth of active anti-eviction movements and housing rights movements. Tenants' movements during this period were successful at promoting public awareness, and they made their issues political problems. These changes can be interpreted in the light of the collapse of the authoritarian regime and the development of a civil society out of the political democratisation movement of the 1980s (Kim, 2006a).

These strong social protests led to some crucial transformations to housing policies, and a new compensation system was introduced to improve the urban poor's and tenants' housing rights. The state has become more involved with housing provision for the low income groups and has assumed responsibility for the protection of their housing rights. In 1989, the president announced that the state would supply affordable social housing and permanent rental social housing (Ha, 2002). In 1991 the mayor of Seoul settled an agreement around temporary accommodation and the compulsory building of social housing for rent in urban redevelopment areas. These changes meant that tenants would be eligible for compensation in the redevelopment process. A new urban redevelopment policy termed the Urban Poor's Housing Environment Improvement Act was introduced in 1989 to improve the living conditions of low income groups, and the state took more responsibility for urban redevelopment (Lee, 2000). This was a great step forward, but this progress was not fully realised due to the characteristics of the property-led accumulation coalitions connected with the chaebols (Lee, 2003). For example, less social housing was constructed than was originally intended as part of the Two Million Housing Unit Construction policy; this was because of lobbying from chaebols (Park, 1998). Also, the state did not provide enough support, so what was initially social housing was eventually replaced by more expensive housing in which the urban poor could not afford to live. The new urban redevelopment policy aimed to help resettlement of tenants and lower income homeowners. However, they were displaced by the property capital of property agencies and construction companies since they could not afford to improve their housing by themselves (Yoon, 2002:178).

Social protests over urban redevelopment became weaker in the 1990s after the democratic transition, since squatter settlements had largely disappeared as a result of large scale urban redevelopment in the 1980s and the legalisation of compensation systems for tenants thanks to the 1980s struggles (Park and Lee, 2012). However, housing rights were still not guaranteed and the protection they offered was inadequate (Kim, 1998b:248). The new town development policy became active around the suburban outskirts of Seoul in the early 1990s, so tenants and poor property owners still suffered from eviction and demolition. Therefore, social resistance against urban restructuring continued and more social organisations were established during the

1990s. New social organisations established in the 1990s have moved beyond a focus on anti-demolition issues to concern themselves with housing rights and social welfare. They have tried to improve laws and policies to strengthen all citizens' housing rights, not just evictees'. Their efforts led to the introduction of the 2003 Housing Act, which regulates housing standards. Housing started to be considered a right rather than a need (Park and Lee, 2012).

Large scale anti-eviction and urban redevelopment movements re-emerged in the late 2000s. Social conflict over urban redevelopment has become more complicated and expanded along with existing conflicts between tenants and other parties. Property owners were relatively passive in previous anti-urban redevelopment movements, but they have actively started to mobilise over the last five years. In general, property owners were in favour of urban redevelopment because it enabled them to increase their property's value; by obtaining a new flat, they secured themselves a middle class status symbol and a good investment (Park, 1988, Lee, 2013). However, property owners have become major actors in resistance to urban redevelopment, whereas tenants' movements have appeared relatively weak by comparison. New anti-urban redevelopment movements, which are termed property owners' opposition movements, emerged after a new urban redevelopment policy named the New Town Project was launched in 2003. Property owners' opposition movements became more active and visible after the 2008 economic recession. They oppose urban redevelopment and form movements with the slogan 'No urban redevelopment, leave my home'. This is quite a new form of social movement against urban redevelopment in Korea, so it is under-researched and little empirical research has been conducted into it (e.g Kim, 2010, Shin, 2010). There is no substantial literature that examines the effects of these movements on the urban redevelopment process. However, property owners' movements have influenced recent changes in the state's approach to urban redevelopment. Hence, it is crucial to investigate where property owners' opposition movements come from, how and why they develop, and why they matter. This new type of movement will be examined further in chapter 8.

To conclude, urban redevelopment processes have been monopolised by construction companies and the state, whereas the majority of citizens, even residents in urban

redevelopment areas, have been excluded from decision-making processes and other socio-political mechanisms. Therefore, social protests over urban redevelopment systems since the 1980s can be understood in terms of the emergence and development of urban social movements for fundamental social change, not only as movements that aim to promote evictees' rights to housing. This evolution should be interpreted by considering the relationship between the transformation of broad urban social movements and political environments. In general, the state was intolerant of anti-urban redevelopment movements and politically representative systems (such as local electoral systems and opposition parties) until the late 1980s. As a result, social protests were brutally repressed, but the state's actions have become more tolerant and flexible and political conflicts have been more effectively expressed since the early 1990s. Anti-urban redevelopment movements have become more diverse in terms of their key actors, the form they take, and their relationship with other movements and the state.

6.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has provided an account of how urban redevelopment processes have led to gentrification in Korea. The state-business link around urban redevelopment processes and housing development has become evident, as it has played an important role in economic growth and spatial development. It has affected planning approval and the form and extent of resident protection from expropriation, as well as arrangements for compensation. Therefore, residents only have a limited voice in the process of development and have few rights to oppose or halt redevelopment. Even though the state does not directly take part in the processes of clearance, demolition and flat construction, it has played a critical and extensive role as a facilitator and regulator. Simply put, the state has planned where to redevelop and then decided on the type and size of the new housing and for whom it is meant, in order to promote homeownership and housing provision. Based on the state's plans and regulations, property owners have initiated urban redevelopment as they provide the land. Chaebols have taken part in urban redevelopment as homebuilders, and have contributed towards the costs of urban redevelopment alongside property owners. Chaebols have provided money for flat construction due to the absence of direct financial support from the state. The triangle partnership formed by

the state, chaebols and property owners has steamrolled urban redevelopment, and all these parties have benefited from redeveloping land and properties for profit. The state has increased the supply of decent housing and obtained political support from homeowners. Property owners have improved the quality of their housing and increased their property assets. Chaebols have benefited as developers. Urban redevelopment has been managed according to the individual players' interests rather than the overall public interest. The emerging middle class's desire for condominium ownership has also played a crucial role in the urban redevelopment processes. The middle class has taken part in urban redevelopment by investing in and consuming new flats.

After deepening understanding of the social factors underpinning Korean urban redevelopment as a gentrification process, this chapter has examined the relationship between economic and political change and anti-urban redevelopment movements. Under the strong state and relatively weak civil society prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s, urban redevelopment programmes caused large-scale eviction and displacement. In spite of this, it was not possible for evictees to form collective movements. Class-based movements, such as urban poor movements, were brutally suppressed under the authoritarian regime. However, there was progress to protect tenants thanks to a series of successful social movements in the 1980s and 1990s. Anti-urban redevelopment movements became more radical, systematic and stronger in the 1980s. Urban social movements succeeded in making some progress on housing rights in terms of legislation to protect tenants' rights and secure better compensation packages.

Urban redevelopment has strengthened the commodification of space and housing, the violation of property and housing rights and social polarisation. Social conflict and protests over urban redevelopment have continued to be inevitable, since housing in Korea has operated under open market mechanisms. Many low income households are still seeking a roof over their heads, since they have limited power to choose and keep a home. In addition, large scale eviction and displacement continue to take place due to the New Town Projects which was launched in 2003. Forced eviction and displacement have become widespread and taken place systematically in the name of urban redevelopment for the sake of economic interests. As a number of people and

communities have been affected, more social protests and resistance have emerged. However, there are insufficient channels to halt urban redevelopment taking place against residents' wills. Therefore, society needs to pay attention to housing rights once again.

Chapters 5 and 6 have elaborated on the production of urban built environments and social interaction in the Korean context. The emphasis is on the serious limitations that restrict commercial development within the organisational context in which urban redevelopment operates. These two chapters have provided a preliminary discussion that sets out the context for the next three chapters, which are based on empirical analysis. The next three chapters provide detailed examinations of Korean gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in connection with the theoretical approaches presented in chapters 2 and 3, and the Korean context as discussed in chapters 5 and 6.

Chapter 7: State Redevelopment Policy – Putting Property before People

“A toad, a toad, Give you my old house, Give back a new house to me.”

This is part of a children’s song popular in Korea. When children make a sandcastle with friends, they sing this song. Many property owners believe that they can obtain new housing if urban redevelopment takes place. In the 2008 elections for MPs, many citizens who believed this story chose MP candidates who made election pledges promising they would encourage urban redevelopment policies and designate more urban redevelopment areas (Jeong, 2010). It seems that urban redevelopment is often perceived as a golden ticket for property owners to get rich and politicians to win elections. Many areas have been designated for urban redevelopment since these elections. As shown in chapter 6, 15 per cent of the total Seoul population have been affected by the New Town Projects.

Place entrepreneurs – the state, chaebols and property owners in Korea – promoted urban redevelopment to achieve their own goals in the 1980s, as discussed in chapter 6. Between the 1980s and early 1990s the state was strong enough to push forward urban redevelopment, and it did not matter whether residents agreed or not. Compared to the 1980s, politics has now been democratised and citizens have more channels through which they can participate in urban politics. However, urban redevelopment systems seem to have changed very little over the last three decades. The urban redevelopment system in Korea has maximised the redevelopment profits of the private sector, and has paid less attention to shifts in tenure and neighbourhood changes. This chapter discusses the role of the key actors in favour of urban redevelopment. Section 7.1 addresses how property owners in the H urban redevelopment area (hereafter area H) have responded to urban redevelopment. It outlines the characteristics of the key players in the Property Owners Association for Redevelopment (POAR). Section 7.2 attempts to explain who the newcomers in gentrified areas are. Section 7.3 investigates the views of tenants in area H. Section 7.4 focuses on owner-occupiers’ views in area H and attempts to explain why they

have been silent compared to owner-occupiers in other urban redevelopment areas. Section 7.5 analyses the characteristics of Korean gentrification. The analysis considers the different aspects of developmentalism and the role of urban growth machines in redevelopment by assessing the relationship between politics, the economy and place.

7.1 Home Sweet Home, No, It is Money!

About 90 per cent of housing (267 units) in area H are deemed to be in bad condition, since most of the buildings there were built before 1970 (Table 7-1). Since most of the housing is over 20 years old, the area has already met the minimum criteria to obtain redevelopment permission from the state.¹⁷ Many buildings are old, and property owners have not refurbished their properties properly since they have assumed that their area will be designated for urban redevelopment. In addition, the initial urban redevelopment plan for this area was decided in 2004, so property owners have not looked after their properties since then. As a result, much of the housing has deteriorated, as shown Figure 7-1. Instead of this, super high-rise flats as shown in Figure 7-2 are due to be built.

Table 7-1 The current composition of housing in area H

Housing	Number	
Total	267	
Good condition	32 (12%)	
Bad condition	235 (88%)	
	20–29 year	26
	30–39 year	19
	Over 40 years	162
	No data	28

source: YGG (2011:9)

¹⁷ The minimum requirements for redevelopment vary depending on the construction year of the buildings and their number of storeys. In the case of buildings constructed before 1983, 20 years must have elapsed before redevelopment can take place. Meanwhile, buildings constructed after 1992 are only allowed to be demolished and rebuilt after 40 years if they have more than five storeys and after 30 years if they have less than five storeys.

Figure 7-1 Present housing and a commercial building in area H




Figure 7-2 New housing around area H



Since the current housing is old and in poor condition, it is relatively cheap to rent considering its prime location. For example, the monthly rent of a 42.9 m² housing unit in this area was £150 (with a £2,500 deposit) in December 2012. New high-rise flats of a similar size located opposite area H were rented out for £350 (with a £5,000 deposit). This shows that the land the buildings are located on has a high potential value, since it can be transformed for the “highest and best use” (Smith, 1979b:543). Seoul has expanded outwards in search of more land for residential development, whereas this area has remained underfunded for a long time and the rent gap has expanded. Shin (2009b) puts forward the argument that urban redevelopment in Korea is the process of rent gap actualisation by various property based interest groups, the central and local states, property developers and property owners. In fact, after the urban redevelopment plan to build super high-rise flats in this area was released in 2011, the land price doubled in one year (Figure 7-3). The state has created high capital accumulation potential by changing land zoning. Zoning changes have created rent or value gaps (Hamnett and Randolph, 1984), or a functional gap (Sýkora, 1993), which explains why there is pressure to make the best use of land. Gentrification in Korea is initiated by a ‘state-induced rent gap’, as was true in the case of the docklands development plan studied by Adrian Smith (1991) and the New Deal for Communities regeneration scheme in London analysed by Watt (2009).

Figure 7-3 Changes in land price per square metre in area H



source: Onnara (2012)

In order to exploit this rent gap, property owners in area H established a POAR in 2012 and have driven the urban redevelopment plan. The average period of urban redevelopment in Seoul is 10.6 years from start to finish (*DongA Daily*, 7th September 2012). The annual budget to run a property owners' association for redevelopment is about £150,000 (H POAR, 2012:182). Under these circumstances, a POAR needs to do its best to shorten the time required for the redevelopment in order to minimise spending and maximise profits. One leader of the POAR in area H clearly pointed this out in the first interview:

“Time is money, so I will do my best to finish this redevelopment business as soon as possible. I do not want to delay our business like the Yongsan incident. I push forward this redevelopment business rapidly.”

As he noted, an urban redevelopment project is a property owners' 'business' and is meant to earn money. This suggests that the benefits of urban redevelopment are not distributed equally across society, which conflicts with the initial objective of redevelopment the local state insists upon. The local authority changed the urban redevelopment plans of this area in connection with the Secondary Central Business District plan for urban restructuring. Property owners play an important role as developers in the Korean urban redevelopment system, just as professional developers and capital interest groups do in the West. The most important actors in urban redevelopment are the board and committee members of the steering group. In area H, 41 owners among the 284 property owners were elected members of the steering group. Even though property owners decide the most important matters by voting, the steering group is responsible for managing the process – contracting with sub-contractors and negotiating with the local state – on behalf of all the property owners. It is thus necessary to examine who they are, since they are more in favour of urban redevelopment than other property owners and also influence other property owners' opinions.

According to the documents which I obtained from the H POAR, about 7 in 10 owners are over 60 years old. 28 of the 41 property owners have a higher education. This figure is much higher than the national average for this demographic. Most of them have run their own companies or shops, and seven currently have jobs relevant to the construction and property sectors (for example, working with real estate agencies). This implies that pro-urban redevelopment property owners are affluent and can afford to pay extra money for a new flat if necessary. They

can be considered largely middle class. In detail, 12 owner-occupiers and 29 absentee landlords in area H comprise the steering group. Ten of the 12 owner-occupiers have been living in the area for more than 17 years. In contrast, 14 of the 29 absentee landlords bought their property just after the redevelopment plan was decided. They are unlikely to have any sense of community or psychological attachment to the place. They are more interested in exchange value than use value. Most of the absentee landlords are already living in flats in middle class or upper middle class areas. This indicates that affluent absentee landlords bought their property for the purpose of investment after the development proposal was put forward.

For example, one absentee landlord lives at the most expensive address in Korea and bought 90 m² of land and a 54-year-old house for £825,000 in September 2008 – he has not rented it out. This strongly suggests that he invested a huge amount of money in land in area H as he expected to profit from the redevelopment. Absentee landlords who have recently bought their property are more willing to get involved in the urban redevelopment process. Indeed, the absentee landlord living at the most expensive address in Korea actively participated in the discussion at the first inaugural assembly on 22nd September 2012, a meeting at which I was present. Absentee landlords are likely to push for profit for speculative investors rather than end users. One absentee landlord working as a board member expressed this view at the first inaugural assembly:

“I will do my best to make our profit, so I will fight against the Seoul authority and the Yongsan authority, if necessary.”

An absentee landlord working as a board member who bought a property in 2009 also commented on his expectations in the first interview:

“The US army base camp will soon be transformed into a national park like Central Park in New York. Our area is next door to the park. After our area is transformed, all residents in our flat complex can enjoy an amazing park view from their rooms. It is for certain that our new flat complex is going to be the best and most prestigious residential area in Korea. The price of our new flat complex must increase substantially.”

About 80 per cent of property owners in area H are absentee landlords, as shown in Table 7-2. This high percentage of absentee landlords greatly influences the views of the POAR, as urban redevelopment becomes a profit maximising business. The main interest of absentee landlords is reaping high economic benefits, and this was observed at the first inaugural assembly. Absentee

landlords expressed their opinions as follows.

“According to the book provided by the POAR, our new flat complex will be on the market in early 2013. I suppose that economic depression will not have improved after six months. People are not willing to buy housing at the moment. If there is not enough improvement in the economy next year, we are likely to have difficulties selling our flats to new buyers. In that case, we cannot avoid carrying an extra financial burden. The success of this redevelopment project totally depends on how much we sell our new flats for.”

“Many new super high-rise luxury flats are now being built in Yongsan, so our new building would need to compete with them. Do you [architect] have any special strategy to make ours better than others? It is very important to sell our new flats at a high price.”

Table 7-2 The current composition of ownership in area H

No. of households			Population			No. of total property owners
Total	Owners	Tenants	Total	Owners	Tenants	
468	66	402	805	142	663	284

source: YGG (2011:7)

Unlike absentee landlords, owner-occupiers tend to have lived in the area longer and are more likely to have community ties or some sort of sentimental attachment to the neighbourhood; however, many of them still tend to be profit seekers. They seem fine with leaving their property and community as long as they get a share of the urban redevelopment profits.

“I have lived here since the 1960s. I have never expressed my opinion to the POAR. I have not attended any meetings so far, because I have not decided whether redevelopment is good for my family or not. I have my own house and supermarket, so I can make my living by myself here. Unless I get enough money to buy a house in another area and spend the rest of my life there, I will not agree with this redevelopment” (Owner-occupier 1).

“I have been living here and running a small restaurant for 30 years. Actually, many people sold their property two to three years ago, when urban redevelopment plans were decided. One of my neighbours sold his property for £20,000 per pyung two years ago; it was a bit less than others got previously. Some people have said that now we could not get more than £20,000¹⁸ for one pyung due to the economic recession, but I think I can get more than that, as the urban redevelopment project is in progress. Someone paid that amount of money, which means they were sure that they would earn more money from their investment. Therefore, I agree with this urban redevelopment” (Owner-occupier 2).

In these circumstances, urban redevelopment has turned into a speculative private business instead of a public business. The local state has planned for construction of just 406 new housing units, although 468 households currently live in area H (Table 7-3). This decrease in the

¹⁸ This price is almost the same as the price of the P super high-rise flat complex in Yongsan.

housing stock shows that 90% of tenants in area H have no chance of returning from the beginning. Even if they are given a chance to return, they cannot afford to since most of the newly built housing is designed as large scale units intended for sale, unlike the current housing (Table 7-4).

Table 7-3 The composition of the proposed housing by size in area H

Size (m ²)	62.7	82.5	118.8	151.8	181.5	231	Total
No.	56	28	174	58	60	30	406
Per cent	13.43	6.90	42.86	12.29	14.78	7.39	100

source: YGG (2011:24)

Table 7-4 The current composition of buildings by size in area H

Size (m ²)	Under 60	60–85	Over 85	Total
Residential	87	57	54	168
Non-residential	39	9	51	99
Total	126	36	105	267

source: YGG (2011:28)

Although the local state planned to build 56 smaller housing units, there are no plans to build smaller housing units besides the compulsory social housing stock (44 units) in the current urban redevelopment plan which the POAR decided upon. About 80 per cent of the new housing units are planned to be over 30 pyung, which is considered the threshold size for middle class housing. The POAR proposed the estimated price of the new housing, as shown in Table 7-5. The price is almost the same as that of the P super high-rise flats, one of the most expensive housing complexes in Seoul. The monthly rent of the P super high-rise flats varies from £1,650 to £4,250, depending on the size of the property in question (REB, 2012). The average where household monthly income in 2012 was reportedly at about £2,000, so only a few households can afford to own or rent such a property. Also, low income owner-occupiers and small property owner-occupiers cannot afford to own these expensive and large properties, since they need to pay extra for them. Urban redevelopment plans are designed to push low income owner-occupiers into selling their properties and moving out. That is, the urban redevelopment plan

itself is skewed in favour of gentrification. After urban redevelopment, this area will become totally different with new housing and new residents. Then, it naturally raises the question of who would move into the area after urban redevelopment is complete. This is taken up in the next section.

Table 7-5 The proposed price of new housing in area H

Size (m ²)	64	85	120	150	183	233
No.	44	29	174	58	60	30
Price (£)	278,930	380,422	580,965	746,297	875,289	1,177,303

source: The H POAR (2012:157)

7.2 Who is Moving in? The Characteristics of the Newcomers

As has been discussed, Korean gentrification is initiated by the state and capital. It is not classic gentrification led by individual young professionals using their sweat equity. This may lead to there being differences in the characteristics of newcomers between the West and Korea. When it comes to the characteristics of gentrifiers in the West, LeGates and Hartman (1986) provided a good summary which showed that gentrifiers tended to be young, one or two person households, university educated and in professional or managerial jobs. In contrast, it is not easy to determine the characteristic of in-movers in Korea, especially residents living in gated luxury super high-rise flats.

There are several empirical studies which examine the socio-economic status of in-movers living in general flat complexes after urban redevelopment in Seoul. Kim (2006b) found that almost all incoming households consisted of conventional nuclear families with children. Ha (2004a) also traced the characteristics of in-movers and failed to find the same characteristics as those displayed by gentrifiers in the West. Ha acknowledged this point by declaring that “there is in fact no wide difference in household type and demographic characteristics between the areas redeveloped through the JRP and typical middle-income residential areas in Seoul” (Ha, 2004a:388). Many studies have indicated that affluent households with a traditional household structure have moved in after urban redevelopment, and their income and education

level are generally higher than those of the previous residents. It shows that urban redevelopment gives birth to gentrification in terms of social upgrading through physical improvements to the environment.

In contrast, few studies on the socio-economic characteristics of residents living in super high-rise luxury flats have been carried out. The lack of empirical studies on super high-rise flats can be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, this type of housing only emerged recently: in the early 2000s. Secondly, this type of community is usually heavily gated. It is very difficult to access residents unless researchers live in that flat complex. It is difficult to even get in the building. Even investigators for the 2010 census had difficulties accessing this type of housing, so the local authority sent official letters to request residents' cooperation (*MK Daily*, 23rd September 2013). Existing research reveals that one of main reasons new residents move in to such complexes is that they are more effective at protecting privacy than other types of housing (Sun, 2004, Lee, 2006). Thirdly, there are limited resources available that can be used to grasp residents' socio-economic characteristics. As discussed in chapter 4, census data is not helpful so questionnaire surveys and interviews are the only alternatives. It is not easy to conduct questionnaire surveys, since researchers have problems accessing residents and response rates are generally low. Given the various limitations, few studies have been conducted on residents of luxury super high-rise flats (Jung, 2003, Sun, 2004, Lee, 2006, Kwon, 2007, Park, 2012). The existing studies and some newspaper reports suggest that the board members of chaebol companies, politicians, high income professionals and celebrities occupy this type of housing. My interviewees, who live in the P super high-rise flat complex and the S general flat complex, pointed this out as well:

“Many famous people live here. As you already know from the media, a candidate for the presidency moved into this apartment block last April. Many celebrities, former ministers, and MPs live here. In addition, the former mayor of Seoul also visited to buy a property. This flat block is in a wonderful location, and all residents are provided with a high standard of service and have access to good gym facilities, golf lessons, and a reception hall. I can say that this flat block is a masterpiece. In the past, ‘Tower Palace’ in Gangnam was a by-word for the luxury super high-rise housing of rich people. However, nowadays, my flat block is famous for this. Considering all of these factors, this flat block is popular for high income households. Only those on a high salary or rich people can afford to live here” (Resident in the P super high-rise flat complex).

“I would say that people in my flat block cannot be considered to have the same social status as people in the P super high-rise flat complex. More professional workers such as doctors or lawyers are living there, whereas self-employed and white collar workers are in my block” (Resident 1 in the S general flat complex).

Previous studies have indicated that the many households are composed of ‘empty nesters’ or older people with children. Since this type of housing is much more expensive than general flats, it is likely that rich older people or young professionals on high salaries will choose it. The response rate to my questionnaire survey was too low (about 10 per cent, with just 22 responses from the 200 households that were targeted), so my findings are not representative enough to allow for generalisations about in-movers’ incomes, jobs, tenure status and so on. In spite of this, the results of my research show similar trends to those observed in previous research. The education level and income of residents in the two flat blocks were much higher than the Korean averages. Eighty per cent of all respondents from the two different flat blocks own their properties. People in the P super high-rise flat complex earn more money and have a higher level of education and more professional jobs than residents of the S general flat complex. Seven in 10 respondents in the P super high-rise flats are elderly or nearly elderly, whereas five in 12 respondents in the S general flat complex are in the same age group (elderly or nearly elderly). Most of them are married couples with children. My interviewee in the E general flat complex pointed out that

“I am living alone in my 30 pyung flat. I think most residents are traditional households consisting of parents and children. I suppose that I am the only person living alone in my building” (Resident 2 in the S general flat complex).

As my interviewees and other research have suggested, observation of newcomers in gentrified areas in Korea indicates differences in age and household structure from gentrifiers in the West. However, there are similarities in income (high salary), education (high level of education), and occupation (professional and managerial jobs), and in their reasons for moving (proximity to the city centre). Given the limitations of my questionnaire survey (due to the low response rate), only tentative conclusions can be reached about who newcomers are and why they move into city centres. However, it can be confidently argued that they are members of the middle or upper middle classes.

7.3 A Man's Home is His Castle, But Not for Tenants!

There is an old saying that 'an Englishman's home is his castle'. This saying is not true for all residents in urban redevelopment areas in Korea. It is almost impossible for tenants to return to areas that have been redeveloped, as discussed in the previous section. Tenants can obtain some compensation packages thanks to the 1980s anti-urban redevelopment movements, but their housing security is still not guaranteed. Urban redevelopment still affects tenants severely, since they have difficulties finding affordable housing near their current homes. They have limited alternative areas to move into, because they need to move into an area near their workplace and their children's schools. Urban redevelopment causes large scale movement of people, and this causes housing rents near urban redevelopment areas to increase. Many tenants and owner-occupiers have moved at the same time. This has resulted in huge rent increases. People have moved all around Seoul and nearby cities to find affordable accommodation, and they are called 'New Town Refugees' (*Pressian*, 25th October 2011).

Even though tenants are still excluded from urban redevelopment decision-making processes and suffer many hardships, it is not easy for them to change their circumstances in the urban redevelopment system. Statistically, 20 per cent of all households in Seoul move home every year and more than 30 per cent of all households live in an area for less than two years (Table 7-6). Therefore, people do not have enough time to get involved with their neighbours and in their community. This leads to residential tenants not getting involved in urban redevelopment processes and local politics. This also leads to politicians paying more attention to homeowners' opinions rather than tenants', since homeowners tend to live in the area longer and have a greater interest in local politics.

Table 7-6 Residence period for all households in Korea

	under 1 year	1-2	2-3	3-5	5-10	10-15	15-20	20-25	Over 25 years	Total
Korea	19.5	11.9	9.4	10.8	21.0	9.6	5.3	3.3	9.0	100
Seoul	20.2	13.8	10.9	12.1	23.3	9.0	4.3	3.1	3.3	100

source: KOSIS(2010)

Housing tenants have access to several compensation packages: the right to move into social

housing, temporary accommodation, home loss payments and disturbance payments (Jeong and Kim, 2011). In contrast, business tenants are not offered the same compensation as housing tenants. They are given compensation called ‘business suspension’ for the loss of income caused by redevelopment and relocation (Yang et al., 2010). Business tenants have recently become a key issue, since many proposed urban redevelopment areas are in city centre or inner-city locations which are not purely residential, unlike previous urban redevelopment areas. In area H, more than 40 per cent of all buildings are non-residential, as shown in Table 7-7. A substantial number of business renters are small supermarkets, eating and drinking places and shops, so they are not well off. Therefore, more conflicts between tenants and the POAR are expected in area H because many tenants are business renters. This could lead to severe conflicts between the POAR and business tenants, as seen in the Yongsan incident.

Table 7-7 The current composition of building by usage in area H

	Total	Residential	Non-residential
No. of Buildings	267	168	99

source: YGG (2011:7)

Business tenants are likely to be more vulnerable under the current compensation system, because some of them lose their workplace and home at the same time. A social activist working at the South Korean Federation Against Housing Demolition (SFHD) emphasised this by using one case in an interview.

“One man running a restaurant invested £65,000 in refurbishment (£40,000) and a shop premium (£25,000) when he opened his shop. As he ran his shop very well, his shop premium went up to around £100,000. However, he got just £10,000 for compensation when he was forced to move out by redevelopment. This is not enough money to open the same business in another area. In fact, the effect of urban redevelopment is greater on business tenants than residential tenants; it is almost business closure not business suspension. Nevertheless, little money is given to business tenants, and they do not have any other compensation. In many cases, business tenants have to change from being shopkeepers to being employees, such as waitresses, and most of their jobs are temporary. Many people open their business by borrowing money from a bank on their property. Consequently, they lose everything overnight. However, there is no way to help them under the present law, so we have to change the law.”

Therefore, small business tenants resent urban redevelopment bitterly since they often go out of business as a result. This could happen to business tenants in the H urban redevelopment area. Also they observed what happened to business tenants in the Yongsan incident area more closely.

Therefore, it is more likely that collective action from business tenants would be taken at the early stages of urban redevelopment. However, no significant movements have been observed so far. Four reasons can be put forward to explain this.

Firstly, tenants have not been given correct information about urban redevelopment as the POAR does not have a compulsory duty to provide such information. They hardly grasp what is happening in their neighbourhood. They have no idea how much compensation they will be given.

“We do not know how urban redevelopment is going on here, because we are tenants. We haven’t got any information about it from our landlord or local governments or the POAR” (Business tenant 3).

Social activist 2 in the Nationwide Coalition for Housing Countermeasures (KCHR), which is one of social organisations working to improve housing rights, also stated that

“Generally, tenants take action after they are informed of their compensation package. So it seems like no problem before they are given information about their compensation”

Secondly, given the lack of information, business tenants have vague hopes that their area could be different from other cases and that they will not have any problems.

“Basically, I do not agree with this urban redevelopment as a tenant. Tenants in this area have not discussed collective action, but we will never move out meekly when our compensation is not acceptable. The main reason for the Yongsan incident was that business renters did not have enough compensation, so I think that acceptable compensation will be provided to us. I know the current compensation law does not consider a shop’s premium, but the POAR should consider it for our compensation, to some extent. Otherwise, another Yongsan incident will occur. Who on earth is happy with being kicked out without enough compensation? Enough money to at least keep our shop somewhere must be given” (Business tenant 1).

“I have seen a placard about the POAR. However, I don’t think urban redevelopment is really going to take place. There are many business tenants in this area and this is quite a nice area to run a restaurant. How can the POAR kick us out easily? As we have already seen with the Yongsan incident, it is not easy to drive urban redevelopment without our agreement” (Business tenant 4).

Thirdly, many business tenants think it takes a long time to start urban redevelopment so they believe they do not need to take action immediately. The reaction of the tenant of a small flower shop is typical:

“I opened this flower shop one year ago. When I started this shop, I knew this area had been designated for urban redevelopment. I didn’t worry about it much, because it would take a long time to embark on urban redevelopment” (Business tenant 6).

Another tenant stated that:

“I have not been informed of anything by my landlord, the POAR or the local government. I have just caught what’s going on from the placards which the POAR put around this area. I saw the placards celebrating the establishment of the POAR with 80 per cent agreement. However, 20 per cent of total property owners still disagree with this. So I do not think urban redevelopment will start soon” (Business tenant 4).

Fourthly, even though they disagree with urban redevelopment, they do not think they are entitled to be involved in the urban redevelopment process. They believe they have no right to oppose it because they are tenants:

“We have run our shop here for 20 years, so our patrons are around here. Frankly speaking, we are not happy with this redevelopment, but what can we do to stop it? We are just tenants. This is the state’s policy, isn’t it? We can’t help but follow the urban redevelopment plan” (Business tenant 3).

“As a tenant, I do not have any right to oppose it. Even if I try to resist, what difference would it make? Once the government makes a decision to redevelop this area, it goes forward no matter what happens. We have observed many cases so far, haven’t we? When our landlord tells us to leave, what kind of options can we choose except departure?” (Business tenant 2).

“I heard that some tenants suggested that we should make an association for tenants’ rights. But no specific organisation has been formed yet. Even if it is organised, I may not join it. Tenants are not able to get involved in urban redevelopment and also do not have any influence over the plan” (Business tenant 5).

Likewise, tenants do not feel that they are entitled to take part in the redevelopment project and they have not organised themselves into tenants’ associations so they can express their opinions. In contrast to these passive tenants, their landlords have pushed forward redevelopment plans to maximise their profits. One leader of the POAR in area H told me in the second interview that

“We can earn more profit from this redevelopment business than in any other redevelopment area, so there are a few property owners who disagree with this redevelopment. I know who agrees and disagrees, and I do not think more opponents will come out later. As I told you, time is money, so I will do my best to finish this redevelopment business as soon as possible. I will give compensation to residential tenants, according to the law. If business tenants strongly resist and do not leave their property, I am willing to give as much money as they want.”

The POAR in area H has calculated the costs and benefits of its urban redevelopment business. The total bill would be £150 million, and this association has estimated £28 million for its net income (H POAR, 2012:163–166). They would make huge profits from urban redevelopment, but only about £8.6 million is allocated for tenants’ legal compensation. Considering many other cases, it is not easy to give business tenants as much compensation as they want since one leader of the H POAR should get approval on the amount of tenant compensation to be awarded

from the other property owners. Other property owners stated that

“It is sad that people in the Yongsan incident lost their lives because of urban redevelopment, but I think they asked for too much compensation. After that incident, the capital circulation for urban redevelopment stopped. It is said that chaebol construction companies are not willing to participate in urban redevelopment projects. This means many urban redevelopment projects in Yongsan have been delayed” (Owner-occupier 1).

“As far as I know, tenants are not forced to move out with no compensation. They are also given some money. Usually, business tenants are a problem, but they have run their business, since they spent money on refurbishment and premiums. Why do we have to compensate that kind of money too?” (Owner-occupier 2).

Furthermore, many property owners’ associations in one borough are informally connected to each other and they do not want to set a precedent. If one POAR gives more money than others, other POARs would face more pressure. Even though one leader of the POAR in area H wants to give tenants more money, it is unlikely that this would go ahead without problems. This was pointed out in an interview with a former board member of the POAR in the P super high-rise flat complex:

“When I worked as a board member for my property owners’ association, I thought that the money given to poor tenants is nothing considering the redevelopment profit that property owners can obtain later. I tried to persuade property owners to provide more money than legal compensation. In many respects, it is helpful for property owners’ associations to give more money to tenants who severely resist and do not move out till almost all tenants leave. If they resist longer, we need to pay more for our urban redevelopment business. It is the best way to save time for more profits. My case was successful, but it was difficult to get approval from property owners. Together with this, we had to take into consideration the other POARs.”

Therefore, it is inevitable that conflicts between tenants and property owners happen when business tenants are offered their compensation at a late stage. They start to take action only when they know how much compensation they will be receiving, which is generally much less than what they expected or invested in their business. However, it is too late to stop urban redevelopment. When tenants realise that their compensation is too limited for them to keep their shops open, they seek to initiate individual and collective demonstrations in their neighbourhood and ask for help from social organisations such as the National Coalition for Victims of Forced Evictions (NCFE) and the South Korean Federation Against Housing Demolition (SFHD). However, a social activist with the SFHD commented that

“The earlier people take action, the better result they can get. However, in many cases people do not know what the benefits and losses from urban redevelopment are. They just believe that the law helps them to keep their rights, so they first try to bring a suit

when they learn they will only be receiving a small amount of compensation. However, their legal action changes little. They appeal to the court, but it does not help them. In the end, they realise later that they were wrong, and they are in danger of losing their home or business. They ask us to help them at the last minute, so there are not many things we can do for them when they visit us.”

As this activist has pointed out, the current law is not helpful for business tenants who want to stay put and run their business. They cannot resist displacement or urban redevelopment itself, since they have no rights to their property as tenants. They have to vacate their property with compensation. However, their legal compensation is not sufficient for them to open a new shop elsewhere. Their first and foremost goal when they protest is negotiating a better deal with the POAR. Even if they demonstrate and occupy their shops to challenge the urban redevelopment plan, many of them are not able to continue occupying their premises because of harassment from the POAR. One protester with the NCFE told me what kind of problems she and her neighbours experienced during their protest:

“At first, 50 people protested, and claimed the unfairness of urban redevelopment. As time went by, people gave up because they were not able to work and even their family did not fully understand them. On the one hand, the POAR conciliated our spouses with money. On the other hand, the POAR threatened our families in order to stop our demonstration. The POAR said that we would not be given any compensation, even legal compensation, unless we stopped our protest. Because of this, many protesters had to deal with family discord.”

The social activist with the SFHD also explained the difficulties of protests:

“This protest is really difficult. We cannot keep human dignity since human rights are often infringed during protests. It is hard to keep protesting unless you give up yourself and your lifestyle.”

Because of these difficulties, some tenants do not consider presenting strong resistance. The response of business tenant 3 is typical:

“I know our compensation would not be enough. However, I am not sure protest would be helpful. I saw protesters who resisted till the end got more compensation. I do not know how much they got, but I do not think it was enough money. While protesting, we experience financial losses because we are not able to work. It takes a long time to win and obtain more compensation. It could be better to restart my shop in another area as soon as possible rather than protest.”

Likewise, some tenants are passive when it comes to protest and political action since they have seen other protests fail. Only a few people who keep up their protest obtain a marginally higher level of compensation, compared to the legal level of compensation. It is not possible to make a law for business tenants or change the urban redevelopment system in their favour, since they

have difficulties protesting and maintaining solidarity with other business tenants. In addition, their self-help movements have not been widely supported by the state and ordinary people because of East Asian values, as discussed in chapter 3. This is a reason why business tenants' protests have failed to transform their legal rights and protect them from urban redevelopment. The organiser of the NCFE commented on the limitations of tenants' movements in the first interview:

“Eviction is torture by the state. However, society and the state consider eviction a by-product of the urban development process and view it as inevitable. The state seems to think that they do not need to take responsibility for eviction when no incidents happen. Only when someone dies by eviction will the state and ordinary people pay attention to this issue. There is no serious concern about the fundamental causes of eviction and how to solve it.”

He insisted that evictees are victims of urban redevelopment plans, so their protests are inevitable to protect their lives. However, the urban planner in the Yongsan government expressed substantially different views:

“Most protesters are not entitled to compensation. As you know, tenants must have lived in the property for at least three months prior to the residents' consultation day for the designation of urban redevelopment areas. People who move into an urban redevelopment area after this day cannot get compensation. In spite of this, some people claim compensation and protest for money. They try to take advantage of urban redevelopment, although they are not entitled to compensation. In addition, some people move around urban redevelopment areas in order to get compensation.”

Owner-occupier 2 expressed the same opinion as this urban planner. In contrast, the social activist with the SFHD argued that

“Developers and some property owners say some people intentionally move into urban redevelopment areas in order to get compensation. It is ridiculous. Who on earth likes moving home from here to there? Who on earth is capable of moving home often? They make excuses to not give money to tenants. Some areas designated for urban redevelopment 10 years ago have only just seen urban redevelopment begin. In such a case, even tenants who have been living there for the last 10 years do not have a legal right to compensation. Some of them did not even know their neighbourhood was designated for urban redevelopment.”

The founder of the Seoul Council of the Centre for Victims of Forced Evictions (SCFE) also commented on the issue:

“Who decides tenants' qualification for being entitled to claim full payments? Why not three years instead of three months? The laws are not for the poor, but for the rich, since the state and capital make laws.”

These differences in opinion between pro-urban redevelopment coalitions and anti-redevelopment groups are reminiscent of the dialogue between citizens of earth and the Galactic

Hyperspace Planning Council from *The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy*. Pro-urban redevelopment coalitions insist that they fulfil their obligations to tenants by offering legal compensation and claim they have the right to redevelop their property. In contrast, tenants insist that urban redevelopment is not just and fair even if pro-urban redevelopment coalitions follow all the legal procedures. These different attitudes sometimes lead to violent eviction, as was the case with the Yongsan incident. After the Yongsan incident, a new measure has been discussed: this is the introduction of the Protection from Forced Eviction Act which defines unlawful eviction and harassment as criminal offences. Prevention is better than cure, and this could help to improve the housing rights of tenants. There is no disagreement over this act, but it has yet to be legislated. Even though the Yongsan incident succeeded in seriously raising consciousness among the public and society about the urban redevelopment process, it was still not enough to transform it. The social activist with the SFHD blamed politicians for this delay:

“When the Yongsan incident got attention from the general public and MPs, we thought many things would be changed for the poor and the vulnerable quickly. However, almost everything has remained the same. Why is it hard to make a law to protect tenants from eviction? I think MPs themselves are large property owners, so they do not want to make a law which conflicts with owners’ property rights.”

However, even owner-occupiers with full property rights have been displaced over the last five years while the introduction of this act has been delayed. Some owner-occupiers have been harassed with forced eviction as a result of urban redevelopment. There have been some severe conflicts between owner-occupiers and their POARs, regardless of the stage of urban redevelopment in question. Owner-occupiers have now realised that urban redevelopment does not always give them financial benefits, which was not the case previously. Many urban redevelopment projects have been almost stopped by some owner-occupiers’ protest. Some owner-occupiers have been demanding that the government call off redevelopment plans, and they have succeeded in cancelling the designation of an urban redevelopment area in Changsindong, Seoul (*Edaily News*, 17th June 2013). The mass media has publicised various problems which property owners in many urban redevelopment areas have faced. Owner-occupier displacement could happen in area H as well, but there have not been any significant resistance movements from owner-occupiers in this area so far. It is important to consider why they have been silent, unlike other owner-occupiers in other urban redevelopment areas.

7.4 Owner-occupiers Could be the Next Residents Displaced

Property owners in area H were not given the exact costs and benefits which they would pay and obtain from the urban redevelopment when they were asked to give their opinions on it. Despite lacking sufficient information about the financial benefits and costs of the proposed urban redevelopment, 80 per cent of property owners approved the establishment of the H POAR in 2012. Before the H POAR appraises each property and give financial details of each property valuation to property owners, property owners cannot have to rely on information supplied by real estate agencies or their POAR. In spite of the lack of accurate information, property owners in area H seem to consider the urban redevelopment promising. Also, property owners in this area do not think that problems other property owners have experienced will happen to them, since their area is different and more profitable than other areas that have been subject to urban redevelopment. Owner-occupiers and absentee landlords have been trying to maximise their profits after the establishment of the POAR, but not all property owners will be able to live in the new housing. One leader of the POAR in area H is well aware of this. He made this comment in the first interview:

“Probably, about 10 per cent of owner-occupiers can afford to return and live in this area after redevelopment. This area is going to be transformed into a super high-rise luxury flat complex, so the standard of living is going to be totally different. At the moment, utility bills and maintenance costs are not expensive but we would have to pay much more money for those when we live in a new flat. So, it is much better for them to sell their property in due course and move out somewhere. When they sell their property, they can buy a bigger house with that money. Actually, about 50 per cent of all property owners are already new. In contrast, it is highly likely that new absentee landlords can move into a new flat since they can afford to do it.”

In fact, property owners start selling their properties when urban redevelopment plans are still being discussed. When an urban redevelopment plan is in progress, more properties are sold to outsiders. According to Kim (Kim, 2011c:92), 60 per cent of all property owners in the S general flat complex redevelopment area sold their properties during the urban redevelopment process. In particular, one in two owners sold their property between the time the urban redevelopment plan was decided and the time their POAR was established. Choi et al. (2009) analysed the determinants of the rate of return of property owners in Busan by using a substantial amount of empirical data. They revealed that the return rate of absentee landlords is

1.53 times higher than that of owner-occupiers, and found the period of residence to be a negative determinant (Choi et al., 2009:414).

Most new properties are large and expensive, as suggested in the previous section. This is one reason why owner-occupiers' return rate is lower than that of absentee landlords. The large size of the new housing units can displace even owner-occupiers that previously lived in small properties and owners on a low income. The urban planner with the YGG I interviewed also noticed this:

“In the past, people preferred larger flats to smaller flats, because a big flat is more profitable. Therefore, most new flats were over 40 pyung [132 m²] so many owner-occupiers had financial problems when it came to returning. However, I think the case of area H will be different. Since the majority of new housing would be smaller flats, more owner-occupiers can return.”

However, most new housing is designed as flats over 100 m². The questionnaire for property owners conducted by the H POAR shows that half of property owners want their flats to be over 132 m². This can be related to the high proportion of absentee landlords. Absentee landlords can afford and indeed prefer larger flats, but small property owners and low income property owners struggle to keep their property running when new housing is built in the form of large flats. The law states that the most important decisions for urban redevelopment have to obtain over 50 per cent agreement from property owners, but this clause does not protect the minority. Even if all owner-occupiers in area H oppose urban redevelopment, nothing would change since they make up only 20 per cent of property owners. Structurally, there is no way to protect owner-occupiers who do not want urban redevelopment when absentee landlords and pro-redevelopment owner-occupiers are actively promoting it. Owner-occupiers whom I interviewed already knew that they would not be able to return:

“I think I will not be able to come back here after redevelopment, because it is said that expensive flats are going to be built. How can people like us afford them? I have spent most of my life here. I brought up children and looked after them here. It is a bit sad to leave here but what can I do?” (Owner-occupier 1).

“I do not think I can afford it, since the new housing is going to be too expensive. In addition, I do not want to work anymore, so I will sell this building in due course, and start my new life with that money. I think I can make new friends at a new place” (Owner-occupier 2).

Owner-occupiers who have been living in the area for more than 30 years are aware of the difficulties they face if they wish to return, but they agree with urban redevelopment or at least

do not vote against it. Even though most owner-occupiers cannot afford to move into a new flat after redevelopment, they tend to be in favour of urban redevelopment since it enables them to increase the exchange value of their old property. As owner-occupier 2 said, urban redevelopment can be a chance to improve their old life, since they can trade up for a better property or accumulate wealth. Property owners from the POAR can buy a new flat after redevelopment at 80 per cent of the non-members' price, so they can sell their property and their rights to speculators and potential homebuyers at a high price before urban redevelopment finishes. Potential homebuyers are willing to buy property owners' rights, since it is cheaper than purchasing at a non-members' price. Speculators are also willing to buy from them. If speculators sell their new flat at its market value, the difference between the property's purchase price from the property owner and the property's market value is pure profit. Under Korea's weak welfare system, housing is a very important substitute for an individual's pension and acts as their life savings (Lee, 2003). Urban redevelopment can offer a good chance to improve property wealth, so owner-occupiers are broadly supportive of urban redevelopment although they cannot, in most cases, return. Accordingly, owner-occupiers who cannot afford to return are displaced along with tenants. Even if owner-occupiers manage to keep their property, they are more likely to rent it out than move into it. Even in this scenario it can be said they are displaced. Instead of owner-occupiers, more affluent renters move in. Resident 1 in the S general flat complex said

“My landlord used to live in this area until the urban redevelopment started. He did not have enough money to pay for a new flat, so he borrowed money from a bank. He had difficulties paying the interest on £200,000, but he did not want to sell this property. So he has rented out this 50 pyung size flat to me for £278,500. He is now living outside Seoul. Unless he can pay back my chunse deposit, he will not be able to live in this area again.”

As a result, the social composition of the area is totally changed. Owner-occupiers in area H know this well, but they are still in favour of urban redevelopment and seem to accept their displacement. However, their agreement to gentrification is valid only when owner-occupiers obtain profit as they expect to. In other words, owner-occupiers are in favour of urban redevelopment as long as they get a share of the urban redevelopment profits. If owner-occupiers do not obtain any profit, they could make collective movements against urban

redevelopment. However, owner-occupiers in this area do not expect to gain nothing because of the lack of information and their vague hopes. This is why there have been no opposition movements from owner-occupiers so far.

7.5 Profit-driven Gentrification

The current urban redevelopment methods, which are centred on the private sector and the market, have caused various problems which more direct participation from the public sector could help to solve. When half of property owners agree, they can run their urban redevelopment project with the mayor of their council or a state-funded construction company instead of a chaebol-owned construction company. However, this has not happened so far. The urban planner working at the YGG gave an explanation for this in an interview:

“I think if the state took more responsibility for the urban redevelopment process the various current problems would be reduced. However, property owners do not want this method. People like the ‘brand flats’ which chaebols build.¹⁹ They think they cannot earn much profit when their new flat is built by state-owned companies. As you well know, even if two flats are next to each other, the housing prices are different due to their brand power.”

It seems that the state cannot get involved in urban redevelopment because of individual property rights. However, gentrification is not solely the result of property owners’ interests. An organiser at the REO, which is a social organisation that works to help property owners in favour of urban redevelopment, suggested a different view in an interview:

“Of course, property owners do not want to work with the state. Property owners in urban redevelopment areas think that the state takes too big a share of the redevelopment profits; even in this circumstance the state does not actively take part in it. Residents worry that the state would take more profit if it were to get more involved.”

In fact, the state has facilitated urban redevelopment by implementing various policies. In the West, the connection between state policies and gentrification has only recently been given attention while the role of the state in Korea has always been overriding and overt. The state has been a key player in enabling urban redevelopment and gentrification. Even though the state in Korea does not provide funds directly, the results of urban redevelopment are similar to the

¹⁹ Chang and Park (2009:261) argue that while social stratification depended on whether you lived in a flat or not until the late 1990s, living in a brand flat became a more important factor when determining social status in the early 2000s.

results of the federal urban renewal programme enacted in the US during the 1950s, which Anderson (1964) dubbed ‘the federal bulldozer’. It is social cleansing that sees low income households cleared out to make way for middle or high income households; it is often accompanied by visible violence from the state. Without the designation of urban redevelopment districts and zoning changes by the state, property owners are not able to transform their shabby houses into super high-rise flats and increase the exchange value of their properties. They can only refurbish or rebuild their own house for its use value, and they would not earn large exchange values. In this scenario, large scale, new-build gentrification would not happen. The state changes land zoning to allow super high-rise building construction in order to reshape inner city areas. Instead of the state directly running and funding urban redevelopment, the POAR drives urban redevelopment plans according to the wishes of the state. Area H is due to be rebuilt as mixed-use buildings, not purely an office block, although this urban redevelopment aims to build a subsidiary central business district. The urban planner in the YGG commented on this in an interview:

“If the state plans to transform area H into a 100 per cent office building, urban redevelopment itself is impossible. Redevelopment relies on profits from the sale of flats, but office development does not make enough profit.”

A real estate expert I interviewed also pointed this out:

“The success of urban redevelopment depends on how much the POAR profits from the sale of new flats. In this respect, offices are not good for making profit, since people prefer renting out offices over owning them. In spite of this, the local state makes the POAR develop business offices and their homes through urban redevelopment. The system itself is contradictory.”

The state does not seem to have sat back from the gentrification process, although property owners’ speculation and financial interests have driven gentrification. In fact, the state has set the stage for gentrification. The founder of the SCFE stated that:

“There were about 1,631 owner-occupiers and 3,405 tenants living in my neighbourhood. Three to four households were living in a house together. When my neighbourhood was listed for redevelopment, 22,402 pyung of the land was state-owned. The land was large enough to build social housing for tenants, but the state sold it to a chaebol construction company. Which one is right: to build social housing for the poor on state-owned land or sell the land to a construction company? That’s why I started to form collective movements for social housing.”

Most interviewees commented that the state has taken only the returns from urban redevelopment, not the risks. The state does not invest much money and is not in charge of

urban redevelopment, but it does take various benefits and profits. Firstly, the POAR has to make 17 per cent of new housing units small social housing units. The state buys this social housing from the POAR so it does not need to search for and build on land to create its own social housing. The local state can produce social housing all around Seoul without much effort, although the new social housing stock is not substantial. Secondly, the POAR deals with tenants' compensation and relocation, so the local state has no responsibility for these issues. Thirdly, the state can earn more property tax from new housing. Fourthly, the state gains money from selling state-owned land located in urban redevelopment areas. In the case of area H, the state would get about £21 million from selling state-owned land (H POAR, 2012:164). Fifthly, the state imposes taxes and utility charges; the H POAR calculated these taxes and charges at about £5 million. Sixthly, the state collects 25 per cent of urban redevelopment net profits in tax; this cut would be worth about £7 million in the H urban redevelopment area. Therefore, urban redevelopment is not initiated solely to aid urban infrastructure development or improve the residential environment for those on a low income in deprived areas. The main beneficiary of the Korean urban redevelopment planning system is the state.

Gentrification has been integrated in public policies and urban politics. Accordingly, the state has been the main player in the Korean gentrification process. This could be interpreted in terms of the third wave gentrification orchestrated by the state (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). Hackworth and Smith (2001:464) suggest three reasons why the state has been involved in the third wave of gentrification processes in the West.

First, continued devolution of federal states has placed even more pressure on local states to actively pursue redevelopment and gentrification as ways of generating tax revenue. Second, the diffusion of gentrification into more remote portions of the urban landscape poses profit risks that are beyond the capacity of individual capitalists to manage. Third, the larger shift towards post Keynesian governance has unhinged the state from the project of social reproduction and as such, measures to protect the working class are more easily contested.

Hackworth and Smith's first explanation is applied to the Korean context, but the second and the third reason are not useful to explain the role of the state in Korean gentrification. It is due to the relationships between the Korean state, capital and urban change in Korea which are related to the developmental state and its legacy. In the Korean urban political economy, state interests rather than capital interests have determined the growth and decline of urban redevelopment

patterns. Urban planning policies and practice have not contributed to an egalitarian society, because they have been used as growth machines to facilitate economic growth and asset accumulation.

These urban planning policies have created pro-redevelopment coalitions consisting of the state, construction companies, absentee landlords, owner-occupiers and potential buyers, whereas tenants and some less affluent owner-occupiers constitute anti-redevelopment groups (Table 7-8). Pro-redevelopment coalitions have become winners, while anti-redevelopment groups have become losers. Pro-redevelopment coalitions resort to corruption and illegality in order to obtain permission for redevelopment. In fact, civil servants, including the mayor of the YGG and some board members of the S general flat complex POAR, were arrested in February 2012 because of bribery and corruption (*YTN*, 7th September 2012). A civil servant working as a manager of the urban management department within the YGG was also arrested due to bribery and illegally giving permission for construction of the P super high-rise flat complex to go ahead (Im and Jeon, 2009b). Nationally, corruption scandals relate to three actors: politicians, bureaucrats and construction companies. These actors account for 51 per cent of all scandals and 48 per cent of the total amount of bribery reported between 1993 and 2008 (the *KyunghyangSinmun*, 2010:106).

Table 7-8 Winners and losers of urban redevelopment

Winners	Losers
Absentee landlords	Tenants
Owner-occupiers	Owner-occupiers
Potential homebuyers	
Real estate agents	
Construction companies	
Architects and planning consultants	
Local and national governments	

In contrast, the majority of residents and users of redeveloped areas are displaced from their homes and neighbourhoods and excluded from redevelopment profits. The gap between the

winners and losers has increasingly expanded. Urban redevelopment has caused wealth to be concentrated in a few people and a few places, and socio-spatial polarisation has become more marked since exchange value has been promoted by pro-redevelopment coalitions over use value, which is emphasised by anti-redevelopment groups. This has increased social inequality and injustice and raised a question: ‘whose city?’ (Pahl, 1970). The answer is the city belongs to pro-redevelopment coalitions, which are in a very strong position in the urban redevelopment system compared to the general public and anti-redevelopment groups. Urban redevelopment is a problem for everyone, not just residents in urban redevelopment areas, but the majority of ordinary citizens do not consider themselves losers since they have not directly experienced the disadvantages of the urban redevelopment process. Ordinary citizens feel sympathy toward people facing direct displacement, but do not realise that they could be victims of urban redevelopment themselves. Newly built flats are very expensive to buy, so only a few people can afford them. It is hard to buy a new flat as a non-homeowner. At the same time, urban redevelopment means the loss of affordable housing in the city. This increases housing rents and prices in surrounding areas and even in the wider urban housing market. Thus, ordinary citizens who are not directly affected by urban redevelopment could lose out because of it; involuntary displacement can be caused by rent increases, exclusionary displacement and lacking the funds necessary to become a homeowner in a city (Marcuse, 1985a). Housing issues are fundamental and people tend to take more action over housing issues compared to other issues. In spite of this, it is very complicated and difficult to mobilise citizens, since individual citizens will have different views of housing depending on their tenure, socio-economic status and class. Therefore, it is not easy to build widespread social solidarity and break up pro-redevelopment coalitions. Winners attempt to change policy or relating laws only when losers resent and form collective movements fiercely.

7.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has explored the characteristics of gentrification in Seoul. The funding structure and operating system of urban redevelopment hold the key to the future of urban redevelopment. Urban redevelopment processes have been primarily governed by the exchange value interests

of property owners, which are aligned with those of capital and the state. Given the profit-driven urban redevelopment system, absentee landlords comprise the majority of property owners who have played the role of speculative investors. Even though owner-occupiers know they cannot afford to return after urban redevelopment, they do not strongly oppose urban redevelopment as long as they can obtain enough cash to resettle in a new property in another area. The state benefits in various ways from the process. Although tenants are not unconvinced, they do not think they are either able or eligible to oppose urban redevelopment. Even if some tenants take collective action, they face bad treatment from their property owners' association and the state. They have little option but to give up their protest due to the many difficulties they are faced with, and only a few people succeed in obtaining better compensation. Therefore, the 1980s urban redevelopment system has remained operational.

To sum up, urban redevelopment is a state-sponsored, property owner-initiated and chaebol-facilitated gentrification process. Gentrification in Korea is the result of structural factors and the key roles assumed by the state and large private developers rather than individuals. An ideology holding that urban redevelopment is good because almost everybody gains from it has been dominant. This ideology is the legacy of the developmental state, wherein the state emphasised that growth is good for all since economic growth filters down to all levels of society. The urban redevelopment system in Korea is the spatial manifestation of the developmental state. However this ideology is no longer valid. Property owners, chaebol construction companies and the state initiate urban redevelopment for exactly the same reason. It is all about redevelopment profit, but their interests have recently conflicted. More owner-occupiers are starting to realise that they stand to become losers through the process. Owner-occupiers have started to resist urban redevelopment via collective movements. This new kind of movement is considered further in the next chapter.

Chapter 8: New Urban Social Movements – Putting People before Property

“New Town Projects and urban redevelopment projects in Seoul are fraudulent.”

This is the title of the book which the Nationwide Coalition of Property Owners for Immediate Counteractions to Urban Redevelopment (NCPO) published in 2012 in order to expose the adverse effects of and problems caused by urban redevelopment projects. This book warns people to be aware of the reality of urban redevelopment projects, which can be very detrimental for property owners. As can be seen from chapter 7, property owners have generally been in favour of urban redevelopment. Chapter 7 indicated the typical responses of residents and the state to urban redevelopment in Korea. In contrast, this chapter discusses new anti-urban redevelopment movements after 2008.

Over the last 30 years, there have been some instances of property owners demonstrating against urban redevelopment in different redevelopment areas; however, they did not establish a national association or take any kind of collective action. The process of urban redevelopment has changed little during this 30-year period. In fact, the mayors of Seoul, especially Lee Myung-Bak and Oh Se-Hoon, and many MPs have revised the existing laws and introduced new laws in order to boost urban redevelopment over the last decade (e.g. the 2005 Special Act for Urban Redevelopment Promotion). They have since won elections thanks to making election pledges centred on urban redevelopment, and they have relaxed conditions to facilitate urban redevelopment. Nevertheless, some property owners have resisted urban redevelopment in their neighbourhoods and tried to change urban redevelopment processes and related laws. Critiques of large scale urban redevelopment, first articulated by urban social movements in the 1980s (as discussed in chapter 6) when tenants and social activists, including intellectuals, students and religious groups, were at the forefront of demonstrations, seem to have changed over the last five years. Property owners have played an important role in this shift, and have helped to create new types of anti-urban redevelopment movements.

Under the new urban redevelopment policy enacted over the past decade, some owner-occupiers have struggled against displacement and eviction, like tenants. However, it was not easy for property owners to organise their struggles in the beginning, and they were not given enough attention and support from social organisations involved with housing rights and anti-eviction movements. Existing social organisations were reluctant to get involved with this new form of movement, since property owners were seen as stakeholders who stood to gain economic benefits from urban redevelopment (Kim, 2010:169). Property owners have also kept away from existing anti-urban redevelopment organisations, especially the South Korean Federation Against Housing Demolition (SFHD) and the National Coalition for Victims of Forced Evictions (NCFE), which have a long history of helping evictees (Park and Lee, 2012). Interestingly, tenants and property owners have not formed collective anti-urban redevelopment movements over the last five years; this is because their reasons for mobilising themselves differ, as they have divergent interests. Therefore, property owners working against urban redevelopment have found it hard to establish their credibility with other social organisations. As a result, they organised the NCPO in 2008 to share their experiences and form strategies to improve their situation and since the creation of the NCPO, more organisations have been established as part of the same movement.

Although these new movements have had an impact on urban redevelopment policies, it is hard to identify the role of new social movements at first glance. This is why new social movements are under researched. Given the same urban redevelopment system, it is important to ask why some property owners are against urban redevelopment. It is necessary to explore their characteristics. This chapter attempts to clarify the nature of the new movements by examining several key questions: Where have these movements taken place? Who has taken part in them? What are their goals? How have they mobilised? and what are the outcomes of these social movements? These questions can help to reveal the complexity of the new movements. The answers to these questions can also help to explore whether these new movements are a sign that people have changed their views about housing and urban redevelopment as a means of wealth accumulation. For example, do they now want to preserve their community ties and

neighbourhoods? Section 8.1 identifies who has resisted urban redevelopment and which groups are most likely to take part in opposition movements. After creating a typology of opponents to urban redevelopment, it investigates why they have protested. Section 8.2 examines the lack of community values in opposition movements led by property owners. Section 8.3 explores how property owners-led opposition movements have changed their goals and expanded. Section 8.4 outlines how local politics, mainly the SMG, has been changed by property owners-led opposition movements. Section 8.5 discusses the nature and extent of these movements and their limitations.

8.1 The Illusion of Urban Redevelopment

Table 8-2 shows the placards which the NCPO has used at its demonstrations to clearly show what it wants and who it is. Most households in Korea invest most of their wealth in home equity, as shown in Table 8-1, regardless of their income. Many participants in this movement are owner-occupiers aged between 50 and 80. Many elderly owner-occupiers have made their living from rents, so their home is their income base and a substitute for a pension (Ronald and Doling, 2010, 2013).

Table 8-1 The composition of household assets by income quintile in Korea

	1	2	3	4	5	Average
Financial asset	57.1	28.9	21.0	27.0	16.5	21.7
Property	42.9	61.1	69	73	83.5	78.8
Housing	35.5	52.5	55.1	49.5	35.9	41.1
Land	5.2	7.6	12.2	20.6	36.8	29.3
Building	0.3	0.2	0.5	1.3	9.7	6.6

source: KOSIS (2006)

Homes are for the elderly their past, present and future, so they are desperate to protect them. For an elderly man who I interviewed at the NCPO weekly meeting, urban redevelopment has meant losing his home and monthly income. In his words:

“I built my three storey house in the early 1990s for my old age. I earn £750 in rent every month from my tenants, so I can live without help from my sons and daughters. However, I will not be able to do this anymore when I move into a new flat. A new flat

might be better than my present house. But when I lose my monthly income, what is the point of getting a new flat instead of my old house?”

An elderly lady attending the weekly meeting also expressed her grievous situation in an interview:

“In the beginning, I was told that I would get a new flat without extra charge. People who the POAR sent told me this. The market price of my house was £200,000, so I thought I would not have any great difficulty moving into a new flat. I own a house and I am living on the second floor. I have rented out the rest. My house is worth £200,000 on the market, but the property owners’ association offered £115,000 for my property appraisal price. After I refund my tenants’ chunse deposits, there is only £40,000 left for me. What kind of housing can I buy with that in Seoul? It is not enough money to find alternative housing, even outside Seoul. Why has the state taken no action to protect us?”

Because their houses often represent all of their wealth, owners cannot afford to pay extra money for a new flat. They have to leave their homes and lose their monthly rents – their source of income – at the same time due to urban redevelopment. Therefore, most of those attending the NCPO weekly meeting were elderly owner-occupiers (Figure 8-1).

Figure 8-1 Property owner Anti-redevelopment Demonstration in Seoul



source: Yonhapnews (2013a)

Table 8-2 The placard statements of the NCPO

Elderly existing residents in their 70s and 80s would become beggars after they refund deposits to their tenants.
Just compensation! No compulsory purchase orders. Rational property value appraisal! Protect property rights. Urban redevelopment laws are laws for property thieves. Stop redevelopment right now, progress it after review. Stop urban redevelopment which displaces original residents. Stop the current urban redevelopments which totally ignore existing residents. Run urban redevelopment with the agreement of existing residents.
Save existing residents by cutting pro-redevelopment coalitions. Stop urban redevelopment for chaebols. When legislation, jurisdiction and administration are fair, existing residents can return. When the press is fair, existing residents can stay. Civil servants who condone wrongful urban redevelopment should be punished! Redevelopment projects and urban infrastructure are accountable to the state. Do not use housing rights for political interests!

source : The NCPO online forum (2012a)

In Korea, the main participants in urban social movements have, for a long time, been young college students and progressive intellectuals, as pointed out in chapters 5 and 6. Elderly people have not had much experience in taking part in urban social movements before. During their formative years, it was not possible to oppose the state, as social activist 1 of the Nationwide Coalition for Housing Countermeasures (NCHC) pointed out in an interview:

“They have not participated in any social movements before. Most owner-occupiers in urban redevelopment areas are elderly people in their 60s, 70s and 80s. They experienced the period of turbulence [Japanese colonisation, the Korean war and the dictatorship] in Korea and have property. This means that they worked hard and lived obediently during the repressive period. Their lives were affected by Confucianism, Japanese colonisation and anti-communism. Therefore, they did not dare to think about resistance against the state. They took a submissive attitude to authority for a long time.”

These elderly people used to be too conservative to protest, since they saw that protesters against the state were arrested and jailed during the authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, elderly property owners have recruited other people in the same situation and have organised their movements without any help from professional activists. They have resisted the state's policies and taken to the streets in order to protect their homes. In fact, there was little organised opposition in the earliest urban redevelopment areas. However, this form of protest has built gradually and cumulatively, since the Korean urban redevelopment system has not worked well since the 2008 economic recession which saw the previously booming property market go bust. The elderly have learnt from others' experiences, and have seen that property owners in other areas have got into trouble. This has stimulated awareness of the necessity of protest. Leaders in both organisations (the NCPO and the NCHC) are relatively young (in their 50s) compared to the other members, so they are likely to have a good sense of how to get organised and be confident when dealing with problems with local governments. These organisations have given elderly people confidence to do something to save their property. Social activist 1 of the NCHC added his comments:

“The elderly were not confident in the beginning. After they attended our meeting and looked at young people's interactions with the local authority, they got confident. Sometimes, they take part in demonstrations more actively than young people.”

The second category in Table 8-2 shows why property owners have taken action. The main reason they started to oppose urban redevelopment and take collective action against the state is to recoup their financial losses following low value property appraisals. They also oppose the compulsory purchase orders (CPOs) exercised by property owners' associations, since they wish to keep their property and hence their wealth for their old age. When an urban redevelopment plan is decided, property owners in Korea have three options: to move into a newly built flat after paying extra money, if necessary; or to sell their property to others with a premium; or to obtain the assessed valuation of their property after redevelopment is completed. If owner-occupiers cannot afford to rent alternative housing during the flat construction period and have to pay the difference in price between their current property and their new property, they cannot help but sell their property to more affluent people. Most owner-occupiers who cannot afford to buy a new flat choose to sell their property in due course and leave their home

and neighbourhood, as was shown in chapter 7. However, they would have financial difficulties when looking to buy a new property elsewhere with their compensation. This is because their compensation is based on the valuation of their existing property which is generally in poor condition. Property valuation under the Korean CPO system is less than the property's market value. If they fail to find an alternative residence locally, some of them are likely to become tenants in order to stay in the area or otherwise move away in search of more affordable housing in order to remain homeowners. Nevertheless, there is little research investigating owner-occupiers' experiences of tenure change. No public financial packages are available to help those who want to maintain their ownership elsewhere. Even though urban redevelopment plans in the current planning system regulate housing type, the height of the building and other factors in detail, there are no social plans or policies that allow us to see who is affected by plans and how their negative effects could be mitigated. Almost all legislation deals with the physical appearance of or environmental effects of urban redevelopment; people are disregarded. There are no systems in place to protect poor owner-occupiers' ownership rights. Current policies do not deal with the many social issues caused by urban redevelopment, such as the needs and anxieties of tenants and property owners who do not want redevelopment.

During the 1980s and 1990s, there were chronic housing shortages so housing prices skyrocketed. New flats provided by urban redevelopment were sold to new buyers at high prices. Therefore, property owners earned more money than they had to pay out to buy a new flat. Even though the property value appraisal was less than the market price, most property owners were not greatly concerned about their property's valuation price. This is because they had a chance to upgrade their residence, getting a new flat without having to carry a financial burden or buying a new home in another area after selling their property with a premium to speculators or potential homebuyers. Social activist 1 of the NCHC commented on the urban redevelopment ideology as discussed in chapter 6:

“Actually, the previous property owners got a new 30 pyung flat and some money instead of their 14 pyung house after urban redevelopment. Therefore, property owners thought that urban redevelopment would be good for them. People voted yes for urban redevelopment, since they observed and heard similar stories. They believed that they would get the same.”

As can be seen from this interview, the ideology of urban redevelopment influenced many people and most property owners welcomed urban redevelopment with open arms. However, property owners currently have difficulties getting this kind of return: many urban redevelopment projects were initiated at the same time, and the property market has slowed since the 2008 global financial crisis. Potential homebuyers have been reluctant to buy new flats, since they expected a decrease in housing prices after the economic recession. Under these circumstances, many property owners' associations have not made a windfall profit since they have had difficulties selling new flats to new buyers. Therefore, unlike in the past, many property owners cannot now get a new flat without an extra charge. Even though they provide their land, they have to pay a substantial amount of money for a flat the same size as their previous residence. When they cannot afford to pay the extra charge, they have to move out with insufficient cash compensation to settle down elsewhere. Once they find out they stand to make a substantial financial loss and are in danger of losing their property, they start to become aware of the problems with the current property value appraisal system which forces out existing, sometimes long term, residents. One elderly participant expressed this at the NCPO weekly meeting which I was at present:

“Urban redevelopment steals the poor’s property and gives it to others. This system can make a profit since our properties are appraised at less than their market value. It is a robbery from one owner to another owner who can get rich. It may be legal but it is immoral.”

Therefore, property owners' opposition movements tend to be more active in places where the proportion of owner-occupiers is high since they are not likely to be investors. There is, however, no clear relationship between an area's composition of owner-occupiers and absentee landlords and the activation of property owners' opposition movements. For example, owner-occupier 1, attending the NCPO weekly meeting, stated:

“About 90 per cent of all property owners in my urban redevelopment area are owner-occupiers, but only about 30 per cent of owner-occupiers have participated in this opposition movement. Owner-occupiers who have not joined in with this movement have not abandoned the illusion of urban redevelopment. They still think they can profit from urban redevelopment.”

It is also difficult to conclude that there is a positive correlation between a preference for urban redevelopment and property size. On the one hand, it is clear that small property owners are

displaced, but they often agree to urban redevelopment projects as they hope to make some profit from their property when they sell it to investors. On the other hand, some large property owners are totally against it. Some property owners are not consistent in voting for urban redevelopment. For example, a man I met at the NCPO weekly meeting has two buildings in two areas. The urban redevelopment process has been in progress in both areas. He voted yes in one area, but has opposed urban redevelopment in the other area. His property in one area is smaller than his property in the other area, so each property value is very different. He has focused on anti-urban redevelopment movements in the area which contains his bigger property. This is a rational decision, but it shows the weakness of these social movements. Participants in these movements are motivated by profit like the property owners who actively drive urban redevelopment. They are likely to leave these movements when they are given more money for their property from their property owners' association. The head of the NCPO also recognised this weakness:

“There are some people like him [the man in the previous example] in the NCPO, because they are incapable of participating in anti-urban redevelopment movements in two areas at the same time. They compromise in order to keep the property with the higher value. However, many people have realised that the previous logic, that is to say redevelopment always gives profit, is not valid anymore because of the economic recession and housing overage.”

Social activist 2 working at the Korea Coalition for Housing Rights (KCHR) also pointed out this weakness:

“Many people are motivated by economic goals and that is why they have participated in the property owners' opposition movements. It is likely that participants would change their mind and agree with urban redevelopment if the booming economy comes back and redevelopment profit can be expected.”

Property owners' opposition movements are not against urban redevelopment itself or the inequality induced by urban redevelopment. Property owners want to stop urban redevelopment because they would be displaced without adequate compensation. If they can have a share of redevelopment profits, they are likely to be in favour of urban redevelopment. Their opposition to redevelopment is contingent rather than fundamental. It could be a basis for their organisations. The reaction of these two men at the NCPO weekly meeting is typical:

“Who would be against urban redevelopment if our property is appraised at its market price?”

“It is important to prepare a migration measure so that people can maintain their current lifestyle in other areas”.

The interpretation of social activist 1 with the NCHC clearly shows the range of motivations of property owners participating in these movements:

“Objectors do not want urban redevelopment at present, because they lose many things. They do not disagree with redevelopment itself and are not unconditionally against it because they know politics. They dislike redevelopment at the moment because they make a loss from it. When their properties are rationally appraised and they can move into good housing in other places, they would not be against urban redevelopment. At the moment, they are evicted with insufficient compensation after they provide their property.”

Likewise, the first and foremost reason for mobilisation is to keep property rights and get fair compensation. Some people insist at the NCPO weekly meeting that halting the designation of urban redevelopment areas would help property values.

“After halting the designation of urban redevelopment districts, property values in many areas have increased.”

As discussed so far, objectors against urban redevelopment are not a homogeneous group and they participate in these movements for different reasons. They differ according to a number of factors: property size, property occupancy, income, and age. However, elderly rental landlords without another income are the most likely group to oppose urban redevelopment. Also, low income homeowners who cannot afford to pay the extra charge tend to take part in property owners’ opposition movements. Although participants’ membership is strategic, the main goal of property owners’ opposition movements is retaining people’s homes.

8.2 We Know How Many Spoons Our Neighbours Have

It is difficult to say that there are strong community ties in Korea, especially in a big city like Seoul, since rapid urbanisation and pro-growth development have caused high residential mobility as shown in chapter 7. There is not enough security of tenure for tenants. This makes it hard for people to establish communities. In relative contrast, residents in proposed urban redevelopment areas tend to live in the same area for a long time, as residential tenant 3 in the H urban redevelopment area commented:

“This area is located in the middle of the city centre, but it is not as same as other places. This is a kind of a village. I don’t mean only the appearance of this area. Even though land value is high, rent is cheap since the housing is old. People have been living here for a long time, so we know how many spoons our neighbours have”²⁰.

This is because residential environments are not highly desirable and the rent in them is relatively cheap. In particular, owner-occupiers are more likely to live in neighbourhoods for a long time so potentially have community ties or sentimental attachment to their neighbourhood and home. Nevertheless, property owners’ opposition movements fight for property rights and redevelopment profit rather than community ties, as has already been discussed. This is similar to people’s struggles in China and Hong Kong, as discussed in chapter 3. There is an insufficient sense of community and a lack of sentimental attachment to neighbourhoods in property owners’ opposition movements, unlike the Western anti-gentrification movements which Ley and Teo (2014) discuss. It is not easy to collect people with different interests under one umbrella for many reasons in the Korean urban redevelopment context, even if there is a sense of community.

Firstly, gentrifiers in the West generally come from outside the neighbourhood. It is often evident in academic papers that long term local residents tend to be losers, whereas new incomers are winners (Marcuse, 1985a, Smith, 1996, Slater, 2006). Conflicts between the two groups are often generated. Therefore, collective movements from residents, regardless of their tenure, are possible against outside invaders. The threat makes them recognise their sense of community or feel it more strongly. When existing residents consider the changes to their neighbourhood one by one, the threat feels real and they can prepare to take action in order to stop further gentrification. By contrast, gentrifiers in Korea are not always outsiders because of the nature of the urban redevelopment system. In the case of Korean gentrification, it is easier to identify the enemy – owner-occupiers and absentee landlords – than is true of Western classic gentrification.

If there is a good sense of community between landlords and tenants, their relationship turns sour when an urban redevelopment project proceeds since landlords try to drive out tenants.

²⁰ This means they know how many family members others in their neighbourhood have. That is, they know each other very well.

Some of the landlords in the H urban redevelopment area have already refused to extend their tenants' contracts, or have settled agreements that mean tenants will have to vacate their properties without delay when demolition begins. Even though their community is shattered by this, some owner-occupiers remain passive and some of them actively participate in the redevelopment process in order to obtain a new flat and profit. Although there is no rent control system in Korea, landlords in the H urban redevelopment area do not charge high rents because of the quality of their housing and their relationship with their tenants. Owner-occupier 2, who rents out a ground floor, commented:

“I have known my tenants for a long time, so the rent is not high. It is only £150 per month, but I cannot increase it since I know my tenant's situation.”

For landlords, urban redevelopment is a good chance to gain substantial capital by selling their rental property. This is quite similar to the 1970s property market in Britain; Landlords tried to sell their property through flat break up after vacating their rented property from tenants in order to crystalize the value gap between the their rental returns and their potential capital value, if sold (Hamnett and Randolph, 1984:273). In contrast, for tenants urban redevelopment means tenure insecurity and rent increases. New owners, who bought properties after the urban redevelopment plan was decided, have already increased rents. Business tenant 3 commented on the changes to the area caused by urban redevelopment:

“When I opened my shop about 20 years ago, there were a couple of property agencies in this area. The number of property agencies has increased a lot since urban redevelopment commenced. Property agencies have persuaded landlords to kick out their tenants and property agencies have opened their shops. Nowadays, property agencies are in every other building because of urban redevelopment. Since then, our rent has increased a lot, so it is difficult to run our business.”

As business tenant 3 indicates, tenants have had problems because of urban redevelopment. However, they have not taken collective action yet, as shown in chapter 7. This is because of tenants' different interests. As has already been discussed in chapter 7, displaced residential tenants receive better compensation than business tenants; the issue for housing tenants tends to be finding affordable housing in another area rather than the compensation itself. In contrast, better compensation is the most important issue for business tenants, since it is directly connected to their job security. There are no tenants' unions which support all tenants and work

to form solidarity between housing tenants and business tenants. Tenants also have limited power in the local electoral arena compared to property owners. As shown in chapter 7, residential tenants have difficulties in getting involved in local politics because of high residential mobility. Business tenants may not live in the same areas which their shops are located, so they have limited power in local politics. Under these circumstances, fighting against urban redevelopment for better compensation, rather than over sentimental attachment, is both practical and necessary.

Secondly, even owner-occupiers can be divided into two groups according to their level of preference for urban redevelopment. As mentioned in chapter 7, time is very crucial for property owners looking to make a profit in the Korean urban redevelopment process. Therefore, property owners in favour of urban redevelopment push forward with their plans, so opponents are blamed for delays. Owner-occupier 2, who agrees with urban redevelopment in the H urban redevelopment area, said that

“Unless owners oppose urban redevelopment very strongly, I think they have to cooperate with the POAR in order to manage the process quickly.”

It is hard to build a consensus about displacement among the different categories of residents who oppose urban redevelopment, since they all have different interests (Table 8-3). Without a consensus, it is impossible to establish a community organisation and mobilise all the potentially displaced residents in order to stop urban redevelopment. In the end, the community is broken up by residents' different views of and interests towards urban redevelopment. Individuals are concerned with getting a better deal from the POAR, not protecting their community and home or changing the urban redevelopment system itself in order to help all the residents in the urban redevelopment area. To sum up, tenants oppose urban redevelopment for their housing rights and fair compensation, and owner-occupiers fight for their property rights.

Table 8-3 The opponents of urban redevelopment and their goals

Opponents	Goals
Owner-occupiers	Oppose the assessed property price which is less than market value Property rights
Business tenants	For just compensation
Housing tenants	For affordable housing
Rental landlords	Oppose the assessed property price which is less than the market value For their income loss Property rights

While many property owners in the new anti-urban redevelopment movements are still interested in their property rights, fair compensation and profit, some of them have realised the unfairness of the present redevelopment system. As the third category of Table 8-2 shows, property owners who are against urban redevelopment have recognised the contradictions of the urban redevelopment process itself and have pointed out the absence of their voices from the urban redevelopment process. They have protested against top-down planning and the fact the urban redevelopment system is dominated by the hegemony of pro-redevelopment coalitions. Property owners' opposition movements have demanded control and management of urban redevelopment beyond defensive movements against physical threats. In terms of the typology established by Pickvance (1985), property owners' opposition movements have moved to type 3. They have requested their right to participate in the decision-making process in order to limit the influence of speculative investors. However, the goal of property owners' movements may not be the same as the goals of the residents' associations from the Coin Street and Eldonian Village cases, which saw residents organise themselves and develop an alternative plan and financial strategy for urban redevelopment. This is because property owners-led opposition movements do not intend to keep communities together but instead aim to preserve homes and properties. Property owners have not suggested an alternative to their communities, as their goal has instead been to overcome the economic and political powers behind the urban redevelopment processes.

8.3 Homes Before Profits

The Korean urban redevelopment process was created for maximum benefit at minimum cost to the state under the authoritarian developmental state of the 1980s. This redevelopment system funded by debt finance has relied on property price increases and the private sector. It is highly speculative as has been discussed in chapter 7. When the Korean urban redevelopment system was created in the early 1980s, cities developed very rapidly and urban redevelopment was urgently needed, but the state was not able to undertake the whole process of urban redevelopment because of a lack of revenue. As a result, the private sector has played a dominant role and exercised CPOs in spite of the fact redevelopment is, in theory, for the public's benefit and profit. In practice, private owners and developers have profited the most from urban redevelopment. This long lasting system has affected property owners, as they have rose-tinted hopes for a high return from their redevelopment, even though they are in charge of tenants' compensation and urban infrastructure provision on behalf of the state. It seems that urban redevelopment projects are initiated by property owners who agree with urban redevelopment projects, but it is in fact a top-down exercise. There is no way to reach agreements with individual property owners. The organiser of Share and Future organisation criticised the state in an interview:

“The state has tried to promote redevelopment projects, but it has not provided much information about them and let residents have enough time to consider whether they are good for them or not.”

Social activist 2 of the NCHC also commented that

“Even though the state defines urban redevelopment as public projects, the principle agent is the POAR. The POAR has to put up with losses and profits, but the state has almost all the information. As a result, ordinary residents have no capacity or ability to decide whether an urban redevelopment project would be beneficial for them or not.”

However, property owners are willing to participate in pro-redevelopment coalitions as long as the property market is booming. The urban redevelopment system in Korea is able to operate well only while the property market is booming, since all processes rely on huge redevelopment gains through redevelopment-for-sale profit. When the property market is in decline, the urban redevelopment system cannot rely on private sector resources. The current methods have proved

unsustainable over the last five years. Some property owners do not want to take risks over speculative redevelopment and flats are no longer attractive for all property owners, since it is not easy to make a huge profit as was the case prior to the 2008 economic recession.

Many property owners who oppose urban redevelopment have found the fundamental reason for their problems lies in the contradictions of the current urban redevelopment law, which is biased in favour of the state. Property owners have emphasised the state's lack of responsibility for urban redevelopment. Many property owners against urban redevelopment have stated that the relevant laws are anachronistic and ridiculous. Many property owners have argued that most of the laws were created during the rapid development period, so they cannot reflect the current changing circumstances. Property owners have started to criticise the state for exploiting urban redevelopment for profit, and claim that the state is the key beneficiary of urban redevelopment rather than property owners. Social activist 2 of the NCHC claimed that

“Once the local state designates an urban redevelopment district, the state can provide various urban infrastructures such as roads, parks and schools with property owners' money. The local state can build everything without spending a penny.”

Social activist 1 of the NCHC also stated that

“This urban redevelopment may be good for Seoul, but it is not for those of us living in urban redevelopment areas. From a broad point of view, the state has forced us to make sacrifices.”

A researcher in the REO stated that the current urban redevelopment system imposes too great a financial burden on property owners:

Each property owner on average pays £70,000 for urban redevelopment. 45 per cent (£31,500) of £70,000 is for construction of urban infrastructure (£12,300), construction of social housing (£16,000) and compensation for tenants (£3,200). Only 55 per cent of £70,000 is actually used for a new flat. Two out of three owner-occupiers cannot afford this money. This huge amount of money is one of main causes to delay urban redevelopment and reduce the return rate of owner-occupiers (*Financial News*, 27th May 2011).

The organiser of the REO made the following statement in an interview:

“The state takes 65 per cent of urban redevelopment profits, although property owners run all urban redevelopment processes on their own land. The state forced property owners to build urban infrastructures such as parks and roads and prepare all the compensation for tenants. In the past, property owners accepted these conditions because they made enough profit after doing all these things instead of the state.

However, nowadays it is not possible to do this anymore, since the urban redevelopment profit is not as great as it was in the past. The state needs to take more responsibility for urban redevelopment.”

As has been discussed in chapter 7, the state is using urban redevelopment as a source of revenue and as a way to avoid paying for housing provision and urban restructuring. Jangsu village in Seoul is a good example that shows the state’s limited support for urban redevelopment (Figure 8-2). Urban redevelopment is absolutely necessary in Jangsu village. The area was designated for urban redevelopment in 2004, but redevelopment has yet to begin. Many owner-occupiers in this deprived and run-down area cannot afford to reconstruct their own housing. Absentee landlords are not willing to do so either, since they bought their properties for redevelopment profit. They have hoped that big construction companies would get involved in the urban redevelopment, but construction companies have been reluctant to do so. The majority of the land is owned by the state, and the state has not allowed companies to build high-rise flats in the area because the village is located on a hillside and near historic sites (Park, 2011). Therefore, construction companies do not expect as much profit from Jangsu village as they do from other urban redevelopment areas.

Figure 8-2 Jangsu village in Seoul



source:Jangsumaeul(2014)

Nevertheless, the state has not provided any financial support to improve the residential environment for low income families living there. This shows that the state is uninterested in changing housing and urban built environments at its own expense to meet citizens' needs. The state has been taking advantage of property owners, who have had to pay the costs of urban redevelopment. The state sets up the conditions according to which property owners can drive urban redevelopment, and then leaves the rest of the process to private developers consisting of property owners associations and construction companies. It can be seen as a public-private partnership run mainly by the private sector, as Yoon (2002:6) points out when discussing the limitations of the public-private partnership in Korea:

The private sector in the public-private partnership in Korea almost equals to private developers. Therefore, the private sector's interests are reflected on urban development, but the needs of civil society are rarely accepted. The private sector prioritises profitability of urban development, so they respond to any change to the property market and economy which would affect profit. As a result, urban development is not stable since it relies on the market.

In practice, a few board members and the head of the POAR manage urban redevelopment with construction companies on behalf of all property owners. However, they do not have enough professional knowledge or experience of urban redevelopment, so they rely heavily on the construction companies. There is a high possibility of corruption and bribery between construction companies and board members of the POAR, and many cases of such conduct have been reported. These unbalanced power relations hardly favour all property owners. Urban redevelopment is, in effect, controlled by construction companies, and it causes various new conflicts among stakeholders: construction companies vs. property owners, property owners vs. the POAR and so on. One young man who has been actively involved with the NCPO strongly criticised the nature of urban redevelopment in an interview:

“My neighbourhood has been designated for urban redevelopment, but there has been no significant driving force for urban redevelopment by property owners. However, it is very crucial to eradicate the root illusion of urban redevelopment gains, so I have been trying to cancel the designation of my neighbourhood as an urban redevelopment district. Otherwise, property owners will try to start urban redevelopment when they are persuaded by pro-redevelopment coalitions, such as construction companies. It would create big trouble and divide all the residents in my neighbourhood.”

The NCPO insists that construction companies make huge profits from urban redevelopment construction costs, interest gained from lending money to the POAR, and selling new flats. Property owners against urban redevelopment argue that even though construction companies keep increasing construction costs, they have no means of limiting construction companies. Therefore, the NCPO defines construction companies and board members of the POAR winners as shown in Table 8-4, and has aimed to break the solid connections that make winners and losers.

Table 8-4 Winners and losers of urban redevelopment as defined by the NCPO

Winners	Losers
The national and local state Civil servants Construction companies Board members and the head of property owners' association	Common members of property owners' associations Business tenants

source : the NCPO online forum (2012)

However, it is very difficult for ordinary property owners to overpower the most powerful actors, who are the state and construction companies, when urban redevelopment is initiated. Theoretically, local councils have powers to confront the various problems induced by urban redevelopment. They did not try to use them fully under the conservative mayors of Seoul from the Saenuri Party, which has led to the present form of urban redevelopment, while the main opposition party, the Democratic Party, had gone along with urban redevelopment. The Seoul councillors and mayors did not get involved with what was happening in each urban redevelopment neighbourhood. Whenever property owners demanded the cancellation of urban redevelopment plans or the inspection of an urban redevelopment project by council officials, they were told that council officials could do nothing under the current legislative system. Social activist 2 of the NCHC criticised the limited role of both the state and the law in an interview:

“Residents in urban redevelopment areas reported the problems of urban redevelopment law and process, but the local state, which has the power to supervise urban redevelopment processes, did not get involved in it properly. In fact, the state made redevelopment plans and gave permissions, so the state should be held responsible for all the problems that arise. But there is no authority for citizens. It is democratic authoritarianism. If the law was fair and in favour of citizens, nobody would be against urban redevelopment.”

The two anti-urban redevelopment organisations (the NCPO and the NCHC) have claimed that the public sector is unevenly open to grassroots involvement relating to urban redevelopments.

The organiser of the NCPO said this in an interview:

“The state is not cooperative or friendly to the movements of property owners against urban redevelopment, since it is one of the drivers of urban redevelopment. They are closer to property owners’ associations. They do not side with ordinary people. When we go to the local authority, we are told that 75 per cent of property owners agree with urban redevelopment, but why are the rest of them against it?”

While the local and national state have remained passive toward urban redevelopment problems, residents in urban redevelopment areas across Seoul have been dispersed to allow high-rise flats to be built. It has long been the social norm in Korea to demolish homes and rebuild them because of low housing construction quality. However, property owners have opposed urban redevelopment and insisted that ‘we want to repair it and live there’. Property owners’ opposition movements have emphasised preservation, running urban redevelopment at a small scale and establishing more channels to allow for existing residents’ input. Property owners’ movements against urban redevelopment have set their ultimate goal as cancelling urban redevelopment plans in their neighbourhoods, and oppose the construction of blocks of flats that make all places look the same. One participant at the NCPO weekly meeting stated that:

“It is time we discard the conventional view that we can make profit from a flat. When we own a 30 pyung house, our stake in the land is 30 pyung. In contrast, our stake in land is less than one third of our flat size. How tall a building would be built when the next urban redevelopment takes place in 40 to 50 years?”

As discussed in chapter 6, flats are a by-product of the developmental state which wanted to push costs away from the government and onto the private sector in order to foster faster housing provision. The urban redevelopment system has utilised flats as the main driver of this. Property owners’ opposition movements have pointed out the social contradictions of capitalist development and urban built environments. Property owners’ opposition movements have

shifted political fault lines and created a new environment for urban redevelopment through their social and political action.

8.4 Politicians Only Listen When It Counts as a Vote

Neighbourhood activism created a new ‘political space’ which allowed, and sometimes forced, urban politicians and administrators to interact with new contenders of power (Mollenkopf, 1983:190).

As Mollenkopf argued, property owners-led opposition movements have transformed politics and social protest. The local state plans urban redevelopments and permits the POAR to form, so the local state holds the right to supervise the process. In spite of this, local states are reluctant to directly address property owners’ complaints. In contrast, the current local state in Seoul has been supportive of property owners’ opposition movements after a progressive crossbencher who used to work at a NGO took power in the 2011 by-election for the mayor of Seoul. Park Won Soon, the new mayor of Seoul, has tried to mitigate some of the problems caused by urban redevelopment. This marked a turning point in urban redevelopment policy. This change can be seen partly as the result of property owners’ opposition movements. These movements have now gathered momentum to break into the conventional urban redevelopment decision-making process, that has traditionally benefited pro-redevelopment coalitions, because of this political change (McGovern, 1997). Two statements from a PR poster put up in public places in Seoul shows what the new mayor of Seoul has implemented in order to solve social conflict induced by urban redevelopment policies.

‘Urban redevelopment focuses on dwellers.’

‘Housing rights are also human rights. Now, community and people centred residential regeneration is being driven.’

The new mayor of Seoul has declared that:

The direction of residential regeneration is changing from housing provision by wholesale demolition to building communities and small scale redevelopment focused on residents, community ties and community business. When the proposed redevelopment districts are transferred to this alternative regeneration instead of the current large scale redevelopment plan, the Seoul government will provide financial support to property owners for refurbishment of their property and building community facilities (SMG, 2012).

The SMG has introduced a new urban redevelopment policy called the 'Building Community Project' which focuses on creating a sense of community and growing communities in urban neighbourhoods. This new urban redevelopment policy has been introduced under the slogan of 'from urban redevelopment for profit to urban redevelopment for dwellers'. In this policy, maintenance and improvement rather than clearance and bulldozing of old housing are emphasised. The local state now pays more attention to helping residents living in urban redevelopment areas, helping with physical and socio-economic improvements by offering financial and other support. This is fostering citizens' autonomy and emphasising working partnerships with the third sector. There is confusion and ambiguity with regards to the meaning of community, but this change seeks to enhance democracy and community involvement in urban redevelopment policy and practice. It seems to be a good alternative to the current form of urban redevelopment, and should help to protect the housing rights of tenants and the property rights of owners who do not want urban redevelopment. In terms of democratic management, this policy of encouraging community involvement is valuable. It is also arguable that this community-led regeneration could solve the problems and social conflict created by the Korean urban redevelopment system, since this new policy is an alternative running alongside the existing urban redevelopment system.

Along with this change, several new systems were introduced to improve citizens' involvement in urban planning and urban redevelopment decision-making. The SMG has taken a more active role in trying to solve conflicts between various groups in urban redevelopment areas. Compared to the past, social conflicts around urban redevelopment have become more complicated and urban redevelopment projects in many areas have been disrupted by these conflicts. This has caused serious social issues such as financial losses and the destruction of communities, since urban redevelopment brings out conflict from various economic interests groups (Chang, 2010). The SMG has sent surveyors to all urban redevelopment areas to check the validity of current urban redevelopment projects. Also, the SMG has sent mediators²¹ to severe conflict areas to listen to property owners' opinions. The local state has established

²¹ They consist of negotiators, social activists working for housing rights, and experts concerned with urban redevelopment.

official channels to listen to the reasons why property owners either favour or oppose urban redevelopment. These new interventions represent significant progress, but the most important change is the introduction of a law to enable property owners to halt urban redevelopment when they do not want it.

However, there is still ongoing controversy as to whether these new interventions are effective or not at helping people suffering from urban redevelopment. Firstly, many of the new interventions are regulated by a temporary law which is valid only during the current mayor's period of office; the NCPO and the NCHC should have insisted that it be made a permanent law. The fundamental system of urban redevelopment has not changed. The Korean urban redevelopment system is still used unless residents strongly oppose it. Many of the same social problems could be repeated again in the future.

Secondly, there are some limitations to the SMG's mediation system because there is no arena for tenants to express their views. An interviewee working as a mediator in the SMG pointed this out:

“The key participants in the mediating process are property owners for and against urban redevelopment. Tenants and the SMG are also key parties in urban redevelopment, but they are not included in this mediation. Some people say this is just a window dressing exercise.”

As this mediator stated, the main actors affected by urban redevelopment are tenants, property owners, the state and construction companies. Nevertheless, mediators meet only property owners and focus on the conflicts between them; tenants still lack sufficient official channels through which to make their voices heard by the government. Although the new mayor has emphasised housing rights as human rights, room has only been made for property owners' housing rights. In fact, every Gu government has run a similar dispute mediation committee since 2011. In this committee, even tenants can make a claim. However, a civil officer working at the dispute mediation committee in the Yongsan government has a rather pessimistic view of the usefulness of mediation activities. He explained this in an interview:

“The dispute mediation committee was established in February 2011. Since then, I have succeeded in establishing a committee only three times. When opponents claim, the counterparty must agree to meet with the people in order to establish a committee. But

they hardly ever do. The main conflict cannot be resolved between two parties, since they have such different views. The conflicts result from the urban redevelopment system itself, so it is not possible to form an agreement between people in favour of redevelopment and people against it. There is a seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the two groups.”

Thirdly, property owners against urban redevelopment have to put a lot of effort into halting urban redevelopment plans in their neighbourhood, and have to do so without any assistance from the state. Property owners’ participation is very limited when urban redevelopment plans are decided. When property owners want to halt an urban redevelopment plan, they should show the local state that many property owners oppose urban redevelopment. If there is a POAR, property owners against urban redevelopment must obtain agreement from more than 50 per cent of all property owners. If there is no association, the urban redevelopment plan can be cancelled by the demand of 30 per cent of all property owners. It is not at all easy to mobilise enough property owners to meet this criteria. They sometimes need to meet absentee landlords, but they have difficulties getting their contact details without help from their POAR.²² It is difficult to get such details, since they are private. What is more, POARs do not want to give them out. Property owners against urban redevelopment need to do a lot of work in order to persuade property owners either sitting on the fence or in favour of urban redevelopment to withdraw their support. It seems to be an uneven fight between powerful groups and ordinary residents, since the local state has few resources to offer property owners fighting against urban redevelopment.

Fourthly, the minimum requirement for calling off urban redevelopment is lower than the requirement to establish a preparatory committee for a property owners’ association for redevelopment (50 per cent) and a property owners’ association for redevelopment (75 per cent). Therefore, urban redevelopment could be called off in spite of the fact that more property owners are in favour of redevelopment plans. This has caused new conflict between property owners for and against urban redevelopment. For example, property owners against urban redevelopment in Changsindong, Seoul, halted the urban redevelopment plan there in June 2013. The POAR in Changsindong had borrowed £850,000 from a chaebol-owned construction

²² In 2013, the SMG created a compulsory regulation to make POARs provide the details of property owners when other property owners demanded them. In spite of this, many POARs are still reluctant to share this information with property owners who oppose urban redevelopment.

company to run their urban redevelopment project (*Edaily News*, 17th June 2013). Property owners in the area did not build new flats or refurbish their houses, but they did have to pay back that huge amount of money. As the sunk cost became an issue between property owners and builders, the local state decided to subsidise it. Even if they can get financial support which is up to 70% of their spending from the local state²³, each owner still needs to pay £1,350 (*Edaily News*, 17th June 2013).

As mentioned in chapter 4, the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) established a temporary committee, the Seoul Citizens Supporters (of which I was one of the members), in order to listen to citizens' opinions about the fairness of the state's subsidisation and the amount of subsidisation around the sunk cost. Property owners against urban redevelopment insisted that the board members and property owners who supported the urban redevelopment should pay this sunk cost, whereas property owners in favour of urban redevelopment blamed their opponents for halting the redevelopment plan. Citizens who are not directly involved in urban redevelopment projects raised the question of why tax revenue is used to help property owners, since the urban redevelopment was initiated by property owners to meet their own economic interests. Some citizens pointed out that this subsidisation is unfair. All of these social conflicts can be attributed to the essence of the Korean urban redevelopment system, which has ignored public interests and relied heavily on the gains to be made from redevelopment.

To conclude, the mobilisation of and protests by property owners have resulted in some changes to the relationship between protest groups and the local state. They have also attracted attention from political parties. It is possible that this is because the protestors are property owners; and since property owners tend to stay in an area for a long time, they affect the results of local elections. The organisations established by property owners against urban redevelopment have achieved policy changes to help them. However, it is doubtful that they have created alternatives through political and social change. This is because they have not fully succeeded in drawing ordinary citizens into their movements, as shown by the negative responses of ordinary citizens in the committee toward the state's subsidisation. This limitation leads to a discussion of the

²³ As the sunk cost became an issue among property owners and construction companies, the local state introduced a regulation in order to subsidize the cost.

nature of property owners-led opposition movements in the broader spectrum of social movements.

8.5 Is There Another Way?

Property owners' protests have helped people poorly positioned in the Korean political system, since protest and disruption are good ways to pressure political parties and the state. Each association consists of ordinary property owners who are not experts in urban redevelopment or related laws, but have studied the laws and regulations related to urban redevelopment by themselves in order to protect their rights. In the beginning, property owners in each urban redevelopment area standing against urban redevelopment gathered together to discuss their financial losses and property values. However, property owners have started to expand their interests from their own issues to the fundamental problems with urban redevelopment policy. Therefore, property owners' opposition movements have pushed the local and central states to change the urban redevelopment system itself.

Property owners' organisations such as the NCPO and the NCHC have played an important role in the evolution and success of property owners' opposition movements. The activities of these organisations have ranged from attempts to solve urgent problems at the neighbourhood level to attempts to put pressure on the local and national states. At the neighbourhood level, two organisations have helped property owners to mobilise other owners in their area and given legal advice when property owners decide to take court action against their POAR. At the local and national level, they have sent deputations to councils, organised local and national demonstrations, and attended various public meetings organised by the state, MPs and candidates for the presidency. They have taken collective action such as demonstrations and petitions for legislation, and have demanded access to public information about urban redevelopment, so they can broadcast their opinions on urban redevelopment policies. They have put effort into trying to change their situation through legislation and the administration of urban redevelopment. These social organisations have succeeded in attaining what Meyer (2007:61) argues is the first goal of social organisations: putting pressure on the government.

However, they have not significantly attained Meyer's other goals, which are educating the general public and making them understand the urgency and importance of their movements. Unlike previous tenants' movements, they published a book to expose the irrationality and corruption of urban redevelopment. The book vividly describes the problems residents suffer from by relating their experiences (NCPO, 2012a). In addition, the NCPO was invited to the 2012 Seoul Social Policy Exhibition and ran a booth to explain its movement to people who are not directly involved with urban redevelopment. However, these attempts have not been effective at drawing attention from the general public. This is because they are quite weak in terms of financing and organisation.

Firstly, their funding structure is very vulnerable, since it totally relies on participants' donations and there is no subscription system. They cannot get financial support from the state like other NGOs and NPOs, and they have not tried fundraising among ordinary citizens. Secondly, it is not possible for them to hire paid professional activists due to their low budgets, so they have to depend on the voluntary efforts of property owners standing against urban redevelopment. Nevertheless, individual participation is inevitably weakened by the demands of career and family. It is also difficult for property owners to continue taking part after the case they are concerned with is resolved. This makes it hard to keep these movements going in a systematic way. Because of these weaknesses, property owners struggling against urban redevelopment are likely to be defeated by POARs backed by chaebol-owned construction companies with secure financial backing. In particular, when resistance lasts for a long time it is more difficult to maintain collective movements. Thirdly, their demands have focused more on their individual property rights than general housing rights or whole communities. Social activist 2 with the KCHR commented on this in an interview:

“Property owners-led opposition movements have affected the emergence of the new urban redevelopment policy, ‘Building Communities Project’, to some extent, but participants are not totally in favour of the new urban redevelopment paradigm which focuses on residents not property owners.”

This makes it difficult for the present property owners' opposition movements to obtain support from the general public. Therefore, these movements can be seen as new Not In My Back Yard movements, associated with particular stakeholder groups. The 1980s tenant movements gained

significance as social movements, although they were in a very weak position in urban politics. Since they allied themselves with other social movements, such as those led by university students in pursuit of a democratic society, tenant movements formulated their demands and made the state create new laws for tenants' housing rights and to help people who needed affordable housing. Without ordinary citizens' participation, it is not easy to maintain social movements and make them part of broader political movements. Property owners against urban redevelopment cannot achieve their goals unless they have public support. Accordingly, property owners' opposition movements need a universal approach to represent the masses that have suffered from the lack of decent and affordable housing; this is more crucial than representing their own interests and property rights. Property owners' opposition movements need to offer a clear vision of how the urban redevelopment system should be reorganised for the benefit of all citizens, as this will allow the formation of anti-urban redevelopment coalitions. Restructuring the 30-year-long ideology of urban redevelopment, which can be explained by the term coined by Logan and Molotch (1984:484), "value free development (development is good for all)", is key to transforming the current urban redevelopment system for the benefit of the general public and those who participate in property owners' opposition movements.

8.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has provided a fresh look at anti-gentrification movements in the context of contemporary anti-urban redevelopment movements led by property owners. It has also uncovered characteristics of these movements which clearly do not fit into the mould of previous anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea. This chapter has revealed a complex picture of property owners-led opposition movements. In order to assess these movements' influence on social and political changes, it is crucial to contextualise the background of the urban redevelopment system. Historically, urban redevelopment in Korea has been overwhelmingly controlled by stakeholders in search of big profits from redevelopment born out of wholesale demolition. Korean urban redevelopment has been dominated by a business-like system over the last three decades, since the state has emphasised economic development

and cities have been regarded as engines of economic growth. The state has shifted the costs of urban redevelopment and housing provision from the state to the private sector. There has been no holistic approach to socio-economic problems in distressed areas because of the expectation of a trickle-down effect. However, the fruits of urban redevelopment and economic growth have not been equally distributed to all people nor filtered down to all of society. This approach has widened the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'.

However, owner-occupiers in property owners' opposition movements have recognised the internal contradictions of the urban redevelopment process. The case of the property owners' opposition movements has demonstrated that, as in the West, urban social movements have played a role in changing the urban restructuring processes. Even though the characteristics of the new social movements are ambiguous, complex and contradictory, these movements have undoubtedly hindered and changed the direction of urban redevelopment. These collective movements have introduced a new urban redevelopment paradigm. In addition, the state has taken a more active role in trying to solve urban redevelopment-induced problems. The new social movements have affected the future of urban redevelopment areas, since they are bringing into focus all the problems caused by urban redevelopment. In conclusion, the new social movements over urban redevelopment led by property owners have had a strong influence on the urban redevelopment system in Korea. It is difficult to conclude that property owners have discarded the ideology of urban redevelopment which has prevailed for the last three decades. However, new social movements create opportunities to rethink pro-redevelopment coalitions in times of low economic growth, and encourage democratic planning and citizen participation in the urban redevelopment decision-making process. Even though it is hard to give a clear account of the nature of new social movements, they at least suggest further integration of housing and property rights could advance the future of Seoul. In light of this, the next chapter discusses how to further improve housing and property rights, and build a better city.

Chapter 9: Whose Seoul?

“The current urban redevelopment policies [the New Town Projects] have failed. However, it is difficult to pinpoint whose fault it is, since urban redevelopment was initiated by the agreement of many people such as local state and property owners” (Prime Minister Kim Hwang-Sik, 11th April 2011 from *CBS News* (2011)).

This is the prime minister’s answer when he was asked who is going to be held responsible for the failure of the New Town Projects at a meeting with MPs (*CBS News*, 11th April 2011). His answer seems representative of politicians’ opinions of current urban redevelopment projects. As can be seen from chapters 7 and 8, residents in designated urban redevelopment areas have experienced many difficulties over the last decade, ranging from financial to emotional problems, due to urban redevelopment plans. However, the politicians who promoted urban redevelopment projects have not taken full responsibility for these problems and have failed to suggest any good solutions. Many participants in the property owners’ movements against urban redevelopment, whom I met during the course of the fieldwork, resented the fact that nobody has been or will be held responsible for the problems of urban redevelopment. As conflicts over urban redevelopment have been growing, the local state has introduced new measures to resolve them, as discussed in chapter 8. At the same time, there has been growing interest in finding an alternative way to conduct urban redevelopment and housing provision at both the state and grassroots levels. Recent attempts like the ‘Building Community Project’ or the housing cooperative movement undertaken by the state and civil society are stepping stones that will help to build a better city.

This chapter examines the characteristics of the current changes to urban redevelopment and housing issues as experienced from the state level to the grassroots level. It presents a critical account of the changes in terms of the socio-economic and structural problems of the urban redevelopment system investigated in the previous two chapters. The speed of these changes is very rapid and many changes have occurred while this research has been ongoing. The characteristics of these changes and successful case studies are not yet available at this early stage. Researchers can barely keep pace with new policies and their practice. A number of

research papers have provided anecdotal evidence on individual cases rather than robust critical analysis. However, this chapter hopes to offer a starting point for a wider discussion. Pahl (1974:186) has argued that “answering the question ‘whose city’ does not necessarily determine what is to be done next”, but this chapter attempts to suggest some political changes that could be enacted to make a difference based on the findings from chapters 7 and 8. Section 9.1 examines what needs to be done in terms of citizen participation in the urban planning decision-making process. It shows how citizen participation advances citizens’ interests against those of the powerful. Section 9.2 looks at the potential policy and legislative changes for tenants and owner-occupiers currently excluded from urban redevelopment processes. Section 9.3 investigates the evolution of anti-redevelopment movements over the last three decades and explores new alternative movements from civil society that challenge the dominant social power relations. Section 9.4 links the discussions of the previous three sections to Fainstein’s idea of the ‘just city’ and explores what sort of city people want to live in and what a better city might look like. Section 9.5 discusses how to make the city people want to live in by considering Lefebvre’s concept of ‘the right to the city’.

9.1 Citizen Participation in Urban Planning

Urban redevelopment plays the part of a secondary process parallel to that of industrial production. It is a compensating process: when the surplus value created by industry sinks to a low level, surplus value created by construction and speculative development rises instead. Urban planning masks this relationship and in so doing prevents not only a clear understanding of urban phenomena, but also the property use of the city itself. This is why planning must be subjected to a radical critique which in the end will refute the state, its strategies and its misuse of urban space (Lefebvre cited in Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975:9).

Lefebvre stressed the critical role of urban planning in order to prevent speculative commercial urban redevelopment. It is well acknowledged that the Korean urban redevelopment system causes many problems, as discussed in chapters 7 and 8. Social conflict over redevelopment is very complex, since the various interest groups and their problems are interrelated. However, the most noticeable and enduring problem is the undemocratic nature of the decision-making processes. Urban planning is theoretically controlled by the state for the public benefit. This rationale justifies the intervention of the state in the land and property markets. As was

discussed in chapter 2, the degree of citizen participation in planning processes can be linked to each country's history and culture. The Korean urban planning system has, for a long time, been used as a means of facilitating economic growth, as shown in chapter 5. Korean urban planning projects are approved by the local mayor after several consultations with the general public and expert groups have been conducted (Table 9-1).

Table 9-1 The procedures of urban planning in Seoul

Stage	Consultations	Procedure of urban redevelopment	Approving authorities
1	Public hearing Residents consultation (over 14 days) Seoul council consultation Seoul urban planning committee consultation and Seoul architects' committee consultation	Make urban and residential environment management foundation plans	Mayor of Seoul
2	Public consultation (over 14 days) Each Gu council consultation Each Gu urban planning committee consultation	Make management foundation plans and determine management areas by the mayor of each Gu	Mayor of Seoul
3		Designate an urban redevelopment area by the mayor of each Gu	Mayor of Seoul

Firstly, local people have a right to participate in the urban planning system since there needs to be some form of public consultation before an application for a new urban planning project can be made. However, there are not enough direct channels through which residents can take part in the urban planning process from the earliest stages. There are not many official channels for citizens to express their opinions except for the public hearing, the stage at which the state tries to designate an urban redevelopment district. Residents who are directly affected by urban redevelopment are not usually informed individually, so they have difficulties checking the

proposed plans and participating in the public hearing held by the local council. Even though they may eventually find the plans and want to give their opinion, it is impossible for ordinary citizens to review all the planning documents on their council's website or go to their council within the certain period²⁴. The public hearing and consultation with residents are carried out after bureaucratic officials have already made a decision (Kim, 2004). Even if urban planning officials ignore the views of much of the electorate, there are few official opportunities for people to make their voices heard on public policies. Citizens are still affected unilaterally by policies (Kim, 2001). Therefore, public consultation for a new planning application is just a formality and a more democratic planning system is needed to increase the level of citizen input.

Secondly, consultations are conducted with representatives such as local councillors, the local urban planning committee and the local architects' committee. Local councillors are elected as citizens' representatives. Therefore, it can be argued that the consultation with them reflects grassroots views and opinions, compensating for the lack of direct participation from citizens. This is true in theory, but not in practice. The process does not always take into account the views and wishes of the majority of the electorate. Kim (2011e:98) criticises the limitations of this form of consultation, since local councillors and mayors can profit from urban planning development and are sometimes developers themselves. According to a report from one NGO, 'People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy', 72 of the 106 Seoul councillors in 2006 had jobs and of these 18 had jobs relevant to the construction and real estate sector, which was the most prominent job sector represented (*Newsis Daily*, 14th July 2008). Implementing urban planning directly often means development, profit and money for them. They tend to be interested in intensification of land use and in favour of development, since they are members of growth coalitions. A city official who used to work in urban planning in the SMG criticised local councillors in his PhD thesis. Bae (2007:303) argued that the role of local councillors is to watch out for citizens' interests in local governments, but they tend instead to be representatives of their own political party. This raises a question around whether consultation with councillors really compensates for the lack of public participation and democratises the planning process.

²⁴ It is generally for 20 days.

Thirdly, the local urban planning committee and the local architects' committee are the last groups to be consulted²⁵. The members of these two committees are appointed by the mayor. Even though they make important decisions about citizens' property and housing rights, the names of the members are not available to the public to keep them from being lobbied and protect them from threats. However, the present mayor of Seoul, Park Won-soon, has published lists of the members of the urban planning committee and the architects' committee since 2012. Also the minutes of two committees have been published at the SMG website²⁶. The local urban planning committee of the SMG consists of 29 members. There are four civil servants, including the vice-mayor of Seoul who is the head of the committee, five councillors, and 20 experts.²⁷ The local architects' committee has a similar composition²⁸ and some members of the committees overlap. Experts take the majority of seats on this committee, so in theory they can review urban planning proposals properly without any vested political interests, unlike local councillors. However, it is also doubtful whether this committee actually promotes public participation and reduces the state's manipulation of the urban planning system. Kim (2011e:98) criticises this committee for playing the role of 'yes man', confirming development pressures and the demands of the market and the state. Also, some of its members could benefit from the urban planning system since they are involved in the building industry themselves.

In a nutshell, only a handful of people make decisions in the Korean urban planning system; grassroots views and opinions are not reflected properly in the urban planning decision-making processes. The mayor of each local government has power to approve plans, so their political interests and pressures could affect urban planning. If they do not agree with an urban development plan, it would never be approved and initiated. An urban planner working on urban redevelopment plans at the SMG pointed this out in an interview:

²⁵ These two committees are consisted at the SMG and each Gu government. Although the two committees at each Gu council level directly influence citizens' life and property rights, the Yongsan Gu Government (YGG) has not published them.

²⁶ The YGG has not published the minutes of the two committees meeting at the website, so citizens need to go to the council in order to check them.

²⁷ There were 17 professors at the department of urban planning and architecture, two researchers in two public research institutes and one lawyer in 2013.

²⁸ It had 23 members, including three civil servants, four local councillors, one lawyer, twelve professors and three CEOs, running architecture or construction companies in 2013.

“All detailed plans for urban development are prepared in advance every 10 years and we keep examining whether they are appropriate or not. Planning must be in advance before urban redevelopment areas are designated. However, the New Town Projects were announced before the formation of holistic plans. The New Town Projects were initiated not by long term urban planning, but by the former mayor of Seoul, Lee Myung-Bak, and MPs’ political promises and populism.”

An ex-urban planner working on the ‘New Town Projects’ also criticised the strong role of the mayor in urban planning in an interview:

“Although urban administration is managed by bureaucratic expertise, the former mayor [Lee Myung-Bak] announced many urban redevelopment plans for his political interests. There were not enough processes in place to investigate the effects of urban redevelopment projects. The New Town Projects ignored the existing urban planning system and legislation. Special acts or temporary acts not heeding the principle of urban planning should no longer be introduced.”

Social activist 1 with the Korea Coalition for Housing Rights (KCHR) also spoke of the limitations of the law and the strong influence of politicians:

“Laws are just a formality. Housing policy should no longer be used for politicians’ election pledges.”

Because of a politician’s election pledge, the ‘Hanyang Housing Complex’ that the SMG designated as the ‘first beautiful village’²⁹ in 1996 was demolished by the New Town Projects during the regime of Lee Myung-Bak, the mayor of Seoul. After the urban redevelopment plan in this area was publicised, residents in the village strongly resisted it using various methods, including legal processes, with the help of NGOs (Hong, 2006). They had a long established community and a strong sense of community, so they tried to protect their village and halt the unwanted urban redevelopment plan. However, their challenge was not successful. The Hanyang housing complex community could not challenge the planning authorities, and there was no place where the community could express its views. Instead of small houses and residents who have lived in the area and built social networks for about 30 years, the area will see tower blocks and an influx of newcomers. This case is a typical example of state-led gentrification which gives the community only a limited role in the redevelopment processes due to the overall pro-growth nature of the urban redevelopment plan. This shows that the state and local politicians have prioritised political and economic interests over citizens’ actual needs

²⁹ This title was given to communities where people looked after their neighbourhood well and had strong community ties.

when it comes to urban planning. Consequently, the outcomes of the redevelopment inspection undertaken by the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) are not surprising. The BAI announced that many proposed urban redevelopment areas in Seoul do not meet the minimum requirements for designation as urban redevelopment areas. The minimum requirement is determined by the amount of old housing in bad condition (66.7 per cent of total housing). One proposed New Town redevelopment area has no housing stock which is classified as old and dilapidated (BAI, 2013:13). Accordingly, it is not surprising that urban redevelopment plans have faced severe resistance. More than half of the urban redevelopment areas have yet to see redevelopment begin because of opposition and the economic recession.

The successor to Lee Myung-Bak, Oh Se-Hoon, included an area which is home to about 2,500 households in the Yongsan Global Business Development plan in order to move forward with his ambitious project: the River Han Renaissance. This was in spite of insufficient public consultation and experts' disagreement. This area was not included in the original urban plan, so this decision provoked severe resistance from property owners. It is claimed that Oh Se-Hoon's decision was one of the reasons for the failure of the Yongsan Global Business Development plan (*CBS News*, 18th March 2013). Likewise, if the mayor of a local state drives inappropriate urban redevelopment plans, there are not many ways to stop them. As a result, some urban development plans are decided against both citizens' and experts' opinions. As can be seen from this, political logic is stronger than the private sectors' interest in creating pro-growth coalitions in Korea, so urban redevelopment is driven by politicians' ambitions. These decisions result from the lack of public participation in urban politics (discounting the public voting in regular elections). Popular pressure through the party system is less developed in Korea, so there should be more direct ways other than the ballot box for people to have influence over urban planning.

Thus, it is necessary to envisage a more direct channel through which citizens can take part in urban planning. If a bottom-up planning system was created using the grassroots perspective, the negative effects of top-down planning could be minimised. This process of public participation is not merely a way of overcoming the limitations of representative democracy and the strong influence capitalism has over planning; it could create a socio-political arena for

sharing the city (Abbott, 1996), since citizens' participation means making agreements about what kind of values we should invest in the city we want to occupy in the future. Pahl (1970:193) argued that:

Participation implies that people should not only take part in making decisions about the physical environment, but should also take responsibility for the values implicit in planning decisions.

It is crucial to redistribute power from power-holders to citizens so they can decide who determines what and for whom and make a better city. After the new mayor of Seoul took power in 2012, he established a new committee consisting of ordinary citizens from various backgrounds. This committee has enabled citizens to get involved in the urban planning processes as partners. However, citizens' roles even in this new committee are generally merely advisory roles; it is considered a window dressing ritual unless the committee is as strong as the existing committee in terms of decision-making power. Unless these limitations are improved, the slogan 'citizens are the mayors of Seoul' is merely empty rhetoric. Most importantly, the local state has a strong desire to cooperate with citizens. As Marcuse (1985b:945) claims, how the system is run is what matters rather than the kind of measures that are introduced:

The major question is not whether gentrification can be controlled and displacement eliminated, but whether there is the desire to do so. This must ultimately be decided in the political arena. If the desire to avoid displacement is real, the means to do it are at hand ... If the desire is not there, no matter how perfect the available means, the end will not be achieved.

Therefore, citizens' real participation from an early stage in planning should be guaranteed in order to prevent and resolve social conflict. Citizen participation does not simply mean more stakeholder involvement in decision-making processes. Community based groups that discuss planning decisions must be established so they can create their own plans and act as a watchdog for the official planning system which pro-growth coalitions put forth. "Community-level land use decision", a concept which Marcuse (1985b:934) suggests, can prevent urban planning decision-making gentrification, displacement and eviction of existing residents. Marcuse's suggestion on the process of redevelopment could help to increase the benefits afforded to communities and residents. In the Korean urban redevelopment context, owner-occupiers and tenants should be able to participate in the decision-making processes that impact on their

community and housing rights; their interests should be protected over those of absentee landlords and the state.

9.2 Housing Rights for Tenants and Owner-occupiers

Even though the concept of housing rights is gaining popularity among policy makers and even ordinary people in Korea, housing rights have various meanings both socially and individually. Leckie (1992:4) defined housing rights in two ways. One is related to a house's actual characteristics: "its physical structure, the cost, location, and the infrastructure facilities supplied to it, the site on which it is built and legal security of tenure". This definition is close to outlining basic needs. In the Korean context, it is important to take into consideration her second definition of housing rights which is "the right to public participation and the right to determine one's own destiny in housing matters" (Leckie, 1992:5). Furthermore, the notion of housing as a social right is still unfamiliar, since housing has been treated as a commodity in the market under the family based welfare system; it has operated without sufficient support from the state for a long time (Kim, 2006e). There was no comprehensive welfare system under the 1970s and 1980s authoritarian developmental state, and the state did not take any responsibility for housing at that time (Woo, 2004:203). Lee (1999:26) argued that

For the authoritarian developmental state, the welfare component was to be kept marginal and legitimised only by the national goal of economic development, which is seen as the only ground for authoritarian rule.

The broad welfare system that was eventually introduced was based on "productivist welfare capitalism".

In the Korean case of productivist welfare capitalism, there is a heavy reliance on private sector delivery. Where delivery is undertaken by public-sector agencies, it is usually accompanied by high user fees ... The main objective of the social insurance system is to benefit productive sectors of the economy and to contribute to the smooth operation of the labour market ... One of its key functions was to ensure the suppression of labour activism and the direction of national energies toward productive activity. Consequently, only a very small proportion of government expenditure was spent on social development (Kwon and Holliday, 2007:243-244).

Therefore, social services tend to be provided in terms of a selective social welfare perspective and housing policy has also been implemented in this way. The state provides housing allowances and public rental housing for the least well off, but there have not been sufficient

efforts made to establish rent controls, security of tenure, and housing management for the general public. However, people's interest in the universal welfare system has been growing, as shown by the election of new mayor of Seoul at the by-election in 2011.³⁰ As more citizens have become interested in social welfare, the state now feels pressed to take on greater responsibility for society as a whole.

As outlined in chapters 7 and 8, the urban redevelopment system in Korea has focused on property owners and homeownership expansion. Therefore, while most of the people adversely affected by urban redevelopment are tenants they are not able to take part in the decision-making process that determines urban redevelopment policies. Even though the present mayor of Seoul has emphasised housing rights as human rights, there are still not enough channels for tenants go through even with the new urban redevelopment policy, called the Building Community Project. The organiser of Share and Future organisation taking part in the Building Community Project, which is a public-private partnership, said that

“Tenants are not interested in this project. Their property is not theirs and they will not provide money for this project. Absentee landlords also do not have any special reason to oppose this project, because their property value would increase after the neighbourhood is improved. Therefore, the main target of this project is owner-occupiers who have been living here for a long time and have experienced the sense of place. The success of building community projects is determined by the number of long term owner-occupiers.”

Given the absence of strong tenant protection legislation, even this new urban redevelopment policy could displace tenants because of rent increases. Therefore, slogans like ‘more participation from residents’ raise an awkward question: Which residents? Displacement of tenants cannot be tackled effectively without policies focused on tenants, since the current urban redevelopment planning and implementation system is controlled by property owners. Legal protection for tenants is necessary in order to protect their housing rights as a basic necessity. According to Jeong and Kim (2011:253), only about 12 per cent of tenants correctly know the legal rights and legal compensation they are entitled to. Since many tenants do not understand their rights, they cannot claim their legal compensation. Their claim ability depends on their age, occupation and education level. Therefore, it is important to educate tenants on what their

³⁰ The former mayor, Oh Se-Hoon resigned because of the referendum failure on the expansion of free school meals. He insisted on a selective free meal policy, but failed to obtain citizens' support.

housing rights are and how they can protect their rights before an issue arises. It may be difficult for the local state to arrange a face to face meeting with every household, but it is important to keep tenants informed from the beginning to the end and educate them about their rights and what they can claim. For the sake of vulnerable people who are likely to be more concerned about having to move home, the state has to get involved in this process.

Owner-occupiers' housing rights are also not well protected in the current urban redevelopment system. Even if the urban redevelopment is planned for the public benefit through a democratic decision-making process, dispossessing someone of their property without their full agreement and providing just compensation is hardly justifiable. Even if owner-occupiers are given just compensation and fully supported, the rehousing and clearance process is very unnerving for them. In essence, a house is not only a socio-economic commodity but also a place invested with emotional connections by individuals and families. Nevertheless, there is insufficient help from the state in the current urban redevelopment process and the compulsory purchase order and compensation systems. Firstly, Korean urban redevelopment planning is not fully democratic, as discussed in section 9.1. Also, urban redevelopment is highly controlled by speculative interests and is a process of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003). Much unfairness is woven into the urban redevelopment system in Korea, so owner-occupiers are likely to lose their social, political and economic rights because of urban redevelopment. As discussed in chapters 7 and 8, owner-occupiers against urban redevelopment have limited means with which they can change their future when the majority of property owners – often speculative absentee landlords – agree. Even though 75 per cent of property owners in designated areas want urban redevelopment, there should be a system of checks and balances to ensure that the process is truly democratic and that the opinions of the minority are respected. However, there is currently no system in place to help the minority in terms of legislation.

Property owners have the right to express their opinions regardless of whether they are in favour of or against urban redevelopment. Nevertheless, it is not easy to collect together hundreds of people for a meeting, so the first inaugural assembly of the H POAR, which I was present at, represented a good opportunity for property owners standing against urban redevelopment to

raise issues and put questions to the POAR in front of many other property owners. However, the POAR did not seem to be friendly and happy with hearing different views that threatened to affect the speed of their business operations. When I was at the first inaugural assembly of the H POAR, some property owners expressed different opinions from the POAR and wanted to discuss the issues they raised. However, their issues were not debated openly. The assembly was dominated by the steering group which is absolutely pro-redevelopment; 41 of the 62 attendees were from the steering group. Along with the undemocratic urban planning system, urban redevelopment is not run in a truly democratic manner. There is no place for opposition in the current urban redevelopment system.

Secondly, the property valuation figure assigned to a property listed for demolition is generally less than its market price within the Korean compulsory purchase order system, as discussed in chapters 6 and 8. No financial support packages are available to enable owners to keep their current financial situation and maintain homeownership. This dispossession is not only a matter of property rights. It affects owner-occupiers' housing rights as well. Owner-occupiers who do not agree with urban redevelopment have problems protecting their right to housing, which Leckie defines as the right to decide their own destiny in housing matters. Some owner-occupiers, especially low income rental landlords and owner-occupiers with small properties, have problems keeping their basic housing rights. All of these problems have arisen because the Korean urban redevelopment system pursues redevelopment to profit from selling property. The first and foremost objective of urban redevelopment should be ensuring residents can maintain the lifestyle they were accustomed to before redevelopment began.

Urban redevelopment should not be treated as a business for speculative investment or as a lottery, since housing is key to determining a person's wellbeing. Fundamentally, it raises an issue about the viability of the growth machine concept during periods of slow economic growth. We need to pay attention to urban growth management rather than just to urban growth machines (Gill, 2000). Redevelopment plans for the next decade should be formed for the benefit of existing residents and created after an understanding of the community context for sustainable redevelopment has been reached. Therefore, more supportive systems for residents

are needed. In order to enable community involvement in urban redevelopment, it is first necessary to create different ways of raising funds and changing the relationship between the public and private sector in order to adapt to a new environment. The public sector should become an investor in long term regeneration processes in order to reform landlord–tenant relations and provide decent homes to those who need them. Without the public’s financial support, community involvement in the urban redevelopment process is not effective at solving problems which are rooted in wider structural injustice.

Secondly, various approaches depending on individual communities are necessary for the success of the Building Community Project. A one-size-fits-all approach to regeneration is not likely to create sustainable development and instead just brings about physical redevelopment as the previous system did. It highlights that bespoke community support should be implemented in response to each different need. Community participation should continue, but more responsibility should be assumed by the local state (which is at a lower level than the Seoul city level or the Gu level) and this should be followed by tailored support for small areas. Without this, community involvement in urban regeneration projects cannot be successful.

Thirdly, long timescales are required to achieve the goal of urban redevelopment as it should involve both socio-economic and physical improvement. Urban redevelopment can have a less negative impact on residents when it unfolds over a long period and causes minimal disruption. Redevelopment has aimed to achieve tangible results within a short timeframe, so physical redevelopment has been prioritised. Community-led redevelopment should involve a range of local groups generating access and influence, so it will take longer to see tangible differences compared to the previous top-down form of redevelopment. Unless this progress is made, new policies, whatever they are called (the New Town Project or the Building Community Project), will just be new euphemisms for the long-established Korean style of urban redevelopment which results in various injustices to individuals and communities.

9.3 Seeking Alternatives at the Grassroots Level

Choice is part of democracy, but few options for housing consumption have been available. Koreans have been forced to either buy a flat or deal with highly insecure private tenancy, paying high private rents. Private landlords have not taken social responsibility, but there has been no alternative to the rental market since social housing and housing associations do not exist in Korea as they do in the West. Also, residents living in a dilapidated area where urban redevelopment is needed have had few options. State- and capital-led urban redevelopment has galvanised residents into collective action. Social organisations, which originated in the 1980s, and democracy action groups have joined together with displaced residents to protest against a variety of urban redevelopment and housing issues. Social organisations have kept pace with urgent social issues which evictees and displaced residents face directly. However, the 1980s tenant movements and the current property owners' opposition movements have, to some extent, changed the focus from the city's exchange value to its use value. The transformation of urban social movements over urban redevelopment in Korea can be divided into three waves, as shown in Table 9-2. As discussed, the evolution of urban redevelopment has affected the dynamics of anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea. All the waves can be connected to the type 4 defensive movement suggested by Pickvance's (1985) typology, which is a direct response to demolition, eviction and financial losses as suffered by protesters in a crisis situation. In the first wave, the state was directly involved in slum clearance so urban poor groups confronted the state to safeguard their basic human needs. However, few collective social protests took place and no significant progress was made because of state repression.

Table 9-2 The transformation of anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea

	The first wave	The second wave	The third wave
Period	Before 1983	1983–2002	After 2003
Conflict relations	The state vs. the urban poor	Tenants vs. the POAR Tenants vs. the state	The POAR vs. property owners The POAR vs. the state Property owners vs. the state Tenants vs. the state Tenants vs. the POAR
Goals	Keep basic necessities	Keep basic necessities and housing rights Social justice	Keep basic necessities and housing rights Keep property rights Social justice Control and management of urban redevelopment
Strategies	A few collective social protests	Collective social protests Establish evictees' own centralised social organisations Support from religious groups and student groups	Collective social protests Establish property owners' own centralised organisations Support from various social institutions Form relationships with political parties Lobby politicians and litigation
Outcomes	Repression by the state	Introduce compensation packages and social housing Improve tenants' rights	Halt urban redevelopment in some areas Introduce new urban redevelopment policies Change urban redevelopment paradigm Indirectly influence election for new mayor of Seoul
Pickvance's typology	Type 4	Type 4 Type 1 Type 2	Type 4 Type 2 Type 3

After the introduction of the Joint Redevelopment Project policy, a second wave of collective anti-urban redevelopment movements occurred. Property owners and construction companies became the main actors in the process of eviction and demolition, and the state did not directly take part in the process. This resulted in a new conflict relationship: tenants vs. property owners. Since the Joint Redevelopment Project policy was enacted on a large scale, many people across Seoul were affected. Thanks to the democracy movements and support from progressive groups, anti-urban redevelopment movements made progress in terms of improving compensation packages and social housing. The second wave led to state intervention in housing provision and housing consumption for the poor (Type 1) and movements in this wave expanded their goals from provision of housing to access to housing after the state took action (Type 2).

In the third wave, more conflict relations were produced between different interest groups. The state has promoted large scale urban redevelopment 'New Town Projects' through deregulation since 2003. The new policy displaces even owner-occupiers, so owner-occupiers have played an important role in new anti-urban redevelopment movements. Owner-occupiers' movements have had a significant impact on the introduction of new urban redevelopment policies. Their movements have tried to get power over and control of urban redevelopment (Type 3). These movements, from the first wave through to the third wave, are mainly self-help movements and have various limitations that keep them from developing into a larger framework that can enact fundamental change. Tenants' and owner-occupiers' activism has made progress in developing strategies to address the adverse effects of market-driven urban redevelopment, and has led to policy changes and new legislation. However, their activism has not seen the creation of new alternatives to existing society, alternatives which could create better and stronger communities capable of standing against market-driven redevelopment.

In contrast, new movements within civil society have recently emerged in order to build an alternative urban redevelopment system and change the conventional concepts of housing and urban redevelopment. Even though the state has attempted to solve various problems, there are still gaps between what people want and what the state does. Therefore, new grassroots social movements have emerged. Urban regeneration with social (e.g. Sansae village) or community

interest (e.g. Jangsu village) enterprises and housing cooperative movements with community land trust organisations (e.g. Housing Coop) are some of the new movements to have emerged. These aim to provide affordable housing with secure tenancy and decent jobs to low income households through self-sustaining programmes. These new attempts could offer a new approach and a social alternative to the prevalent bureaucratic, top-down managed and capital driven systems. This new form of housing consumption and provision through housing cooperatives and new urban redevelopment methods could be one strategy which makes it possible to realise consumer control over housing on the basis of need rather than producers' interests and speculator profiteering. These movements also offer tenants an alternative housing tenure system instead of the current unfair system. Accordingly, people can control their homes and not vice versa. Tenants and some owner-occupiers, who have hardly been involved in existing housing and urban redevelopment policies, can become empowered to collectively control their neighbourhoods and their communities can be rebuilt in a cooperative way. These urban social movements are growing more successful. Therefore, there is potential for the Coin Street and Eldonian Village cases to be replicated in Korea.

These new attempts are still minority movements and in their early stages, but they are valuable starting points that make it possible to think about what kind of the city we want to live in and how to reshape our cities by ourselves. These grassroots movements potentially stand to create fundamentally different cities and change people's day to day lives, since each movement has led to general questions in society about inequality and unfairness. The answer to these issues is a just society which guarantees distributive justice and makes greater socio-spatial equality a reality. As a result, new topics such as economic democracy, universal welfare and housing rights are receiving greater attention and discussion of them stands to help create a more equitable, just and democratic society for the 'have nots': a better society in socio-economic, political and spatial terms. This new grassroots approach could be effective at tackling wider structural inequality which has resulted in unequal resource allocation for economic growth over the last half century.

9.4 What Kind of City Do We Want to Live in?

The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from the question of what kind of people we want to be, what kinds of social relations we seek, what relation to nature we cherish, what style of life we desire (Harvey, 2007:15).

As Harvey stressed, the city is the totality of our social relations rather than a physical structure (Lefebvre, 1991). Therefore, urban transformation is the reflection of our changing lives and social relations. More attention is being paid by Korean society to socio-spatial justice and inequality. Several meaningful attempts to create better housing policies and urban planning approaches have been made by the state and at the grassroots level. The existing system and government directives are still powerful, but social values are changing and a different city and society are being demanded. Some participants in the tenant movements commented on their changing social values over the course of their protest. Some of them take part in others' protests even after finishing their own protests. One protester with the National Coalition for Victims of Forced Evictions (NCFE) stated that

“Ordinary citizens trust that the state is fair and helps vulnerable people. However, I realised that this is not true while protesting. We have experienced lots of unfairness. For example, when we demonstrated in front of our local council, we were not allowed to enter that building to use the toilet. We are not citizens, but nuisances to the local state, because we are against urban redevelopment plans. Whenever we complained about unjust urban redevelopment processes and asked for some solutions from the local and central state, we got an awful answer that they can do nothing, because there is no law to help us. Does that make sense? Why do they try nothing to improve laws for citizens? When we had a physical fight with thugs sent from the POAR and construction companies, policemen turned up but they did nothing to protect us from them. We have been treated inhumanely since we started this protest. Therefore, many people gave up and there's only me left. It is very lonely, but I will keep doing this. Of course, when we started our protest, the main reason was to get more compensation. However, I am not bothered about money at the moment. What I am now concerned about is changing the law and constructing a more just society.”

The social activist with the South Korean Federation Against Housing Demolition (SFHD) also expressed her changing values:

“Before I experienced urban redevelopment, I thought protesters were problems. After I became a victim of urban redevelopment projects, I realised what the problems are, and have mistrusted the authorities' power. I have seen many people who were evicted or are at risk of eviction through this movement. I was furious about this at first, but later become terrified at how unjust this society has been for a long time. I still take part in this movement even though my case has been solved, since society is still unfair. It is important to solve each case, but it is more important that we transform our society into a more democratic one for ordinary citizens.”

The founder of the Seoul Council of the Centre for Victims of Forced Evictions (SCFC) stated that

“Compared to the early 1990s, when I organised opposition against urban redevelopment, there has been some progress. However, the fundamental problem still remains. I am in my 70s, but I still go to the place where evictees protest. After I watched the news about the Yongsan incident, I went there.”

Some participants in the property owners’ opposition movements, whose opposition to redevelopment can be seen as contingent rather than fundamental, have also continued taking part in movements after their problems were resolved. Social activist 1 in the Nationwide Coalition for Housing Countermeasures (NCHC) said that

“In the beginning when I got involved in this movement, I got close to divorce because of financial difficulties. It was really hard to do my work with this activity at the same time. I tried to stop this activity after solving my problems. However, it was not easy to do since many people have asked me to help them and share my experiences. When my children ask me my job, I cannot answer correctly. I cannot say I am either a redevelopment expert or a social activist. However, it is necessary to change the law for a better society.”

The organiser of the Nationwide Coalition of Property Owners for Immediate Counteraction to Urban Redevelopment (NCPO) has already had his house demolished, so he has nothing to gain personally from property owners’ opposition movements. In spite of this, he has devoted his time to others to call for fundamental change. The implication drawn from these dialogues is that some citizens who were previously politically inactive have now changed their views. Their interests have been sacrificed by the state and capital, but they thought they could do little about it. However, these citizens have taken action to protect their homes and property. Some of these citizens have opened their eyes and discussed what our society should be like and how to change it. The concept of a better society and city needs to be defined. In the contexts of both anti-urban redevelopment movements and alternative movements, citizens have drawn explicit attention to their rights, which have been narrowly defined and constituted even in the democratic local government system. They have insisted on fair urban policies which are not skewed in favour of particular groups in the name of the majority and have pushed for equal participation in decision-making and more concern for the least well off.

The better city and society discussed by the interviewees above and new alternative movements from civil society discussed in section 9.3 embrace Fainstein's (Fainstein, 2006, 2009, 2010) concept of the just city, or the concept of the good city which Friedmann (2000) outlined. Fainstein and Friedmann identify what needs to be done on a practical level in order to realise their utopian thinking. The principles discussed below provide a substantial idea of what needs to be done in light of the current urban context in Korea. In the first instance, Friedman (2000) argues that material equality, citizens' autonomy and good governance are the minimum conditions for a good city:

The good city, as I imagine it, has its foundations in human flourishing and multiplicity. Four pillars provide for its material foundations: housing, affordable health care adequately remunerated work and adequate social provision. And because process cannot be separated from outcome, I also delved into the question of what a system of good governance might look like, attempting a thumbnail description of such a system. The protagonist of my visioning is an autonomous, self-organizing civil society, active in making claims, resisting and struggling on behalf of the good city within a framework of democratic institutions (Friedmann, 2000:471).

Fainstein (2010) suggests three elements, equity, democracy and diversity, are necessary to realise urban justice. She proposes more detailed guidelines in planning and policy making at the local level. She reiterates egalitarian policy directives for the least well off in housing and urban redevelopment and underlines the importance of citizen activism when it comes to the development of just policies (Fainstein, 2010:181). Fainstein's just city and Friedmann's good city can both be summarised as a city which provides subordinated citizens opportunities to self-govern the democratic production of urban spaces and resist profit-driven urbanisation processes. There is still a long way to go before the just city is realised in Korea, since urban justice protected by equity, democracy and diversity has not yet to be fully realised in the country.

In general, citizens have been given more chances to participate in decision-making processes relating to urban space in Korea since the success of the democracy movements of the 1980s and 1990s. However, the corporate sector's power to restructure urban spaces has continued to strengthen and the state's power has not weakened. Although Korea has developed an electoral political system, citizens' rights to make claims to the city have not influenced decision-making powers. This is due to the fact that the interests of governments and corporate sectors in

reshaping cities are deemed more important than those of citizens. Citizens need to become more active in resisting urban restructuring against their wishes. However, it is not easy to realise the just city in Korea due to the legacy of the developmental authoritarian state and the strong influence of capital. The strong state and market have historically reflected societal and political traditions in Korea. Although political democracy, which covers the right to free speech and the right to choice, was guaranteed after the 1987 democratisation movement, it has not guaranteed the right to be heard. Even though these rights are as legitimate as the principle of democracy, democracy in Korea is not strong enough to produce widely shared prosperity and protect these rights.

Oppression from a tyrannical military government is no longer a factor due to the demise of the military government in 1987. In contrast, the legacy of its oppression in Korea is embedded in everyday life, especially in the form of powerlessness; it came through in the interviews when people spoke of their powerlessness in relation to urban redevelopment processes. The concept by Young (1990) of structural injustice and oppression has been prevalent in Korean society. This phenomenon has been related to the lack of local autonomy and citizens' lack of influence over local politics. Cho (2013) argued that democracy in Korea has been in progress in terms of procedural democracy, but that democracy after the 1987 democratisation movement has become conservative and formal. Citizens have elected mayors and representatives for local councils, so they seem to have had more power over urban development in recent years.

However, citizens still have insufficient power. Urban development and housing have been under the control of the rent based classes of the local state. Established conservative groups³¹ have played a distinctive and important role in local governance systems and citizens do not have enough channels through which they can directly participate. These rent based classes are in fact local growth coalitions and these local growth coalitions have used urban redevelopment as a way to accumulate wealth. Local autonomy has not been effective at realising citizens' liberty and equality, concepts which are the essence of democracy (Cho, 2013:145). Consequently, oppression still prevails through daily practices and produces injustice and

³¹ It consists of people who affect local politics such as landlords, bureaucratic elites, locally rooted corporation owners, local newspaper owners and so on.

unfairness in the name of democracy. This sometimes results in violations of human rights, but it is difficult to eliminate the cycle of oppression due to its self-perpetuating nature. Accordingly, democracy, autonomy and equality, even in the democratic Korea, have come under attack or had to retreat due to state and market pressures. A more democratic system is the first and foremost step necessary to allow for the creation of the just city in Korea. In order to transform the Korean quasi-democracy, everyday democracy and active citizenship are suggested as ways to improve local autonomy and individuals' participatory rights in local politics.

In this context, the unprecedented protests by property owners and new attempts by civil society and the local state to implement a new urban redevelopment system have important implications in realising the principles of the 'just city' in Korea. Although it is too early to answer whether the Korean urban planning and urban redevelopment paradigms have really changed, these recent movements in citizens' participation and urban redevelopment are creating opportunities and new outcomes in urban redevelopment institutions. Anti-urban redevelopment protesters in the 1980s and 1990s experienced bitter and violent oppression and were without appropriate official channels and instruments to express their views. In contrast, the recent social movements have made progress in building official channels with the state, and there have been no expressions of violence between the two. These new developments can be understood with reference to political changes in the SMG, which gives more consideration to the preference of citizens. Property owners are rather active in gathering to protect their own narrow interests, and their protests against urban redevelopment cannot be dissociated from the 2008 economic crisis. Nevertheless, the analysis of the recent collision between the old system and civil society shows the future possibilities of alternative urban redevelopment which would provide more choices, equity and flexibility.

Opposition movements led by property owners have highlighted the tokenistic involvement of residents over urban redevelopment. They have emphasised individual and collective self-determination in urban redevelopment processes and initiatives. After recognising the uneven balance of power, opposition movements led by property owners have demanded more citizen

participation (mainly from owner-occupiers) in order to challenge the injustice resulting from the actions of pro-urban redevelopment coalitions. The protests by property owners against urban redevelopment have had a limited but noticeable impact on urban policies, as discussed in chapter 8. The movements led by property owners have turned around the current urban redevelopment project in some areas and reversed the state's approach to urban redevelopment. Also, they have made the state more responsive to their needs. The state has been trying to find a way to mitigate the disadvantages of the Korean urban redevelopment system, and is listening and responding to the voices of anti-urban redevelopment groups. The movements led by property owners are responsible for the introduction of various new systems to improve citizens' involvement in urban redevelopment decision making. They have contributed to the changing role of the local state, and to the cooperation between residents and the state in managing urban redevelopment. They have succeeded in encouraging residents to become more involved in urban redevelopment areas and in the management process of urban redevelopment in their neighbourhoods. In this context, they have enhanced democracy according to the three criteria of Fainstein's 'just city'.

However, these movements have not led to community governance which involves all residents; only owner-occupiers are involved in decision-making. Also, they have not effectively developed the goal of their protests towards a fair distribution of urban redevelopment benefits for all. It is because they have not yet fully addressed the problems of ordinary people induced by urban redevelopment as a whole. They are not local community-based movements seeking more liveable and sustainable neighbourhoods and cities. Although there is not sufficient acknowledgement of property owners' demands for equity and diversity in the city, the movements they lead have helped to uphold those values in Seoul. In other words, although they have not reinforced or actively generated such values, at least they have prevented a worse situation. As discussed in previous chapters, the influence of current urban redevelopment programmes has extended beyond property owners' districts; since urban development has taken place on a large scale, its impact has been felt in other areas and cities. Disadvantaged social groups in those regions are affected in the same way as the residents in the proposed

urban redevelopment areas. As the movements have halted urban redevelopment projects in some areas, they have saved affordable housing stock for low-income households and prevented their direct and exclusionary displacement, disrupting the process of gentrification. They have saved different types of housing from becoming flat developments, and in so doing, they have preserved the diversity of the physical environment. These are not the outcomes which the opposition movements led by property owners had intended in the first instance, but they have resulted in protecting equity and diversity in the city to some extent.

The Korean urban redevelopment system has resulted in procedural, distributive and spatial injustice. However, the alternative movements and the new urban redevelopment systems the state has implemented have enhanced our understanding of what just urban redevelopment might be. The recent movements have tried new approaches to benefit residents living in urban redevelopment districts, not speculators or absentee landlords, who already enjoy more privileges. The local state and various social organisations have prioritised preservation and refurbishment, rather than tearing down community and housing, through focusing on community input and small-scale urban redevelopment. These attempts have been influential in changing the urban redevelopment system and the attitudes of the people towards the system. These implementations are still in their infancy, but the new approaches are pro-democracy and pro-equity. Although there is explicit attention paid to the values of democracy and equity, concern for diversity is rather implicit. The new approaches have made reference to diversity in the physical environment, but they have not actively addressed the need for diversity in social relations.

It is too early to conclude that all these movements will bring about fundamental changes to improve democracy, equity and diversity. However, they have drawn the attention of the state and society to a just city, rather than prioritising urban growth, and have offered the possibility of establishing an alternative urban development system. In particular, democracy and equity have been given greater attention, unlike the profit-oriented standard approach. Likewise, it is important to empower citizens in order to overcome structural injustice and achieve the ultimate goals of a just city. However, efforts to achieve this have been ineffective and insufficient

within the existing system. Nobody can deny the importance and potential of human rights and citizens' participatory rights, but it is difficult to protect them in practice. Most politicians listen only when listening leads to votes. Accordingly, urban social movements beyond the vote are vital. It is necessary to combine the limited citizen rights with the radical concept of 'the right to the city' which Lefebvre (1996) defined. The concept of the right to the city is helpful in developing and enhancing the capability of people so that they can make a difference in Korea.

9.5 Can We Make The City We Want?

During the period of compressed industrialisation, just procedure and process were ignored and the attention given to social justice and equality was insufficient. Collective value, effectiveness of outcomes and one-sided decision-making tended to be more important than individual value, just procedure and hearing public opinions (Kim, 2011f). This lack of political sensitivity to social inequalities was rationalised as a means of achieving economic growth. These tendencies have remained in place until now and have affected politics, the economy and social attitudes in Korea, even after the authoritarian state disappeared and national developmentalism weakened. Oppressed groups have never fought for their rights to the city in urban politics, and their disempowerment has been broadly accepted by oppressive groups. In particular, urban planning and management policies are led by power holders and some property owners, so oppressed groups cannot realise their rights by proposing and implementing urban policies that aim to protect the fundamental rights of all citizens. This can be recalled in the interviews where tenants spoke of their limited rights over urban redevelopment processes. Most surprisingly, many of the tenants I interviewed agreed there was a need for urban redevelopment in their neighbourhood, although it meant their displacement. One residential tenant expressed his opinion in his response to my questionnaire survey:

“In order to improve residential environments, clearance and demolition are necessary. Since I am a tenant, I have no rights to agree or disagree with urban redevelopment. From the third party point of view, opponents seem to be against it for more compensation.”

For this tenant, urban redevelopment is needed to create a better residential environment although he himself will not benefit. In that case, who is urban redevelopment for? It is certainly

not for tenants. All of the questionnaire survey respondents in the two gentrified areas indicated that they are in favour of the current urban redevelopment method (clearance and demolition). As shown in chapter 7, many tenants do not think they have rights in relation to urban redevelopment because they do not own property. Property owners also note that tenants have no rights to urban redevelopment apart from compensation. As mentioned in chapter 7, some property owners think that tenants and low income owner-occupiers have a better chance of improving their housing by using urban redevelopment compensation although they are displaced. Lee et al.(2013) also argue that their displacement can be seen as voluntary displacement, which people accept so they can pursue a better life using their share of the urban redevelopment profit. This is because displaced tenants and owner-occupiers move into flats which are considered better housing (Lee et al., 2013). They suggest that it is more important to develop strategies to supply alternative housing rather than improve the return rate. Their suggestion seems to be in line with Freeman's view:

If ... gentrification is becoming a widespread trend that represents the future of many cities, we should be thinking about how to manage the process to help us achieve a more equitable and just society (Freeman, 2006:186).

For Lee et al. and Freeman, it is better to manage and mitigate the adverse effects of market driven urban redevelopment and gentrification rather than oppose it. However, it is necessary to think about the 'just city'. It is not about giving more money or sharing the profits of urban redevelopment. It is more about how to protect people's self-determination and equality and create a just city.

The 'have nots' right to oppose urban redevelopment and participate in decision-making has never been taken for granted. This is because the right to the city has not been shared for the common good. The right to the city emphasises the need for changes to existing unequal power relations between the state-capital and citizens, and suggests it is necessary to enfranchise citizens, so they can participate in the process of reshaping the city for themselves (Purcell, 2002:101). The right to the city places emphasis on more direct participation from tenants and owner-occupiers in the Korean urban redevelopment process. The essence of the right to the city in the Korean urban context is recognising the rights of the 'have nots' and making their voices

heard. It is essential that tenants and owner-occupiers are aware of the full range of social and economic rights they are entitled to, so they can make their claims successful. In addition, it is necessary to make the 'haves' accept the rights of the 'have nots'. In the Korean urban context, they need to admit that tenants can take part in urban redevelopment as members of the POAR. To make a just city, urban redevelopment should become equitable development which will "be redistributive, not simply economically but also, as appropriate, politically, socially, and spatially" (Fainstein, 2010:36).

The concept of a just city can create a moral and political lever that social movements can use to argue for changes in the relations between the state and the market. Paired with articulation of the right to use and participate in the production of urban space, formulations of a just city can empower urban residents to more effectively make claims about access to space and the provision of collective resources (Connolly and Steil, 2009:12).

When the right to the city is connected with the idea of the just city, it can provide a good framework for Korean social movements related to housing and urban redevelopment, which are relatively isolated from other movements. Protesters participating in anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea have often been viewed as people making unreasonable demands. They have been blamed for delaying urban redevelopment and causing social disruption. Therefore, urban social movements related to anti-urban redevelopment movements have not been fully supported by the general public. In addition, various stakeholders around urban redevelopment and housing issues do not take collective action, despite sharing the same concerns. However, when the right to the city and the just city are applied to anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea, they can help to make connections with different social movements and give the just city a single voice (Boer and de Vries, 2009:1329).

Using the right to the city as a frame is regarded as the most successful option, since it could be a good method to make clear to both the media and key politicians what the social movements regard as the problems in the neighbourhood. Furthermore, inactive inhabitants could be convinced of the fact that urban transformations aren't something that just happens, but important issues that are vital to one's living conditions and something everybody can (co-)decide about.

A squatting movement called the Dooriban protest did realise its participants' right to the city in the Korean urban redevelopment context. About a year after the Yongsan incident, tenants running a small restaurant called Dooriban, in which they had invested about £50,000, were

asked to leave with only £1,500 in compensation. Chaebol developers sent people to evict the restaurant's tenants to allow scheduled demolition to take place; the tenants of Dooriban refused to leave. They started squatting in their restaurant and remained there for 531 days, ultimately succeeding in obtaining an alternative restaurant from the developers. Tenants in Yongsan and Dooriban squatted to achieve the same goal, reasonable compensation, but the nature and outcomes of their squatting demonstrations are totally different. What made the Dooriban protest a success and the Yongsan incident a tragic failure?

The answer to this question is sustained support from citizens who were not directly involved with urban redevelopment. There was a gap of less than one year between the two cases, but in the case of the Dooriban protest the free and active participation of many citizens from various backgrounds (students, artists, musicians and NGO workers) changed the approach of the state and a chaebol, and made the protest successful. Many ordinary citizens took part in the Dooriban protest, holding many different types of cultural festivals such as concerts, documentary screenings and poetry readings (Yoo, 2012). This represents a very different and new kind of anti-urban redevelopment movement compared to previous anti-urban redevelopment movements. These activities attracted people's attention and participation, and made them desire to help solve the problems induced by urban redevelopment. If more people take part in these movements, more cases like the Dooriban protest will be possible. The owner of Dooriban claimed that

“Ordinary people get morally indignant towards others suffering unfair dismissal or irregular employment, but they do not have same feeling for evictees. Ordinary people think development is necessary and they misunderstand anti-eviction protesters as profiteers. However, evictees' struggles are no less horrible than workers' struggles; they are more distressing and difficult. Please support evictees and protesters” (Hankyoreh, 2011).

These accounts indicate how social collaboration can make a difference. That is, differences in how society and ordinary people respond to displacement, eviction and demolition make people either “move onward or move away” (Centner, 2012). We need to strengthen solidarity and collective action against power-holders and develop community capacity in order to create a different city. After the success of the Dooriban protest, some struggles against urban redevelopment have had support from ordinary citizens and NGOs. This successful case made

more citizens conscious of the relationship between social justice and the city (Harvey, 2009) and realise how important collective action and alliances are to changing our daily lives. Even now, some citizens living in urban redevelopment areas still struggle to keep their property rights and stay put; many of them are likely to fail in their fights against entrepreneurial local states and developers backed by big finance. However, more people have become aware of the urbanisation of injustice (Merrifield and Swyngedouw, 1996) which the past and present urban political systems have caused. More people have been seeking to assert their right to the city and control urbanisation processes by developing the right to the city. We are witnessing a small but powerful shift in the structure of urban redevelopment and housing provision, moving away from the state and capital having a monopoly on the process towards citizens sharing power. Persistent pressure from the grassroots level has brought about these changes, as Logan and Molotch have emphasised:

People can capture control over the places in which they live and critically judge the value of what they make and the community conditions under which they produce it by doing this consistently over time and place, diverse urban people can together build better lives (Logan and Molotch, 1987:296).

Changes in Korea are in progress, pushed forward by growing pressure from citizens who have lost their trust in the old paradigm of housing and urban redevelopment. There is no panacea for all urban redevelopment problems, since they are multi-faceted and fluid. However, the new changes are signposts that will lead to better solutions. The narrative of social activist 1 with the NCHC gives us a glimpse of our future:

“Social reforms such as industrialisation and democratisation in other countries proceeded for several hundred years, whereas we have carried them out over the last half century. The current social problems are the products of history. We proved our enormous potential through our development within a short time, so I believe our potential is the driving force for our better society.”

Development in Korea has arisen from the people's power, and social movements have been an engine driving development in a better direction. The present Korea is the product of the country's dynamic history. As such, dynamic power relations can improve Seoul and its citizens' quality of life for the common good, not for a few 'haves', when they are informed by the concept of the just city and the concept of the right to the city.

9.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has sought to unravel complex and shifting urban redevelopment policies and grassroots challenges to them. It has discussed what needs to be done and how to do things better. Over the last five years, there have been major changes in urban policy in the fields of redevelopment, housing and public participation in the planning decision-making process. The most representative example of this is the Building Community Project in Seoul which focuses on preservation and small scale regeneration led by residents. Along with this new approach to urban redevelopment from the state, new attempts at the grassroots level have been made in order to minimise the various problems caused by the powerful alliance between the state and capital over housing and urban redevelopment. People are challenging the wider capitalist processes of urbanisation. A variety of reforms have been attempted, with consideration having been given to universal welfare and fairness. Ordinary people, who have been marginalised from the decision-making process, should be empowered to self-determine their housing and communities. This is the just city. However, there is another question: How do we realise the just city?

Planning processes need be open to citizens who would like to take part in decision-making processes in order to influence planners. Also, public participation should be effective and able to prevent developments desired by the powerful against the public interest. This democratic planning process seems messy and tends to mean reaching social agreements takes a long time. However, interaction and participation from various social groups in the planning and decision-making process help citizens reshape power relations. It also helps to reduce potential conflicts. Nothing can be perfect from the beginning. Long term and steadfast efforts based on community perspectives can lead to the creation of a better city. It is not possible to create the just city at the city level. Support from the national government level is needed as well. Without the support of the government and adequate funding, citizen participation in urban redevelopment hardly makes a difference. It may not be possible to see the end of the battle soon, but it is not impossible to envisage it. It will take a long time to achieve, but the future is not dark. We are now searching for the just city and deciding what needs to be done.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

High economic growth powered by rapid industrialisation has totally transformed Korea from a poor country to one of the OECD countries over the last half century. However, this development was possible at the cost of losing community ties, local autonomy and the citizens right to choose. Socio-spatial justice was ignored in favour of rapid economic growth between the 1960s and 1980s under the authoritarian developmental state, and this growth can be closely linked to large corporations called ‘chaebols’ in Korea which was reflected in the spatial development process. This state of affairs has continued to the present, even though politics was democratised and liberalised after the June democracy movement in 1987. Uneven geographies of social power and unequal access to political decision-making have strengthened in parallel with neo-liberalism and globalisation. These socio-economic inequalities have been spatialised, so disparities both between and within cities have become apparent. Socio-spatial inequality can be linked to city planning and housing provision in Korea, a country which has failed to improve social welfare and redistribute economic growth. Housing and land have been seen as commodities and housing and land policies have been viewed as means for generating capital gains. In particular, the Korean urban redevelopment system introduced in the early 1980s has had a significant impact on spatial restructuring, social stratification and class mobility. It has caused large scale displacement, intensified socio-spatial inequality and triggered a rise in social movements.

The central aim of this research was to explore why many citizens have continued to be vulnerable to urban redevelopment processes such as gentrification and determine how to improve their rights. The overall research question is ‘how and why have anti-urban redevelopment movements evolved and influenced urban redevelopment in Korea after the Yongsan incident’. Taking four concepts, growth machines, developmental states, gentrification and urban social movements, the research questions have been explored through case studies with mixed methods in Yongsan, Seoul. Rich empirical information collected from lengthy

interviews and participant observation was used to develop a theoretical and conceptual framework suited to the Korean context. Thematic analysis was used to investigate the research question in terms of political economic perspective. Through data analyses, this research has constructed a comprehensive picture of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea. Firstly, this research shed the light on the political and economic factors underpinning the production of urban built environments in the urban redevelopment system in Korea. Secondly, this research revealed the nature, form and scale of gentrification, explaining the key actors and how their interactions affect gentrification. Thirdly, it unfolds the social consequences of new-build gentrification and links them to anti-gentrification movements. Fourthly, this research identified and reflected upon the ways in which anti-urban redevelopment movements have emerged and evolved. Fifthly, this research critically engaged with and identified future challenges in relation to political and legislative changes.

This final chapter draws together the main themes running through all the preceding chapters. Section 10.1 and section 10.2 summarise the research findings and consider the links between the theoretical framework and the empirical findings. Section 10.1 focuses on the nature, form and scale of gentrification and explains how the key actors and their relationships have affected gentrification in Korea. Section 10.2 sets out the nature, form and outcomes of anti-gentrification movements. Section 10.3 is a discussion of the limitations of this research and agendas for future research. This chapter closes with the contributions of this thesis to the research field in section 10.4.

10.1 Cities for Profit: Profit-driven Gentrification

The practice of urban redevelopment is a multi-sectoral affair, but there are three key players; the state, construction companies and property owners have all been highly involved in urban redevelopment processes in Korea. The redevelopment process has been controlled by a triangular partnership between the three key actors. They have pushed urban redevelopment for the sake of their own profits rather than the public benefit. The key objective of urban redevelopment is to build high-rise flats for sale after wholesale clearance and demolition of existing housing. The triangular partnership transforms neighbourhoods from areas with

affordable housing into expensive high-rise flat complexes for middle or upper middle income households who can afford to pay for flats. Since the triangular partnership has benefitted from redevelopment profits, they have driven urban redevelopment processes together over the last three decades. To property owners, urban redevelopment offers a chance to trade up for better housing and accumulate housing wealth. Construction companies can also profit from selling flats without any difficulties, since middle class demand for new flats is high. The middle class aspiration for decent housing and homeownership has made investor speculation a keystone of Korean urban redevelopment, since people try to secure their old age through homeownership and buy properties to rent them out under the productivist welfare system. While each key actor shares urban redevelopment profits, tenants are displaced; this is despite their forming the majority of residents in urban redevelopment areas. Urban redevelopment has worked perfectly as a form of new-build gentrification in Korea.

New-build gentrification in Korea highlights the spatialised nature of developmental states and growth machines. The most important driver of gentrification in Korea has been the state. The state has created pro-growth coalitions for redevelopment and urban growth, but it has more power than business groups. The state's strong intervention over land and building use has been vital to the facilitation of gentrification in Korea. In a capitalist economic context, the state's redistributive powers over the planning system mean that it is in a position to limit commercial redevelopment and share redevelopment profits with communities and the poor. Although the Korean urban planning system has been totally dominated by the state, the state has not used its planning authority to distribute urban resources equally. Instead, the state has created urban redevelopment policies that meet political interests and relieve it of its responsibility to provide housing and a universal social welfare system. The state has used its planning powers against the actual needs of the majority of residents in urban redevelopment areas, since urban redevelopment was designed to decrease the number of existing housing units and increase the quality, size and price of new housing units.

The state has the upper hand, since it has the power to reshape the future of the city due to its control over planning permissions and its increases to land prices through zoning changes.

Apart from urban redevelopment planning, the state leaves the rest of the processes to property owners and construction companies. Property owners act as agents of the state in urban redevelopment, while construction companies are the main financiers of urban redevelopment. They take all the responsibilities for the provision of social infrastructure and new housing, and provide tenants with compensation. The state is able to negotiate with property owners for a share of the profits made from redevelopment, since the state generated rent gap creates high potential for capital accumulation. In many countries, the state and public development corporations are the main statutory organisations exercising compulsory purchase orders for urban redevelopment, so the public sector has a responsibility to manage the clearance and rehousing processes. In contrast, the private sector deals with these processes without sufficient help from the public sector in Korea. This different structure holds the key to the future of urban redevelopment in terms of the implementation of CPOs, compensation and support systems for tenants. In a nutshell, the state's urban redevelopment policy itself facilitates gentrification, since the state aims to realise maximum profits despite minimal capital investment and labour from the state.

Like the state, property owners and construction companies also run urban redevelopment projects to get the greatest profit at the lowest cost to them; this is because they do not have any significant financial support from the state. Property owners and construction companies push through redevelopment as quickly as possible for the sake of profit-maximisation, and this leads to forced eviction and displacement. They exercise CPOs against the will of some property owners who do not want urban redevelopment, and force tenants to move out quickly. Since property owners and construction companies take all the risks of urban redevelopment, redevelopment proposals are sometimes changed between the state and property owners. Property owners and construction companies make more profit from the changes and share some with the state in return for changes to planning regulations.

However, urban redevelopment profit is not shared with tenants and the general public. Tenants in urban redevelopment areas are displaced with only a small share of the urban redevelopment profit as their compensation. Many non-homeowners who cannot afford new flats have

difficulties purchasing and renting affordable housing, because of the destruction of affordable housing caused by urban redevelopment. Although urban redevelopment plans create many problems for the majority of non-homeowners and tenants, there is no effective mechanism in place to enable them to get involved in the decision-making procedures of urban planning and have a say on housing policies. They are collectively and individually powerless in urban politics, so they do not have enough opportunities to change the Korean urban redevelopment system.

To sum up, Korean gentrification is not simply a reflection of the interests of the private sector. The state's short and long term interests have a profound impact on gentrification. The developmental state takes an entrepreneurial stance to promote gentrification at the expense of the majority's economic, social and political rights, claiming it is for the sake of urban and economic growth. Under the state's manipulation of land use and intervention in the property market, the private sector (property owners and chaebol construction companies) accelerates capital accumulation for its own sake. The systematic urban restructuring process driven by the state and capital in Korea is an obvious example of accumulation by dispossession.

10.2 Cities for People: Time to Act

There has been longstanding conflict between residents and the state over urban redevelopment in Korea. The urban redevelopment system in Korea is structured in favour of speculative absentee landlords and the state, whereas tenants and owner-occupiers do not have enough direct opportunities to influence urban planning for the benefit of residents living in urban redevelopment areas. Only tokenistic opportunities are given to owner-occupiers to get involved in the planning process, and tenants are excluded from all processes apart from claiming compensation. Under political and economic conditions favourable to property owners and the state, power has been held by them; therefore, many tenants have been apathetic due to their powerlessness in the urban redevelopment domain. For them, it seems like there is no point in taking action over their displacement since it is fundamentally non-negotiable. As the state has failed to act as an arbiter between conflicting interest groups or as a guardian of the public

interest, tenants have been displaced and suffered extreme stress due to urban redevelopment. The state cannot help but be criticised as an indifferent bureaucracy. In the meantime, whether direct action from some tenants has forced the reluctant state to change its policies is debatable. In fact, tenants' direct action in the 1980s made the state legislate several compensation packages and regulations to protect the interests of tenants. In spite of this progress, tenants are largely powerless and marginalised in the decision-making processes of urban redevelopment. They are more or less simply receivers of compensation from the state and their landlords. They cannot change the main mechanisms of urban redevelopment, which are absolutely skewed in favour of property owners and take tenants' displacement for granted.

It seems that owner-occupiers in urban redevelopment areas have more rights to determine the future of their property and their position in urban redevelopment politics than tenants. However, they do not have many opportunities to make or change the urban redevelopment plans that affect them. They just decide whether they want to initiate urban redevelopment and then follow the state's plan. Even if they are against urban redevelopment, they cannot protect their home from demolition and clearance. Owner-occupiers can be outvoted since speculative absentee landlords constitute the majority of a Property Owners Association for Redevelopment (POAR). Even if owner-occupiers want to stay put after urban redevelopment, some of them, especially low income or small housing owner-occupiers, struggle to do so due to the compulsory purchase and compensation system.

The property valuation figure is generally less than the market price. The increasing value of the proposed urban redevelopment land is not taken into account in calculations. This discrepancy and the building of much bigger new housing units result in low income owners and small housing owner-occupiers being unable to purchase new flats since they need to pay more for them. No financial support packages are available to enable owners to keep their current financial situation and homeownership status. As discussed, the Korean urban redevelopment system depends on construction companies with the capacity and ability to construct new high-rise flat complexes. Even if low income owner-occupiers and small housing owner-occupiers

cannot afford to return, they have a chance to improve their housing wealth since the exchange value of their property is increased by urban redevelopment.

Unlike past owner-occupiers, many current owner-occupiers cannot improve the exchange value of their property and therefore become victims of urban redevelopment, like tenants. Some of them have realised they would become losers through the process and have organised property owners' opposition movements to fight back. In the beginning, their opposition to redevelopment was contingent upon their capital losses and gains. Many participants joined for practical reasons to obtain a better deal for their property valuation and compensation. Owner-occupiers' motivations for supporting and opposing urban redevelopment are two sides of the same coin. This is because homeownership is a cornerstone of individual independence and security. They want to either protect their home from urban redevelopment or increase their housing wealth through urban redevelopment. However, many of them have realised the contradiction of the profit-driven urban redevelopment system which means it makes the state, construction companies, speculative absentee landlords and newcomers better off than owner-occupiers. Property owners-led opposition movements are now pushing the state to come up with a different scheme to help them, not the groups that have traditionally benefitted from urban redevelopment.

As property owners-led opposition movements have become more powerful and the adverse effects of urban redevelopment clearer, the state has introduced several new measures to help owner-occupiers and emphasised community-led urban redevelopment over commercial urban redevelopment. Although there have been some political and legislative changes to the system, the key mechanisms of the Korean urban redevelopment system – which involves the investment of high levels of capital from construction companies and speculative capital from absentee landlords – have remained in place. The fundamental cause of urban redevelopment related problems is the minimal provision of capital from the state. Unless the state increases its financial support, it will be impossible to make a community-led urban redevelopment system sustainable for owner-occupiers and tenants and prevent their displacement.

It is too early to anticipate the success of property owners-led opposition movements and alternative movements. In fact, there is ambiguity, complexity and ambivalence within the property owners-led opposition movements. However, these movements and the state's response to them reflect the changing contradictions of the distinctive Korean urban redevelopment system. The system is deeply connected to the overall housing system and depends on homeownership aspiration and wealth accumulation through homeownership, the productivist social welfare system, and the close links between the economy and the housing market in the developmental state. The Korean urban redevelopment system that has been in place for over three decades is now being called into question; since many owner-occupiers have begun to doubt the idea that urban redevelopment is a 'magic ticket' that facilitates wealth accumulation for them.

On the basis of this research, there is hope that the future of the urban redevelopment system will bring improvements. It is not possible to assess the political nature of the Korean urban redevelopment system, and whether it has passed the tipping point to focus on people and homes over profit and property. It is necessary to wait and see if fundamental changes are enacted for all. However, Korea is now standing at a turning point in determining a new approach to housing and welfare. The state needs to take a more democratic, egalitarian and redistributive approach. Consistent grassroots movements can recreate the urban redevelopment system in favour of the majority of the population and protect the least well off. Starting from the perspective of communities and making vital links with other social groups are ways to generate greater democracy and strengthen citizen power in the Korean urban redevelopment system. Improving people's awareness of the 'just city' and 'right to the city' concepts could lead to citizens controlling the redevelopment process beyond statutory participation. Grassroots movements may not generate massive changes, but they have great potential to gather momentum.

10.3 Limitation of the Research and Agendas for the Future Research

This research has constructed a comprehensive picture of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea, drawing upon rich empirical materials. However, this research cannot cover all the relationships and dynamics involved in urban redevelopment and anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea. It has not provided information on the views of chaebol construction companies, companies which are key players in the production of Korean gentrification. This research does not include the opinions of elected politicians, although they are key actors in urban politics. In particular, it is important to consider politicians who promoted new urban redevelopment policies in order to win elections. Another limitation of this research is the lack of newcomer views from the two gentrified case study areas. The state, rather than individuals, has played the key role of gentrifier as it has reshaped urban spaces according to gentrification processes. Even though gentrification in Korea is the result of structural factors, it is important to understand newcomers in order to understand gentrification. They buy or rent highly commodified forms of housing which only a few wealthy consumer groups can afford, so they enable the occurrence and continuation of gentrification in Korea. These limitations are the result of these groups being difficult to access. For this reason, further research into the roles of newcomers, construction companies and politicians in the Korean gentrification process is needed.

Despite these limitations, this research has covered various views and discussed the interests of a variety of groups related to the urban redevelopment process in Korea, unlike previous research which has tended to focus on a single type of group: either pro-gentrification coalitions or anti-gentrification groups. It is not usual to find pro-gentrification coalitions' own words in existing studies on urban social movements over urban redevelopment in Korea. In contrast, interviews, observational data and the documents on the board members of the POAR used in this research have provided a more holistic approach to understanding how they perceive their neighbours and urban redevelopment projects. In particular, this research has given voice to people whose voices are not present in existing literature: owner-occupiers and tenants who are often passive and silent in relation to urban redevelopment and anti-urban redevelopment

movements. They may form the majority of residents, as people who are displaced without presenting strong resistance. They could be a decisive variable to change the direction of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea.

In order to reduce inequality caused by urban redevelopment and hasten more fundamental changes in the Korean urban redevelopment arena, an official channel for the voiceless needs to be established. Unless they can participate in decision-making and planning, their interests are not likely to be taken into account in plans and decisions, since distributive and procedural justice are dependent on each other. Being disadvantaged in procedural terms has meant that they are not recognised in urban redevelopment planning and decisions. This research cannot generate direct policy changes to answer this problem, but it has provided an assessment of the current situation and potential new directions for urban redevelopment which could protect residents' social rights in terms of the right to the city and the just city. This suggests the need for research to discuss and clarify the current range of different models available; to examine the growth of social movements in housing and urban redevelopment in terms of the right to the city and the just city; and to develop practical solutions and inspiring ideas that show how people and communities are responding to gentrification and displacement.

10.4 Theoretical Contribution

Growth machines, gentrification and urban social movements, which have been conceptualised within the Western world, have been debated in light of a non-Western urban context. However, it is important to avoid generalisation and Western-centric assumptions, and Western notions of urban development. Hence, this research has been examined in the context of the developmental state and its legacy in order to give nuanced perspectives for creating theory or knowledge in Korea. The discussion of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea through these concepts raises important theoretical issues and helps us to rethink the division between the East and the West. This research has contributed to the expansion of knowledge of gentrification in non-Western countries, since it has yielded insights into the gaps in existing research and examined gentrification literature related to East Asia and the West. The final part

of this concluding chapter aims to spell out some of the implications of this thesis for the literature in this research field.

This thesis shed light on the role of the developmental state in the production of urban built environments. As the state has dominated the process of industrialisation and economic growth, it has played a critical role in urban restructuring in East Asia. Nevertheless, there has been insufficient research into the relationship between the developmental state and urban (re)development, as Sorensen et al. (2010:559) and Waley (2012:819) point out. The East Asian states have regulated land use for industrialisation and urbanisation to aid economic growth, but they, with the exception of Singapore, have not increased direct investment in residential development and community services. The Korean state has also been deeply involved in manipulating land values and planning in order to prioritise economic growth and interest. As the state has inclined towards capital accumulation rather than citizens' interests, it has directly shaped the division between winners and losers. It is very significant that, more than in any Western capitalist countries, Korean gentrification is triggered by urban redevelopment policies with the state's strong intent being the promotion of urban and economic growth.

Although the discussion of growth machines in East Asian cities has been relatively overlooked compared to Western cities, it has provided a powerful framework for the analysis of the state-policy-led urban (re)development in Korea. In the age of democratisation and decentralisation, the local state has more influence in urban politics. Mayors, local businesses and citizens have more room to voice their interests. Mayors in Korea have been empowered and have played a greater role in urban politics. However, it is worth noting that, in many ways, the local state takes a developmental stance and is focused on urban competitiveness for urban growth. The local state and the private sector have closely worked together for urban redevelopment, just as the central state and chaebols formed developmental alliances for industrialisation and national economic growth. Growth coalitions in the Korean urban redevelopment context are the local version of developmental alliances. Private investment in high-rise flat construction has been a product of the urban growth coalitions' attempts to maximise profit. In fact, this urban redevelopment has been delivered well under the rapid economic expansion and property

market boom which have been the main source of legitimacy of the urban redevelopment system. Strong aspiration for home ownership and property speculation has helped to maintain this long-established urban redevelopment system, as can be seen in other East Asian countries.

However, the combination of state policy and private capital in Korean urban redevelopment is rather unique compared to the West, or even other East Asian developmental states. The analysis of the gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea reveals important contextual differences in the urban political economy compared with the West and the other parts of East Asia. Generally, the state in the West (Watt, 2009, Lees, 2013) and East Asia (Chua, 1997, Chui, 2001) uses compulsory purchase orders to acquire land and relocate residents, and sells the land to developers who try to maximise their profits by building luxury condominiums and focusing on commercial development. Public assets and land have been obtained by the private sector and handed over to new residents rather than the indigenous population. Therefore, previous research in this field has tended to characterise winners and losers as homogenous groups in matters of gentrification: insiders versus outsiders, insiders versus the state, insiders versus developers.

In contrast, the role of owner-occupiers distinguishes Korean gentrification processes from those of other countries. Unlike other cases, owner-occupiers in Korea have shared a part of the urban redevelopment profit. Under the highly commodified housing market (with a limited welfare system), owner-occupiers have triggered gentrification in their pursuit of living in high-rise flats and improving their housing conditions. Owner-occupiers have opportunities to increase their property values and capitalise on them. They tend to consider gentrification positive, so they play a role as gentrifiers, although they are insiders. This difference makes Korea's gentrification a special case in an international context. Also, it has significantly affected the characteristics of anti-gentrification movements in Korea. Because of this rather distinctive role of owner-occupiers, protests cannot be generated as local community-based movements to protect the quality of the environment and neighbourhood against urban redevelopment and displacement itself. This finding has shown quite a different type of resistance that is not seen in Western cities. The results of my study strengthen the argument

that East Asian anti-gentrification movements are not based on attachment to place or ethnic and racial resistance, but on obtaining better compensation, as discussed in chapter 3. Furthermore, this difference draws attention to owner-occupiers' opinions on gentrification in the West and raises the question of whether owner-occupiers in gentrified areas are winners or not. It is rare to find research discussing owner-occupiers' views on gentrification in their neighbourhood. Most gentrification literature pays attention to tenants' issues, so owner-occupiers in gentrifying and gentrified areas seem to have been overlooked. This research has challenged binaries towards winners and losers in gentrification studies.

There has been a lack of research into the issues of civil society in East Asian developmental states (Pekkanen, 2004:363). This is an important but rather underexplored area of study. This research has raised inherent questions about the evolution of civil society in East Asia. When looking at grassroots movements over urban (re)development in East Asia, the institutional legacy of the developmental state needs to be considered. Social protests over urban redevelopment can be understood in terms of the emergence and development of urban social movements for fundamental social changes, not only for displacees' right to life. This understanding can be developed by examining the relationship between the transformation that broad urban social movements have brought about and political environments (for example, whether citizens can access resources of political parties or not, and whether citizens can establish interest associations or not). As the results of my study have suggested, many Koreans have had inadequate rights and entitlement to be involved in planning, monitoring and managing their own communities. It has been very difficult to bring about institutional transformation by collective action. Social struggles have not succeeded in changing dominant discourses of urban redevelopment since the developmental alliances and growth coalitions have overpowered non-owners. As the action of protesters has not been disruptive and not challenged the exercise of power to a greater extent, many people have been powerless to change the urban redevelopment system itself. Social protests have not totally shifted the urban redevelopment system, which is designed for the profitability of winners. Protesters have only

been able to help by obtaining better compensation packages and bringing about marginal changes.

However, the analyses of the opposition movements led by property owners and alternative movements in chapters 8 and 9 have implications for a paradigm shift in anti-gentrification movements in Korea to a certain extent. The analyses suggest that citizens are conscious of participation in controlling urban redevelopment processes. Although their characteristics remain socio-institutional in complexity, conditioning the extent to which property owners engage in anti-urban redevelopment movements, this case provides an important perspective on urban social movements over urban redevelopment. What makes movements led by property owners special is the magnitude of their claims and the roles that they have come to occupy in the anti-urban redevelopment protest politics of Korea. The current changes are in response to the crisis of the long-lasting urban redevelopment system which is the institutional legacy of the developmental state. These new movements have promoted alternatives which are more democratic and just forms of urban redevelopment. These new movements have gained a degree of input into urban redevelopment decision-making, which a few powerful groups used to control. These new movements have insisted on taking on the role of the state in local community services and provided infrastructures, which the state has failed to do. They have facilitated the state's focus away from the extraction of profit from urban redevelopment above all other considerations. This new phenomenon has generated pressures for a new approach to be taken. Despite the lack of collective identities within the groups and larger goals for the public, these new movements have placed a limit on the old system and made the state turn its attention to innovative policies that accommodate social justice. The debate over fighting for the just city and the right to the city in the developmental state has resulted in the suggestion that a more democratic and egalitarian society should be realised that will reduce socially structured injustice and inequalities.

In sum, this thesis identifies the similarities and differences between gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in the West and in Korea. This thesis has bridged theoretical and empirical gaps between the west and East Asia. The findings of my research could enrich urban

theory in East Asian urbanism and East Asian urban social movements. Revealing the multifaceted nature and path of dependent development, this thesis suggests that researching gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in different institutional settings provides a new perspective for the future comparative research agenda in this field across both the East Asia and the West.

10.5 Final Words

This research has captured a particular moment in the evolution of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea through the case study on Yongsan. This case is one of various urban redevelopment areas, but it has shown complicated and complex aspects of urban redevelopment and its effects on the everyday lives of residents. This research is a snapshot of what has been happening in urban redevelopment and anti-urban redevelopment movements, and identifies some principles for future urban restructuring. Many urban redevelopment projects are continuing and will continue in the long-lasting urban redevelopment system which is the outcome of the developmental state. The recent changes in the urban redevelopment paradigm and anti-urban redevelopment movements are contingent results of the recent political economic conditions: the 2008 economic crisis and the victory of the progressive candidate in the Seoul local election. Therefore, there remains uncertainty about the future direction of urban restructuring. However, at the very least, the research reveals that there are some positive aspects which indicate a better future. There are causes for optimism. Firstly, the progressive mayor of Seoul was re-elected in July 2014. Secondly, there are a couple of success stories about movements led by property owners. Thirdly, the new type of public-private partnership between the local state and NGOs has shared the risks and rewards of urban redevelopment. These current transformations could provide opportunities to make more decisions that are right for all; for this reason, it is necessary for urban social changes to be continuously observed and analysed.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Questionnaire with residents and accompanying cover letter

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Participation in a study of urban redevelopment in your neighbourhood

I enclose with this letter a questionnaire about developing new high rise flats in Yongsan. The questionnaire is part of my PhD research project at the School of Social Science and Public Policy at King's College London. The background to this project is that the Seoul Metropolitan Government and the Yongsan Gu Government have increasingly focused their urban redevelopment. For this questionnaire I am seeking information regarding how you think about urban redevelopment policies. Your household has been randomly selected, as part of an attempt to generate a general impression from the people living here. I should emphasise that this questionnaire is solely for the use of this study. Any information provided will be TOTALLY CONFIDENTIAL. My interest is with general patterns, and I am not seeking to identify for myself, nor in any report from this work, any individuals. I hope you will be able to help me with my research, as a high response rate is critical in order to identify general patterns accurately. The results from this questionnaire will provide a substantial element of this PhD thesis research, which when combined with other elements of my research, will help inform policy makers and local communities about the changes associated with the redevelopment in Seoul. I would be grateful if the head of this household could complete this questionnaire and return it in the stamped-addressed envelope provided. If you have any questions regarding this questionnaire or my research, please do not hesitate in contacting me.

Yours faithfully,

Lee, Seon Young

Part 1.about your neighbourhood

1. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree/nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Overall, I am satisfied in living in this apartment complex.					
I borrow and exchange favours with my neighbours.					
My apartment complex is indeed a community.					
Almost households in my apartment complex have similar socio-economic status.					
Overall, I am attracted to living in Yong-San.					

2. Given the chance, do you want to move out?

Yes () No () I don't know ()

In either case, please say why

3. Within the last couple of years, there have been large scale demonstrations around urban redevelopments from some tenants and owners here. In general how do you view these? Are you

Very favourable		Rather unfavourable	
Rather favourable		Very unfavourable	
never have thought			

4. Would you be in favour of or against the current redevelopment method (clearance)

Very favourable		Rather against	
Rather favourable		Very against	
never have thought			

5. How important was this housing type of Yong-San in your decision to live here?

very much	somewhat	so-so	little	very little
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6. Why did you move into Yong-San? Tick all that apply

- To reduce commuting time ()
- Convenient transportation ()
- Liked the area ()
- Convenient neighbourhood facilities ()
- For Bigger Property ()
- For smaller property ()
- Change in household ()
- For Investment ()
- Near to the city centre ()
- Others - details ()

Part 2. About your housing

1. Did you live in this area before redevelopment? Y () N ()

2. Where was your previous residence located?

- Yongsan - please give area name ()
- Gang-Buk - please give area name ()
- Gang-Nam- please give area name ()
- Gyeonggi-do - please give area name ()
- In-Cheon - please give area name ()
- Elsewhere in Korea - please give area name ()
- Not applicable - details ()

3. How many of the following people live in your home, including yourself?

- Number of adults (aged 18-65) F () M ()
- Number of Children (under 18) F () M ()
- Number of adults over 65 years F () M ()

4. What is the status of your residence at this property?

Owner () Chunse () Monthly rent ()

5. If you buy your house, which financial source is the most important to you?

Saving () inheritance () mortgage ()

Part 3. About you

1. What is your gender?

F () M ()

2. What is your age?

20s	30s	40s	50s	60s	Over 70s
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	----------

3. What is your marital status?

Never married	()	Separated by death	()
Now married	()	divorced	()

4. What is the highest level education you have attended?

None ()

Middle School ()

High School ()

University/College ()

Postgraduate ()

5. Are you employed now or not?

Yes, paid employment:	Full time employee	
	Part time employee	
	Self employed	
No, no paid employment:	Retired/pensioned	
	Housewife	
	Student	
	Unemployed	
	Not to working to incapacity	
	Other : _____	

6. Do you or did you supervise other people at work

Yes () No ()

7. Please specify your occupational sector

Managers ()

Professionals and technical workers ()

Clerks ()

Sales and service workers ()

Craft & related trades workers ()

Plant and machine operators and assemblers ()

others ()

8. Are the tasks you do at work mostly manual or mostly intellectual? If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means “mostly manual tasks” and 5 means “mostly intellectual tasks”

1	2	3	4	5
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9. How much independence do you have in performing your tasks at work? If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale to indicate your degree of independence where 1 means “no independence at all” and 5 means “complete independence

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

10. Are the tasks you perform at work mostly routine tasks or mostly creative tasks? If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means “mostly routine tasks” and 5 means “mostly creative tasks”

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

11. Your total monthly household income (salaries, rents pensions and other incomes) is approximately () Korean won

12. People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the

High	High	
	Middle	
	Low	
Middle	High	
	Middle	
	Low	
Low	High	
	Middle	
	Low	

Appendix 2 Interview questions with Residents in the H urban redevelopment area

About you

1. Social characteristics (tenure, rental cost, education, occupation, household structure, gender, age, income, marital status)
2. How long have you lived in this area?
3. Where did you live before?
4. Why did you move into this area?

About neighbourhood

5. How pleased or displeased are you with your neighbourhood?
6. Do you spend your free time with your neighbours?
7. To what extent do you feel your neighbourhood is a community?
8. Do you feel you emotionally belong to your housing and neighbourhood?

About redevelopment

9. Do you think this redevelopment is necessary and desirable?
10. How do you think about this redevelopment method?
11. Do you agree with this redevelopment? If you don't agree, why?
12. How have you tried to keep your rights?
13. What kind of resistance and organisation have you made if any? If not, why not?
14. Has anyone tried to organise the resistance. If so, who?
15. What factors have stopped or discouraged you?
16. Have you been offered any compensation? Are you satisfied with compensations?
17. Do you want to return here after redevelopment and what is the reason?
18. Are you satisfied with the decision making process of redevelopment?
19. Have you easily expressed your opinion to the local government and the landlord redevelopment cooperation?

20. Do you think that the local government supports the landlords or developers or the residents?
21. How do you evaluate the local government performance in redevelopments?

The board members and one leader of property owners association

1. What is the main purpose of this redevelopment?
2. Why do you agree with this redevelopment?
3. Why do you take part in urban redevelopment as board members?
4. What are the gains for you of this redevelopment?
5. After the redevelopment, what kinds of changes do you expect to occur?
6. What kind of compensation do you provide tenants?
7. How do you deal with resistances from tenants and some property owners?
8. Are you satisfied with the helps which the local government has provided?
9. What is the most difficult point to carry out this redevelopment?
10. Are you satisfied with the construction company?
11. Have you offered any compensation?
12. Do you want to return here after redevelopment and what is the reason?
13. Are you satisfied with the decision making process of redevelopment?
14. Have you easily expressed your opinion to the local government?
15. What do you think the new urban redevelopment policies after the new mayor of Seoul took power in 2011?
16. Can you tell me how things have changed in your organisation and movement after the Yongsan incident?

Appendix 3 Interview questions with policy makers and urban planners

1. How long have you worked about urban redevelopment? in the city or this area?
2. Can you briefly outline what your job entails?
3. Why was this area designated as the redevelopment area?
4. Why did the local government decide on this redevelopment method?
5. What are the local government's purpose and policy to perform the redevelopment for this district?
6. What is the role of local government for facilitating the redevelopment?
7. After the redevelopment, what kinds of changes do you expect to occur?
8. The return rate of existing residents after redevelopment has been problematic for a long time. What kind of policy do the local government have to improve this?
9. How do the local government help residents to understand this redevelopment?
10. What kind of plan do the local government have to support residents about moving, relocation, keeping their rights?
11. How do the local government try to keep public interest and regulate windfall profits from redevelopment projects?
12. What is the degree of citizens' participation? Has there been any change in time?
13. How do the local government try to encourage citizens' participation in redevelopment process?
14. Can you tell me how things have changed in redevelopment process after introducing new town project and the Yong-San incident?
15. Who are the main players involved in redevelopment processes?
16. What do you see as the main challenges in redeveloping Yongsan?
17. What do you think the new urban redevelopment policies after the new mayor of Seoul took power in 2011?

Appendix 4 Interview questions with activists in social protest organizations

1. How long have you worked in this organisation?
2. When did you join this organisation and why?
3. When was this organisation established?
4. Who set it up?
5. Were there key and organised, individuals who organised it?
6. How is this organisation funded?
7. How many people does the organisation employ?
8. What is the main purpose of your organisation?
9. Who are the other bodies/organisation do you frequently work with?
10. Can you give me some examples of main challenges your organisation face in achieving the aims of your organisation?
11. How have your organisation helped people having problems in urban redevelopment areas?
12. What do you think about the benefits and shortcomings of this redevelopment method and system?
13. What are the most important changes to help people who are struggling from redevelopment?
14. Can you tell me how things have changed in your organisation and movement after introducing new town project and the Yongsan incident?
15. What do you think the new urban redevelopment policies after the new mayor of Seoul took power in 2011?

Appendix 5 the information sheet and consent form



Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.

New build gentrification (NBG) in Seoul and its consequences for residential displacement and social protest: a case study of Yong-San in Seoul, Korea

King's College Research Ethics Committee Ref: GSSHM/11/12-29

Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.

- I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw from it immediately without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to the point of publication
- I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained to me. I understand that such information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the Data Protection Act 1998.

☐☐

Participant's Statement:

I agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves.

Signed

Date

Researcher's Statement:

Lee, Seon Young confirm that I have carefully explained the nature and demands of the proposed research to the participant.

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